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Abstract
This thesis analyses British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban during 
the periods the British government introduced and lifted it in 1988 and 1994. The 
orthodox position promoted by terrorism ‘experts’ in academia is critiqued for its 
propagandists approach to the political violence of state and non-state combatants 
and its legacy of normalising media censorship. It is argued here that the position of 
orthodox scholars on the mass media and ‘terrorism’ is ultimately designed to 
encourage and legitimise pressure against the mass media during conflicts so as to 
increase state dominance of public perceptions. By suggesting the problem is the 
‘oxygen of publicity’, it follows that the solution is the suffocation of censorship. The 
role of journalists in the propaganda war during the Northern Ireland conflict is 
scrutinised in this thesis to discover the extent to which media workers in the British 
print media supported and resisted British government direct censorship against the 
British broadcast media.
Combining content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA), journalistic 
constructions of the broadcasting ban in British newspaper articles are explored 
quantitatively and qualitatively. British newspaper articles representing the Northern 
Ireland conflict during the periods when the British government introduced and lifted 
the ban are analysed to reveal the newsworthiness of the broadcasting ban in both 
periods. The discursive composition of broadcasting ban newspaper articles is also 
analysed to reveal the discourses supporting and opposing the censorship that were 
circulating in the House of Commons as well as British newspapers and non-elite 
spheres of society when the British government introduced and lifted the broadcasting 
ban. A combination of textual analysis techniques are used to explain how these 
discourses functioned to build support and opposition to the ban, how journalists 
represented social actors expressing these discourses and how they were refracted by 
journalists through reported speech.
After analysing British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban, discursive 
and social practices impacting British journalists during the periods the British 
government introduced and lifted the ban are considered. An important conclusion of 
this thesis is that British journalists largely perpetuated discourses supporting the 
broadcasting ban. However, this is explained by the allegiances of newspaper owners 
and editors with the Conservative Party, the generic conventions of newspapers and 
articles, the reliance of journalists on elite sources, the weakness of media workers 
after Wapping and the decades of pressure on media workers to report the Northern 
Ireland conflict in line with the British government perspective, rather than because 
journalists embraced British government censorship of the British broadcast media.
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Introduction
The Northern Ireland conflict was conducted through a combination of war, words 
and silence (Rolston and Miller, 1996). Besides the obvious physical aspect of the 
conflict, mediatized discourses and censorship were inseparable aspects too. The 
thesis presented here examines a crucial period in which the Northern Ireland conflict 
shifted into the Northern Ireland peace process. It was also a period that saw direct 
censorship over the British broadcast media. The central focus of this research 
concerns the broadcasting ban (1988-1994) and how this direct censorship was 
represented by British newspapers. As the title of the legislation suggests, the 
broadcasting ban sought to control British broadcasters (particularly television). 
However, it is important to discover how the British print media represented the 
British government introducing (19th October, 1988) and lifting (16th September, 
1994) the broadcasting ban. There are several reasons for this.
Although several studies have analysed the impact o f the broadcasting ban on 
the British broadcast media (Henderson et al., 1990; Moloney, 1991; Lago, 1998), 
very little research has examined how it was represented by the British print media.1 
Those subscribing to democratic principles would hope that if one section of the 
British media was being directly censored by the British government, the remaining 
sections of the British media would defend the ‘Fourth Estate’ and its independence 
from the government. By analysing British newspaper representations o f the British 
government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban, it is possible to discover the 
extent to which national newspapers supported and resisted the ban. This will also 
reveal the stru ggles within the British newspaper industry, which impacted what 
journalists and editors could and could not say about the broadcasting ban specifically 
and the Northern Ireland conflict more generally during this period.
The broadcasting ban was the most severe attack on the British mass media by 
the British government during the Northern Ireland conflict and amounted to the most 
stringent control o f the broadcast media in Britain since World War II (Moloney, 
1991). The United Nations made clear that the broadcasting ban amounted to official 
censorship, ‘causing self-censorship among journalists, which reduced knowledge and 
understanding of the conflict in Northern Ireland’ (Hussain, 2000: 7). Such practices 
contradicted the notion o f Britain being an open and democratic society. Therefore, it 
is important to recount the history of the British mass media during the Northern
1
Ireland conflict by contextualising the British government starving the ‘oxygen of 
publicity’ from its enemies by introducing the suffocation of censorship. It is also 
important to explain the extent to which media workers resisted attempts by the 
British government to control the British mass media in this period.
The research questions of this thesis are threefold. Firstly, how much 
coverage of the broadcasting ban was there in British newspapers when the British 
government introduced and lifted the ban? Secondly, how was the broadcasting ban 
represented in British newspapers when the British government introduced and lifted 
the ban? Thirdly, how can newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban be 
explained by analysing facets of the production and consumption of the British mass 
media as well as power relations inside and outside the news room?
This thesis is presented in seven chapters. The first chapter reviews the already 
existing literature on the mass media and ‘terrorism’ to introduce and explore the 
debates in this research field. These range from the contentious issue of defining 
‘terrorism’ to its relationship with the mass media and the repercussions this has on 
media freedom. This broad introduction to the literature on the subject of the mass 
media and ‘terrorism’ provides a good starting point for understanding the way in 
which the British mass media was impacted during the Northern Ireland conflict.
The second chapter looks at this more specific research field by reviewing the 
literature that traces the way in which the British mass media represented Northern 
Ireland following partition, through to the beginning and end of the conflict. This 
involves analysing the relationship between the British government and the British 
mass media and how the former consistently attempted to control the latter by various 
means. It was through exploring this history that the research questions were 
developed as it became clear how little research there had been on British newspaper 
representations of the broadcasting ban.
In the third chapter, the methodological approach of this research is outlined. 
The research questions o f this thesis are rationalised on the basis of preceding reviews 
of literature, the method of sampling and data collection in this research is then 
explained, followed by an introduction of the Northern Ireland conflict subject 
categories used for coding relevant British newspaper articles. The rationale for 
combining content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) in the 
methodological approach is then outlined and justified, explaining how content 
analysis and CDA are used to answer the three research questions o f this thesis.
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The fourth chapter presents the research findings of the content analysis of 
British newspapers representing the Northern Ireland conflict in the periods when the 
British government introduced and lifted the broadcasting ban. These reveal that 
broadcasting ban articles accounted for a small amount of British newspaper coverage 
of the Northern Ireland conflict. In addition, the findings reveal that there was 
considerably more newspaper coverage of the broadcasting ban in the ‘quality’ press 
and during the period in which the British government introduced the censorship 
compared to the period in which it was lifted. Such findings are briefly explained in 
this chapter, but are more vigorously addressed in subsequent chapters.
In the fifth chapter, CDA is used to deconstruct the most prevalent discourses 
present in broadcasting ban articles and explain how these discourses functioned to 
build support and opposition for the broadcasting ban. All the significant discourses 
are explored by deconstructing and contextualising them using a combination of 
textual analysis approaches that focus on lexical choices, as well as the foregrounding 
and backgrounding of social actors and discourses. Intertextual analysis is also used 
to explain the origins o f the discourses and how they were refracted by journalists.
In the sixth chapter, CDA is used to explore a selection of individual 
newspaper articles representative of the ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’ and ‘quality’ 
newspaper genres. The textual analysis focuses on the most significant newspaper 
articles during the sample period in which the British government introduced the 
broadcasting ban and shifts from the general thematic analysis of the previous chapter 
to a meticulous sentence by sentence analysis. The way in which journalists represent 
social actors, their reported speech, and the discourses explored in the previous 
chapter is examined to explain how the choices made by journalists functioned to 
build support and opposition for the broadcasting ban.
The seventh chapter uses CDA to analyse and explain the discursive and social 
practices impacting British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. 
Beginning with the discursive practices involved in the production and consumption 
of newspaper journalism, this final chapter explores the processes in which the 
authors and audience o f texts draw on already existing discourses that shape how texts 
are encoded and decoded. The analysis is then expanded in terms of social practices 
and the role o f journalism in relation to wider society. This includes analysing and 
explaining government controls over the British mass media during the Northern 
Ireland conflict and the industrial disputes preceding the broadcasting ban.
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There are three interrelated general conclusions about British newspaper 
representations o f the broadcasting ban in this research. Firstly, the British newspaper 
industry did not consider the broadcasting ban particularly newsworthy. Secondly, 
elite social actors and discourses dominated newspaper articles representing the 
broadcasting ban. Thirdly, the majority of British newspapers overtly supported the 
broadcasting ban. Aside from these general conclusions, further conclusions are 
drawn from this research, which can assist in explaining such representations and the 
role of the mass media in society more generally.
For example, it is argued in this research that elite division and unity about the 
broadcasting ban impacted representations of the ban in British newspapers. When 
the British government introduced the ban, there was a broader range of discourses 
and more coverage of the ban because elite social actors were divided as to whether 
censorship in Britain was the best strategy for winning the war against the Republican 
Movement. In contrast, the British elite was united on the failure of this strategy by 
the time the British government lifted the broadcasting ban in 1994, which meant 
there was less coverage and a narrower range of discourses in newspaper articles.
Furthermore, it is argued that the broadcasting ban itself is indicative of two 
propagandists propositions about the mass media, which originate from the British 
elite and their defenders in academia and the mass media itself. Firstly, that 
‘terrorists’ thrive on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and, secondly, that the broadcast media 
actually supply it. In the case of the Northern Ireland conflict, suggesting the 
‘terrorists’ thrived on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and the broadcast media supplied it, 
functioned to build support for the suffocation of censorship in Britain.
Although workers in both the broadcast and print media did attempt to resist 
the broadcasting ban, such bravery could not match the strength of the unity between 
the British government and the majority of British newspaper owners. Indeed, the 
struggle for meaning of the broadcasting ban newspaper articles representing this 
censorship was itself a refraction of the struggle between media workers and media 
owners. Another conclusion of this research then, is that whilst there is evidence of 
resistance by media workers within the newspaper articles representing the 
broadcasting ban, overall the power of the British elite to dominate the discourse was 
more apparent.
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Chapter 1 -  The mass media and ‘terrorism’
Understanding the conflicting perspectives on the relationship between the mass 
media and ‘terrorism’ is imperative for this research. It is important to recognise that 
the direct censorship of the broadcasting ban emerged after decades of indirect 
censorship of the British mass media by means of pressure from the British 
government. It is equally important to acknowledge that the main justifications for 
these actions during the Northern Ireland conflict were grounded in theories that 
suggested the mass media aids and abets ‘terrorism’. For this reason, it is important 
to critically analyse the theories that endorsed British government interference with 
the British mass media. By doing so, it will be possible to assess the credibility of 
such theories.
Before analysing the relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’, it is 
important to recognise the difficulty in defining ‘terrorism’. The concept itself is 
highly contested and is applied differently to similar acts of violence that induce terror 
and fear in civilian populations. Opinions on this contentious subject largely fall into 
two camps -  ‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’. The definitions of ‘terrorism’ they subscribe 
to often influence the opinions expressed regarding the relationship between the mass 
media and ‘terrorism’. These conflicting positions are analysed here, followed by the 
views and research of orthodox and critical scholars about the ‘contagion effect’ 
theory, new media and ‘terrorism’, the symbiotic relationship between the mass media 
and ‘terrorism’, and the repercussions of such theories on media freedom.
Defining terrorism -  the orthodox position
As the label implies, the ‘orthodox’ position represents the ‘conventional wisdom’ 
and ‘expert’ opinion about ‘terrorism’, which is largely shared by governments of 
‘Western’ societies. Orthodox writers have often been involved in think-tanks that 
provide recommendations for government policy dealing with ‘disorder’ and ‘counter- 
insurgency’.3 Some orthodox writers were even British combatants themselves such 
as Major General Richard Clutterbuck (Royal Engineers) and Paul Wilkinson (Royal 
Air Force). In fact, both were made Commanders of the Order of the British Empire 
(CBE) by the British government (Clutterbuck, 1981; Rengger, 2011).
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When it comes to defining terrorism, orthodox writers often appear neutral in 
their explanations. For example, Wilkinson (1974) argues there are different types of 
violent acts that induce terror in people, but it is the reasons behind them, which 
justify how they are labelled. Therefore he suggests those who intimidate through 
violence for personal gain can be considered ‘criminal terrorists’ and those that do the 
same for political ends are ‘political terrorists’. He also recognises in his typology of 
political terrorism that states (using ‘repressive terrorism’) and non-state organisations 
(using ‘revolutionary terrorism’ or ‘sub-revolutionary terrorism’) carry out ‘political 
terrorism’ (Wilkinson, 1974; Wilkinson 1977). His definitions are often compelling 
and impartial, but his applications are not.
Wilkinson (1990: 27) briefly defines ‘terrorism’ as ‘the systematic use of 
murder, injury, and destruction or threat of the same to create a climate of terror, to 
publicize a cause, and to coerce a wider target into submitting to its aims’. However, 
he does not apply such definitions equally to the actions of the British state and its 
opponents. Although Wilkinson (2006) concedes that the actions of the US and UK 
governments since the attacks on the US in 2001 are questionable and counter­
productive, he does not consider Anglo-American bombings and shootings of 
civilians in the Middle East to be terrorism. The reason for this may be due to his 
emphasis on specific -  media related -  motivations when defining ‘terrorism’. By 
arguing that ‘terrorism’ is used ‘to publicise a cause’ (Wilkinson, 2006: 15) it implies 
that those lacking power to set agendas in society are the sole perpetrators of 
‘terrorism’. This reserves the label of ‘terrorism’ for non-state organisations that lack 
the power to access the media in the way states do.
The emphasis on seeking media attention when defining ‘terrorism’ is also 
apparent in the work of other orthodox commentators. Alexander and Latter (1990: 2) 
argue ‘terrorism is essentially violence for effect’ and that ‘publicity via the media is 
central to the success of the strategy’. Crenshaw (1981: 386) suggests ‘the most basic 
reason for terrorism is to gain recognition or attention’ and Chalfont (1990: 18) 
maintains ‘terrorism would be impotent without publicity’. Morris and Hoe (1987) 
define ‘terrorism’ within the ‘propaganda by deed’ objective and Clutterbuck (1981: 
141) contends ‘the primary aim of most political terrorist attacks is publicity’. 
Laqueur (1987: 143) argues ‘publicity is an essential factor in the terrorist strategy’ 
and that ‘terrorists’ need to be ‘innovative’ to ensure media attention, meaning they 
can be considered ‘the super-entertainers of our time’ (Laqueur, 1977: 23).
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Nacos (1995; 2002) argues publicity for ‘terrorists’ is essential because 
without it, the acts o f violence would not be communicated to a wider audience. She 
uses the phrase ‘mass-mediated terrorism’ to define ‘terrorism’ as violence for 
political ends against non-combatants intending to win publicity, which excludes the 
possibility of governments committing ‘terrorism’. This is because it is in the 
interests of governments to keep quiet and suppress information that would lead to 
public knowledge o f their violence for political ends against non-combatants. Whilst 
Nacos (1995; 2002) notes that there are different types of terrorism (domestic and 
international) and different perpetrators (states and autonomous/state-sponsored 
groups), the focus o f her analyses reinforces the idea that ‘terrorists’ are those non­
state organisations and individuals that kill civilians in or from ‘Western’ societies.4
Defining terrorism -  the critical position
The other school of thought, the ‘critical’ position, represents a radical critique of the 
orthodox position. When defining ‘terrorism’, critical scholars note the acts of 
political violence and outrages carried out by non-state organisations and individuals 
against civilians, but also highlight those of states, which invariably kill more 
civilians and are frequently carried out by ‘Western’ states (Miller, 1994; Carruthers, 
2000; Abunimah, 2001; Collins, 2002; Zinn, 2002; Cottle, 2006a; Herman, 2006).
Critical writers also acknowledge that acts of terrorism by non-state 
organisations and individuals are often motivated by and connected to previous acts of 
terrorism committed by states. For example, Mathiesen (2002) argues the actions 
against the US on 11th September 2001 were terrible, but no more so than the actions 
committed by the US against other countries. As a result, ‘there is a reservoir of 
possible terrorists among all those people in the world who have suffered as a result 
of U.S. foreign policy’ (Zinn, 2002: 17). In essence then, critical writers acknowledge 
that ‘violence begets violence’ (Mandel, 2002: 83) and that it is almost always the 
case that ordinary people reap what their rulers sow. For example, the victims of the 
7th July, 2005 attacks in London had little power over Britain’s role in the illegal 
invasion and occupation of Iraq, yet they suffered the consequences nonetheless.
It is also worth noting that ‘terrorists’ target members of the ‘security forces’ 
and are not solely preoccupied with killing civilians. For example, the IRA carried 
out attacks against members o f the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the British
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Army, as well as high-ranking members of the Conservative Party (Schmid and de 
Graaf, 1982). Critical writers recognise that not all violence by non-state 
organisations and individuals actually constitutes terrorism (Sproat, 1991; Hocking, 
1992; Miller, 1994). Interestingly, Sproat (1991) argues it is theoretically impossible 
to label non-state combatants as ‘terrorist’ because it depends on each act of violence 
as to whether they constitute terrorism. Therefore, unless a non-state organisation or 
individual exclusively kills civilians for political purposes, they cannot be labelled as 
‘terrorists’ in any real sense.
Returning to the example of the Northern Ireland conflict, it is therefore 
possible to argue that IRA members who attacked and killed civilians did commit acts 
of terrorism, but those who attacked and killed enemy combatants such as members of 
the RUC and British Army did not commit acts of terrorism. Therefore, the IRA as an 
organisation cannot be labelled a ‘terrorist’ organisation because IRA combatants 
mostly attacked and killed enemy combatants (Sutton, 1994). Likewise, the RUC and 
British Army cannot be labelled ‘terrorist’ organisations because, although their 
combatants did commit acts of terrorism when they attacked and killed civilians, they 
also attacked and killed enemy combatants such as the IRA, which is not terrorism.
Tuman (2003) distinguishes between the terrorism of states and non-state 
organisations by labelling the former ‘terror from above’ and the latter ‘terror from 
below’. But, unlike the orthodox writers he applies his definitions more vigorously, 
noting the use of terrorism by totalitarian and democratic states. He argues the 
outrages carried out by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Nazis in Germany, the 
Communist Party in the Soviet Union and China are no different from those carried 
out by the Americans in Vietnam or ‘any military conflict where innocent civilians are 
killed or injured’ (Tuman, 2003: 122) such as in Nicaragua, Iraq and Afghanistan.5
The criterion for defining ‘terrorism’ is not on the use of killing civilians to 
gain publicity, but on the killing of civilians for political purposes itself. This means 
it is possible to view acts of violence against civilians for political ends by state and 
non-state entities as terrorism. To signify the difference in scale of state and non-state 
terrorism, Herman (2006) uses the terms ‘wholesale terrorism’ for the violence 
committed against civilians by states and ‘retail terrorism’ for the violence committed 
against civilians by non-state organisations and individuals:
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Wholesale trade implies large scale business operations that deal with many 
smaller retail operators. The retailers have little capital and do business with a 
small set of local customers. State terrorists apply their violence over a wide 
terrain using the large resources of the state, and they can employ a broader 
and more cruel range of techniques of intimidation, including devastating 
weapons like napalm, phosphorus, depleted uranium munitions; cluster, 
thermobaric and 500-pound bombs; advanced delivery systems like helicopter 
gun-ships and cruise missiles; and torture. Retail terrorists operate more 
narrowly in space, with fewer personnel, limited resources, and working with 
relatively unsophisticated weaponry and delivery systems. (Herman, 2006: 45)
Critical writers also draw attention to the politics of labelling particular acts of 
violence as ‘terrorism’. The pejorative label of ‘terrorism’ cannot be applied in a 
value-free manner as it carries ‘an imputation of illegitimacy and outrage’ (Hocking, 
1992: 86). Hence, it is used by adversaries ‘to demonize their enemies’ (Lewis, 2005: 
53). Constructing the IRA as a ‘terrorist’ organisation by representatives of the 
British government and the British mass media was central to the propaganda war 
during the Northern Ireland conflict. It functioned to de-politicise and de-legitimise 
the Republican Movement and convince the populations of England, Scotland and 
Wales that British involvement in the North of Ireland was a solution to ‘terrorism’ 
and not the cause of it (Curtis, 1984; Miller, 1994; Cottle, 1997).
Collins (2002), Chomsky (2003) and Herman (2006) argue convincingly that 
the label o f ‘terrorism’ has been used by political and intellectual elites, particularly in 
the US, to describe and define acts o f political violence against the US and its allies. 
Put simply, ‘if somebody carries out terror against us or against our allies, it’s terror, 
but if we carry out terror or our sillies do, maybe much worse terror, against someone 
else, it’s not terror, it’s counter-terror or it’s a just war’ (Chomsky, 2003: 60).
It has long been understood that emperors do not like to be judged by the same 
standards they apply to others.6 Therefore, Chomsky (2002) identifies two ways to 
approach the study of terrorism. Either people can adopt a literal approach, where 
definitions of terrorism are applied consistently to similar acts of violence, or a 
propagandists approach, where ‘terrorism’ is the sole responsibility o f an officially 
designated enemy.7 He argues it is governments that generally adopt the latter 
approach and suggests the same is largely true o f the mass media and academia in 
‘Western’ societies. To begin exploring whether or not this is apparent, orthodox 
theories on the mass media and ‘terrorism’ will now be analysed. The literal approach 
to terrorism will then be employed to explain the flaws of such orthodox theories.
9
The Contagion Effect
When discussing the relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’, the 
‘contagion effect’ is often mentioned. The contagion effect theory suggests media 
coverage of ‘terrorism’ is linked to increased incidences of it because ‘other 
individuals or groups join the violence’ (Paletz and Boiney, 1992: 7-8). Alexander 
and O’Day (1984: 146) suggest that ‘by providing extensive coverage of incidents the 
media give the impression that they sympathise with the terrorist cause, thereby 
creating a climate congenial to further violence’. He argues extensive media coverage 
of ‘terrorism’ leads to ‘the exportation of violent techniques which, in turn, often 
triggers similar extreme actions by other individuals and groups’ (Ibid.: 139). 
Similarly, Brosius and Weimann (1991) argue that there is some basis for suggesting 
that media coverage of ‘terrorism’, especially that provided by US television 
networks, significantly contributes to the reoccurrence of ‘international terrorism’.
Much has been written on this theory and to some extent there is still debate 
about it (Martin, 2006). However, few writers in the field seem to be convinced by 
the idea, including some in the orthodox camp. Jenkins (1983: 171) suggests ‘mass 
communication is responsible for terrorism to about the same extent that civil aviation 
is responsible for hijackings’. When discussing the notion that the media ‘cause’ non­
state terrorism, Wilkinson (2006: 145) argues ‘it is well beyond the powers even of 
the modem mass media to create a terrorist movement or a terrorist state’. It has been 
suggested by writers in the critical camp that the ability of the mass media to act as a 
contagion and spread ‘terrorism’ is highly unlikely (Rodrigo, 1991).
Indeed, such a trend is certainly not confirmed by any significant evidence 
(Wardlaw, 1989; Biematzki, 2002) and ‘support for the contagion hypothesis is 
anecdotal and speculative’ (Bamhurst, 1991: 117). Claims relating to the media 
causing ‘terrorism’, such as the ‘contagion effect’ theory, ‘are often invoked as part of 
a state propaganda war’ (Cottle, 2006b: 20). It is certainly one way for a government, 
police force or army to deflect charges that it is actually responsible for provoking 
non-state terrorism. Picard (1991) asserts no cause-effect relationship exists between 
the media and ‘terrorism’ and argues most of the contagion literature consists of 
‘sweeping generalities, conjecture, supposition, anecdotal evidence based on dubious 
correlations, and endless repetition of equally weak arguments and non-scientific 
evidence offered by other writers on the subject o f terrorism’ (Picard, 1991: 50).
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It is unlikely that if the mass media did stop covering acts of non-state 
terrorism, the violence would suddenly stop. As critical writers point out, rather than 
the media causing ‘terrorism’, the reality is that the violence labelled as ‘terrorism’ is 
a form of resistance, which is often inspired by the violence and injustices carried out 
by totalitarian and democratic states. Picard (1991) suggests the mass media could 
actually reduce or prevent ‘terrorism’ if they allowed forums for oppressed, alienated 
and frustrated groups of people to voice their problems to the rest o f the world.
Cotde (2006a: 165) revitalises this idea of the mass media ‘giving vent to felt 
grievances and publicly examining the arguments and opposing interests and 
identities involved’. Whilst this is certainly a better option than waiting for violence 
to occur, states, their ‘experts’ and the mass media would be unwilling to allow such a 
forum (Picard, 1991). As will become clear in the next chapter, when British 
broadcasters allowed representatives of the Republican Movement to speak during the 
Northern Ireland conflict, they were criticised by representatives o f the British 
government and by sections of the British newspaper industry for doing so.
New media and ‘terrorism’
More recently, a new area of concern has emerged about the mass media and 
‘terrorism’. A few orthodox writers have started to focus on the threat that new media 
poses to the success of ‘terrorism’.8 Wilkinson (2006: 148) argues the A1 Qaeda 
network has exploited ‘the enormous scope of the global Internet to disseminate their 
propaganda around the world’.9 Similarly, KJopfenstein (2006: 107-8) points out that 
‘for the first time in history, terrorists can take whatever message and images they 
decide straight to the online world, and that world is global in reach’. Weimann
(2004) identifies eight ways in which perpetrators of non-state terrorism use the 
Internet: psychological warfare, publicity and propaganda, data mining, fund raising, 
recruitment and mobilization, networking, information sharing and planning and 
coordination. Conway (2006) reconstitutes these and those of other writers into five: 
information provision, financing, networking, recruitment and information gathering.
New media and technology have certainly allowed the world to communicate 
and find information more quickly and cheaply and this is just as true for non-state 
organisations and individuals that carry out acts of terrorism. The Internet with its 
anonymity has enabled non-state organisations and individuals operating covertly to
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reach larger audiences and to circumvent traditional media forms (Klopfenstein, 
2006). It has also been used to share knowledge of manufacturing bombs and 
detonation devices as well as to transmit and rapidly circulate footage of successful 
attacks and speeches from people like Osama bin Laden, which some news 
organisations have then broadcasted (Wolfsfeld, 2011).
Cottle (2006a) discusses the use of the Internet by non-state organisations and 
individuals in occupied Iraq as a means to fight the propaganda war with the 
American dominated coalition. He notes that whilst the US and its allies have the 
financial resources as well as fiequent access to the mass media guaranteeing world 
wide circulation of their propaganda, those in Iraq resisting the occupation do not, but 
have managed to produce some low budget, ‘DIY’ images. The preferred propaganda 
images of the US such as their initial bombing of Baghdad with explosions bursting 
across the night sky “like the fourth of July”, the stage-managed public relations coup 
of toppling Saddam's statue when US troops entered Baghdad on 9th April, 2003, and 
Bush's “Mission Accomplished” speech on 1st May, 2003 were obviously shown 
across the world and across various media forms (Rampton and Stauber, 2003).
However, the propaganda images of the other side were also shown, 
particularly the images of foreign hostages, which were ‘staged and choreographed to 
undermine US claims to victory, embolden opposition groups and sap the morale for 
continuing coalition occupation in Iraq’ (Cottle, 2006a: 157). Some of these images 
appeared on mainstream television news, such as Ken Bigley clothed in an orange 
boiler suit and caged like those other foreign hostages held indefinitely at 
Guantanamo Bay by the US (Nunn and Biressi, 2008).10 That said, the majority of 
images, including the actual beheadings of foreign hostages, w ere posted on the 
Internet. Again though, even if it was possible to stop ‘terrorists’ using the internet, 
as long as their political motivation for using violence remains, so will the violence.
Symbiosis -  the propagandists approach to terrorism
It has been argued by orthodox writers that a symbiotic relationship exists between 
the mass media and ‘terrorism’, whereby ‘terrorists’ use it to gain the ‘oxygen of 
publicity’ whilst supplying a story high in news value for the media. For example, 
Paul Wilkinson maintains:
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As long as the mass media exist, terrorists will hunger for what former British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher called ‘the oxygen of publicity’. And for as 
long as terrorists commit acts of violence the mass media will continue to 
scramble for coverage. (Wilkinson, 2006: 145)
Wilkinson (2006: 147) argues that although the media ‘clearly do not represent 
terrorist values’, they are coerced to cover attacks, not by the ‘terrorists’, but by the 
‘fiercely competitive market for their audiences’ (Ibid.). The media are therefore 
certain ‘to respond to terrorist propaganda of the deed because it is dramatic bad 
news’ (Ibid.). Laqueur (2002: 44) expresses a similar view, stating that ‘terrorists 
need the media, and the media find in terrorism all the ingredients of an exciting 
story’. Miller (1982: 1) also suggests ‘terrorism and the media are intertwined in an 
almost inexorable, symbiotic relationship’ whereby ‘terrorism is capable of writing 
any drama -  no matter how horrible -  to compel the media’s attention’ (Ibid.).
As acknowledged by Wilkinson (2006) the idea that a symbiotic relationship 
exists between the mass media and ‘terrorism’ was popularised in Britain by Margaret 
Thatcher.11 In 1985, following the hijacking of Trans World Airlines Flight 847, she 
gave a speech at the American Bar Association in London arguing that ‘terrorists’ 
depend on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and that they should be starved of it:
For newspapers and television, acts of terrorism inevitably make good copy 
and compelling viewing. The hijacker and the terrorist thrive on publicity: 
without it, their activities and their influence are sharply curtailed. [W]e must 
try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of 
publicity on which they depend. In our societies we do not believe in 
constraining the media, still less in censorship. But ought we not to ask the 
media to agree among themselves a voluntary code of conduct, a code under 
which they would not say or show anything which could assist the terrorists’ 
morale or their cause while the hijack lasted? (Thatcher, 1985)
The symbiotic relationship argument is persuasive in the sense that, to an extent, non­
state organisations and individuals do need the media to further their objectives and 
the media do attract audiences by reporting shocking violence. However, it is not 
pervasive overall because the argument is based on several simplistic generalisations 
and flawed assumptions, which need examining. Turning to those scholars in the 
critical camp who have written about the relationship between the mass media and 
‘terrorism’ will allow such an examination. This entails using the literal approach to 
terrorism that Chomsky (2002) recommends.
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Symbiosis -  the literal approach to terrorism
As critical writers point out, the assumption that all ‘terrorists’ crave publicity is 
misleading because it conveniently and, most probably, intentionally excludes the 
biggest (or wholesale) exporters of terrorism. Tuman (2003: 120) argues it is true that 
‘terrorism and mass media share a symbiotic relationship’, but he also recognises this 
symbiosis is dependent on whether it is terrorism from above or from below. It is no 
surprise that the orthodox writers have focused their research on non-state terrorism 
and its relationship with the mass media rather than that of state terrorism. The 
consequence of this has been to produce narrow parameters in which the relationship 
between the mass media and terrorism is understood.
In a genuine, non-propagandistic discussion on this subject, the relationship 
between the terrorism of states as well as non-state organisations and individuals 
should be made apparent. Indeed, it should not be controversial to recognise that all 
social actors require the mass media to further political goals and often use similar 
publicity strategies, whether statements or interviews, briefings or press conferences, 
staged events or publications (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982; Cooke, 2003; McNair, 
2003). The main difference is that, generally speaking -  though not always -  states 
wish to keep the atrocities they commit against civilians quiet, or at least away from 
mass media exposure (Carruthers, 2000; Knightley, 2003), whereas non-state 
organisations and individuals do not (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982; Gerrits, 1992).
This does not change the fact that non-state organisations and individuals as 
well as states need access to the media to communicate with their target audiences. 
As Lockyer (2003) suggests, both have just as much advantage to gain from using the 
media and therefore both attempt to do so. Compare, for example, A1 Qaeda’s 
broadcasting network, Voice o f  Caliphate (Wilkinson, 2006) to the US government’s 
Al Hurra (‘the free one’) (Seib, 2008). Both were obviously created to inculcate the 
‘righteousness’ o f Al Qaeda and the Bush administration in Middle Eastern audiences. 
Wilkinson (1997; 2006) argues it is foolish to deny ‘terrorists’ thrive on the ‘oxygen 
of publicity’ and the symbiotic relationship that exists between the mass media and 
‘terrorism’. This maybe so, but it is equally foolish to deny that states thrive on the 
same ‘oxygen of publicity’ and that between the mass media and the state — whether 
totalitarian or democratic -  a symbiotic relationship also exists.
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Quite simply, the state needs the media to amplify its message and the media 
needs the state because the public consume and rely on the media to inform them 
about the actions and policies of the state. The mass media often rely on centres of 
wealth and power for the ‘information’ that becomes ‘news’ (Herman and Chomsky, 
2002). Therefore, government and business sources, which have the ability to 
produce a large volume of material on a regular basis, find their way into the media 
for the same reasons given by orthodox scholars: competition (maximising profit by 
minimising costs of acquiring ‘news’) and news values (elite actions have a high news 
value) (Harcup and O’Neill, 2001).
Therefore, it could be argued that there are already several flaws in the 
orthodox claim about a symbiotic relationship existing between the mass media and 
‘terrorism’. Firstly, the claim is based on the propagandist^ assumption that 
“terrorism is what somebody else does” (Herman, 2006). Secondly, it fails to 
recognise that states as well as non-state organisations and individuals have a 
symbiotic relationship with the mass media and require the ‘oxygen of publicity’ to 
further their objectives. The main difference is that when states bomb and shoot 
civilians they generally wish to cover it up through censorship or military 
euphemisms, whereas non-state organisations and individuals do not.
Degrees o f dependence and exposure:
Another important point that should be made regarding the notion that there is 
a symbiotic relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’ is that non-state 
organisations and individuals depend on the media to varying degrees. Even if we 
pretend that ‘Western’ states are too civilised to carry out acts of terrorism and that 
only non-state organisations and individuals are capable of such barbarity, the 
assumption that all ‘terrorists’ crave publicity is still erroneous because it implies that 
all the smaller (or retail) exporters o f terrorism are monolithic.
It has been suggested by some that non-state organisations and individuals 
actually have differing relationships with the media. Wieviorka (1993) argues their 
dependence on the mass media varies and characterises the relationship between 
‘terrorists’ and the media into four categories: 1. Pure indifference (where the 
violence is intended neither to spread fear beyond the intended victims nor to realise a 
propaganda coup through their acts), 2. Relative indifference (where the non-state 
organisations and individuals commit violence, but not to capture headlines in the
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mainstream media because means already exist to discuss and explain their positions), 
3. Media-orientated strategy (where the violence is intended and designed to capture 
mainstream media attention), 4. Total break (where the media are viewed as hostile 
and therefore viewed as legitimate targets for physical attack).
This suggests the general rule that there is a symbiotic relationship between 
the mass media and ‘terrorism’ is flawed because such a totalising claim overlooks the 
possibility that different non-state organisations and individuals relate to, and depend 
on, the mass media to varying degrees. Wilkinson (2006: 145-8) rejects Wieviorka’s 
(1993) argument outright but it is clear that this is because Wilkinson defines 
terrorism as intrinsically linked with the mass media. In this narrow definition of 
terrorism, Wilkinson’s (2006) critique is accurate, but in an all-encompassing 
definition of terrorism that includes “us” and “them”, states as well as non-state 
organisations and individuals, it is not so helpful to say that there is a symbiotic 
relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’. This is because the degrees of 
dependence on the media differ not only between the perpetrators o f state and non­
state terrorism but also between non-state organisations and individuals themselves. 
In other words, the quantity o f media coverage that ‘terrorists’ require is not the same, 
making it difficult to predict and generalise about the ‘behaviour’ of non-state 
organisations and individuals that attack and kill civilians.
Paletz and Boiney (1992) also assert that the extent to which non-state 
organisations and individuals use and rely on the mass media is different and 
dependent on many factors, including the media itself, which is not monolithic either. 
They point out that the media is an all-encompassing term for many forms of 
communication including television, radio, newspapers, the Internet and many others, 
which can be owned by corporations, states or by the public. Therefore, the content 
and format differs within and between countries. Furthermore, the degree o f media 
exposure depends on who is killing civilians for political purposes and whether 
‘Western’ governments support the violence or not (Herman and Chomsky, 2002).
Biematzki (2002) suggests that while the media are undoubtedly an important 
element and are factored into the strategy o f those conducting non-state terrorism, the 
media are neither the only element nor the only means to communicate the message of 
non-state combatants to their target audiences. Biematzki (2002) also recognises that 
media coverage can have a positive or negative effect on public perceptions. This 
realisation highlights another factor that is not addressed in the contention that a
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symbiotic relationship exists between the mass media and ‘terrorism’. The simplicity 
of the theory overlooks the complexities of the media and of the different groups and 
individuals labelled as ‘terrorists’ by the orthodoxy and consequently begs several 
questions. For example, if all ‘terrorists’ crave publicity, what kind of publicity do 
they crave? Indeed, does any and all publicity satisfy all non-state organisations and 
individuals who engage in terrorism? These questions suggest that it is important to 
think about the quality of media coverage that ‘terrorists’ receive also.
Not all publicity is good publicity:
Several critical writers have pointed out that although the mass media do cover 
acts o f non-state terrorism, the violence is rarely explained and always condemned. 
Despite anecdotal claims found in some of the orthodox literature, Paletz and Boiney 
(1991: 22) argue ‘actual research evidence tends to support the argument that media 
coverage does not much help terrorists’. The ‘all publicity is good publicity’ ethos 
certainly (and unsurprisingly) does not apply when non-state organisations and 
individuals are killing civilians. Furthermore, while acts of non-state terrorism can 
hijack media attention, the perpetrators do not ‘actually control the news agenda, or 
determine the way in which their activities are framed’ (Camithers, 2000: 191).
Cooke (2003) makes a similar point in his discussion on the relationship 
between the mass media and the Northern Ireland conflict. He argues that 
paramilitaries could generate publicity through violence, but the character of such 
publicity was not in their control and mass media coverage was routinely composed 
o f condemnation from politicians, community leaders, the victims and paramilitary 
groups on the opposing side. Arguably, this enables the non-state organisations and 
individuals to spread fear, but not much else because media coverage typically 
focuses on the violence and ‘fails to provide explanation, reason or political motive’ 
(Cottle, 2006a: 145; original emphasis).
Schlesinger (1991) points out that the media are not open to anyone, especially 
non-state organisations and individuals who challenge the hegemony of states by 
using violence. Indeed, media representations o f explosions, death and destruction 
are not the same as the media allowing those who created them to explain their 
motivations for them. Hall et al. (1978) suggest this is especially true because it is the 
authorities and other state representatives who often primarily define and dominate 
the discourse following violent attacks or disturbances.
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Carruthers (2000) asserts that news reports in ‘Western’ societies not only 
frequently replicate, but sometimes exceed, the language of the state when 
stigmatizing ‘terrorist’ groups. Therefore, unless gaining publicity is the raison 
d’etre, it could be argued that the mass media does not particularly benefit non-state 
organisations and individuals that carry out acts of terrorism. Indeed, she notes that 
‘the gaining of publicity is rarely the ultimate end in its own right: publicity is useful 
only in so far as it furthers the rectification of deep-rooted political grievances’ 
(Carruthers, 2000: 190).
As media coverage concentrates almost exclusively on the violent dimension 
of non-state terrorism with little or no emphasis on the causes and context, it actually 
benefits the state being challenged far more. By creating the impression that the 
violence is not politically motivated and is merely ‘the senseless, inexplicable 
behaviour of lunatic extremists’ (Ibid.), the state is given an opportunity to ‘defend’ 
its ‘people’ by pursuing domestic and foreign policies that would be unacceptable to 
the population were they not living in fear.
This begs further questions about the symbiotic relationship that is alleged to 
exist between the mass media and ‘terrorism’ by orthodox writers. If mainstream 
media representations of non-state terrorism can actually benefit the state more than 
the perpetrators, does this apply to the priorities of news organisations also? It has 
already been suggested that not all publicity is good publicity for the perpetrators of 
non-state terrorism, but is all terrorism good terrorism for the media?
Non-state terrorism sells:
It is clear that non-state terrorism sells and can increase audiences and, 
therefore, profits for mass media corporations. Chermak and Gruenewald (2006) 
suggest researchers mostly agree that international and domestic terrorism carried out 
by non-state organisations and individuals is considered newsworthy because acts of 
non-state terrorism suit journalistic conventions regarding news values. Ben-Yehuda
(2005) notes the abundance of coverage that the media around the world have 
dedicated to non-state terrorism in recent years and argues it has become the global 
topic par excellence. Undoubtedly, since the attacks on the US in 2001, media 
coverage of non-state terrorism has dramatically increased and reached “record 
levels” (Kern et al., 2003), despite actual occurrences o f it decreasing (Lewis, 2004).
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Debatin (2002: 163-4) suggests news values, or ‘news selection criteria’ as he 
calls them, can be understood as media attention rules which are based on 
‘sensationalism, violence, negativism, surprise, dynamics, identification, and spatial
I *7and cultural proximity’. As a result of these news values and selection practices, 
some occurrences in the world are magnified, whereas others are minimised and this 
arguably influences and shapes the issues of significance in societies (Chermak and 
Gruenewald, 2006). Indeed, ‘often the most unusual and unrepresentative events can 
dominate media coverage for a long period of time [providing] an opportunity to 
reshape public thinking about an issue’ (Chermak, 2003: 9).
The majority of people do not experience non-state terrorism directly because 
actual occurrences are rare, but rely on the media to provide them with ‘experience’ 
(Altheide, 1987). It has been argued above that more people in the world experience 
state terrorism directly than they do non-state terrorism, yet the mass media in 
‘Western’ societies largely represent and define ‘terrorism’ in line with the 
propagandists approach (Chomsky, 2002). Therefore, not all terrorism is good 
terrorism for the mass media. An obvious explanation for this is that the media of 
‘Western’ societies have a symbiotic relationship with the state in which they are 
based and ‘carry many o f the culturally dominant assumptions’ (Glasgow University 
Media Group, 1976: 1). But where do these arguments leave the orthodoxy?
The mass media and the suffocation of censorship
Orthodox writers stick to their position on the relationship between the mass media 
and ‘terrorism’, maintaining that ‘terrorists’ desperately seek the ‘oxygen of 
publicity’. The orthodoxy generally regard television as the main supplier of the 
‘oxygen of publicity’ to ‘terrorists’, perhaps because television is the most consumed 
means of communication (Alali and Eke, 1991) and the primary source of news in 
‘Western’ societies (Schlesinger et al., 1983; Ruggiero and Glascock, 2002). Other 
reasons relate to television’s immediacy and global reach (Martin, 2006).
Wilkinson (2006: 157) suggests that broadcasters in ‘Western’ societies 
should adopt principles of ‘voluntary self-restraint to try to avoid the dangers of 
manipulation and exploitation by terrorist groups’. Although in the past, he has 
argued for state censorship of the media and stated ‘it is not undemocratic in the least 
to ban murderers and apologists for terrorist crimes from the broadcasting services’
19
(Wilkinson, 1977: 169-70), he now recognises that it is undemocratic for the state to 
censor the media. This is a laudable volte-face because it is surely a huge 
contradiction to argue that it is wrong for non-state organisations and individuals to 
‘hijack’ and ‘manipulate’ the media but right for states to do exactly the same.
Wilkinson (2006) still warns against what he calls the ‘laissez faire’ approach 
to media coverage of ‘terrorism’, which refers to the media taking no specific steps 
when reporting violence or the threat of violence no matter how serious it is. He 
argues that if the media adopt such an approach it is ‘likely to encourage attacks 
which endanger life and limb and place property at risk’ (Wilkinson, 2006: 155) and 
may even ‘help to induce a situation of incipient or actual civil war with a 
concomitant threat to the stability and survival of the democracy in question’ (Ibid.). 
Again though, this reasoning is based on spurious premises, whether it be that the 
‘Western’ media are open to manipulation by ‘terrorists’ or that just by covering acts 
of ‘terrorism’ it glorifies and glamorizes the perpetrators. Although such arguments 
are far from convincing because of their simplicity, they still form a basis for 
legitimating some form of reproach against the mass media, which, in turn, can lead to 
measures that are undemocratic, yet beneficial to the state.
Indeed, some critical writers suggest that those who argue the media are in 
some way to blame for occurrences of ‘terrorism’ have an ulterior motive. For 
example, Picard (1991) highlights that it has been representatives of the state and 
orthodox academics that promote and defend such theories as the ‘contagion effect’ 
and the ‘symbiotic relationship’ between the mass media and ‘terrorism’. Arguably, 
this is a strategy to justify efforts to alter media coverage by pressuring journalists and 
broadcasters to have ‘restraint’ or by normalising censorship laws. By using the 
media as scapegoats for, or accessories to, ‘terrorism’, governments and their 
‘experts’ can divert attention away from actual motivations for political violence.
Paletz and Boiney (1992: 23) argue that the majority of the literature on the 
relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’ is dismaying, with some of it 
being ‘blatantly propagandist^, consisting of shrill jeremiads, exhortations, 
tendentious examples, and undocumented assertions’. It is hard to disagree. The 
motivation for trying to prove such a relationship exists seems to be a way of 
persuading people to acknowledge and accept the ‘threat’ o f the ‘oxygen of publicity’ 
in order to accept the more dangerous threat of the suffocation of censorship. 
Arguably, this does not protect the public, but it does protect the authorities.
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The claim that there is a symbiotic relationship between the mass media and 
‘terrorism’ functions in a similar way to the claims that there is a “liberal bias” in the 
media (see Alterman, 2003; McChesney, 2004; Kellner, 2005) or that “the media lost 
the Vietnam War” (see Hallin, 1986) because it functions to discredit the media and 
even justify state interference with it. If we accept that in ‘Western’ societies the 
media, particularly television, is vulnerable to the perpetrators of non-state terrorism, 
we are more likely to accept controls of it.
By focusing on the symbiotic relationship between the mass media (meaning 
broadcast media, particularly television) and ‘terrorism’ (not that of states, just that of 
non-state organisations and individuals) the orthodox writers serve their purpose by 
preparing the ground for state interference with the media. This is achieved by cutting 
the ‘oxygen of publicity’ through pressuring news organisations to ‘volunteer’ a 
formulation of guidelines that, effectively, censor themselves such as the ‘reference 
upwards’ system during the Northern Ireland conflict, or imposing some form of 
direct censorship such as the British broadcasting ban (1988-1994).
The mass media and ‘counter-terrorism’
It is clear in the literature of orthodox writers that they also agree mass media in 
‘Western’ societies can and should be used as part of a ‘counter-terrorism’ strategy. 
Wilkinson (2006: 154) suggests the media ‘are a weapon that can be used as a major 
tool in the defeat of terrorism’. Clutterbuck (1975; 1981) argues that the television 
camera is like a weapon lying in the street, which either side can pick up and use. 
Chalfont (1990: 17-18) maintains that to fight ‘terrorism’ effectively ‘a sympathetic 
and supportive climate o f public opinion’ must be established. He recommends the 
way to achieve this is to utilise the mass media.
Nacos (2002: 171-89) lists ten media-related recommendations to help what 
she calls the ‘terrorism response professionals’ and ‘crisis managers’ dealing with 
‘anti-American terrorism’. These include the necessity of giving frequent 
communiques to the media, remembering that most journalists and news organisations 
will assist the authorities in serious incidents, and encouraging guidelines for 
reporting acts o f non-state terrorism. Wilkinson (2006: 152) argues the media can be 
‘responsible’ by helping to shatter the myth that ‘terrorists’ are ‘champions of the 
oppressed and downtrodden’. He argues the way to do this is by revealing their
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‘savage cruelty [...] and the way in which they violate the rights o f the innocent’ 
(Ibid.). Hermon (1990: 39-40) contends that it is acceptable for the police to ask the 
media for support in combating ‘terrorism’ because ‘both are part of the same 
democratic process and belief, and the basis for any discussion is the fact that they 
both should and indeed must have a commitment to its preservation’.
Of course, it is reasonable to argue that the mass media in a democratic society 
should not be used to encourage (or incite) non-state terrorism. However, the same 
principle should apply to state terrorism. Is it unreasonable to apply single standards 
and to argue that the mass media in a democratic society should also discourage and 
inhibit the government of such a society from sending its army to commit acts of 
terrorism? If the orthodox writers encouraged the ‘Western’ mass media to do both, 
their positions would be far more credible. Wilkinson could argue the media can be 
responsible by helping to shatter the myth that NATO combatants are champions of 
the oppressed and downtrodden. Indeed, if the ‘Western’ mass media revealed the 
savage cruelty o f dropping bombs on Afghan villages, the occupation o f Afghanistan 
might be over sooner and the lives o f many civilians and combatants would be saved.
However, as critical writers suggest, orthodox writers are not concerned with 
the violence sanctioned by ‘Western’ governments. Instead, they focus on the 
violence conducted by the other side. ‘We’ can only be the victims of ‘terrorism’; 
never the perpetrators (Chomsky, 2002). Whether or not the ideological narratives 
‘employed by the emperor and his loyal coterie’ (Ibid.: vii) dominated British mass 
media representations o f the Northern Ireland conflict generally and the broadcasting 
ban specifically will be revealed during this research.
To this end, it is important to ascertain whether the British mass media 
adopted a literal approach or a propagandists approach to terrorism during the 
Northern Ireland conflict. If the literal approach was adopted, definitions of terrorism 
would have been applie d consistently to similar acts o f violence, whereas if the 
propagandists approach was adopted, ‘terrorism’ would have been considered the 
sole responsibility o f the Republican Movement. Furthermore, it is important to 
explore British broadcast media representations of Northern Ireland before, during 
and after the conflict. This will reveal the conflicts between the British government 
and the British broadcast media before the broadcasting ban was introduced as well as 
how the British broadcast media operated during and after the censorship was lifted as 
part of the peace process.
22
The mass media and ‘terrorism’: summary
The critical position and literal approach to the study o f terrorism has been favoured 
here. It is clear that acts of non-state terrorism and state terrorism continue to cause 
suffering and death for civilians around the world, whether the means of destruction 
are triggered from a suicide bomber in a crowd or dropped from a stealth bomber in 
the sky. It is important to acknowledge that the way in which terrorism is defined 
determines how the relationship between the mass media and terrorism is understood. 
Orthodox writers define terrorism as violence to gain media attention (the ‘oxygen of 
publicity’), whereas critical writers define terrorism as violence to gain political goals. 
The position people take on the relationship between the mass media and terrorism is 
guided by these initial assumptions.
The contagion effect theory seems to be a particularly archaic one. Even some 
of the orthodox writers admit such a theory is unhelpful (Jenkins, 1983; Wilkinson, 
2006). The threat o f new media being used to empower non-state organisations and 
individuals that conduct terrorism is real in the sense that new information and 
communication technologies (NICTs) are taken advantage of to strengthen the support 
for their cause. However, these technologies are also taken advantage of to strengthen 
the support for states conducting terrorism. As with most of the ‘conventional 
wisdom’ on the relationship between the mass media and terrorism, this supposed 
danger o f new media empowering ‘terrorists’ is more of a smokescreen than anything 
else. The real way to contain non-state terrorism is to contain state terrorism.
The idea of a symbiotic relationship existing between the mass media and 
‘terrorism’ is the most convincing, which explains the attention given to it in this 
chapter. As argued above, this theory is persuasive, but not pervasive (even if we 
pretend that the orthodox assumptions are correct). Whilst it is certainly true that 
some non-state organisations and individuals do receive and desire media exposure 
when they carry out acts o f terrorism, the ‘oxygen of publicity’ is neither necessarily 
beneficial nor supplied. Non-state organisations and individuals will receive 
attention, but the character o f this attention is not properly addressed by orthodox 
writers. In addition, not all non-state organisations and individuals depend on the 
media to the same extent. This is also overlooked by the orthodoxy. The media 
certainly increases audiences (and profits) by reporting ‘terrorism’, but this needs to 
be clarified to non-state terrorism as opposed to terrorism in general, which includes
23
acts of state terrorism. Acts of non-state terrorism do receive copious amounts of 
media coverage in 4 Western’ societies, but acts of state terrorism do not, unless it is a 
rival state of “ours” (Herman and Chomsky, 2002; Chomsky, 2002).
According to critical writers, media coverage of ‘terrorism’ can actually be far 
more beneficial to the state, which also has a symbiotic relationship with the mass 
media and is frequently given the ‘oxygen of publicity’. After a significant analysis 
and by using a non-propagandistic definition of terrorism a more accurate 
understanding o f the symbiotic relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’ is 
established. This would suggest that such a relationship is less clear cut or even that, 
due to the aforementioned points, it is a myth that ‘terrorism depends for its success 
on media coverage’ (Hocking, 1992: 87-88). One obvious reason why this is the case 
is that state terrorism usually benefits from media secrecy and censorship. In 
addition, as long as the grievances of non-state organisations and individuals still 
exist, whether the media is there or not to cover the violence does not change the fact 
that non-state terrorism will continue until the political motivations of their violence 
have been addressed.
This should also be pointed out when the state and its ‘experts’ argue that 
undemocratic measures should be introduced in ‘Western’ societies to combat 
‘terrorism’. Censorship, whether indirect or direct, whether in ‘peace’ or ‘war’, is not 
compatible with a genuine democracy because it prevents citizens from forming their 
own political opinions, therefore preventing informed voting decisions. Nevertheless, 
direct censorship existed in the “mother of democracies”, ‘Great’ Britain, for six years 
in the late twentieth century. The orthodox position on ‘terrorism’ was used by the 
British government to justify preventing Irish Republicans from being given the 
‘oxygen of publicity’ by introducing the suffocation of censorship over the British 
broadcast media. Now that the relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’ 
has been examined, it is possible to explore how indirect and direct censorship of the 
British mass media operated during the Northern Ireland conflict.
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Chapter 2 - The British mass media and the Northern Ireland conflict
The direct censorship o f the British broadcasting ban (1988-1994) emerged after 
decades of indirect censorship of the British mass media by means of pressure from 
the British government. Baimer (1996) argues it is undeniable that the British 
government interfered, indirectly and directly, with British mass media reporting of 
the Northern Ireland conflict. The pressure against, and interference with, the British 
mass media is a clear indication of the perceived importance of this ideological 
battleground. Before analysing British newspaper representations of the broadcasting 
ban, it is important to explore British broadcast media representations of Northern 
Ireland before, during and after the conflict. This will reveal the conflicts between the 
British government and the broadcasters before the broadcasting ban was introduced 
as well as how the British broadcast media operated during and after the censorship 
was lifted as part o f the peace process.
In this chapter, the history of British broadcasting is analysed to identify and 
explain British mass media representations of Northern Ireland from its inception in 
1921 to the present. This includes a thorough investigation of the silent treatment that 
British broadcasters gave to Northern Ireland before 1968, the relationship between 
British broadcasters and the British government as well as the impact of the ‘reference 
upwards’ system. It also involves an analysis of the ramifications of British 
legislation on the British mass media, the impact of broadcasting ban (1988-1994) on 
British broadcast media and, finally, British mass media representations of the 
Northern Ireland peace process. Reviewing the literature on these subjects helps to 
contextualise the British government’s decision to introduce the broadcasting ban and 
informs the methodological and theoretical approach of this research, which explores 
representations o f the broadcasting ban in the British print media.
The silence before 1968
The partition of Ireland on 3rd May, 1921 divided the thirty-two counties of Ireland 
and united the six counties of the north of Ireland with Britain (Hennessey, 1998). 
This created division amongst Nationalists in the south and north o f Ireland, which led 
to the Irish War of Independence degenerating into a civil war between those 
supporting and opposing the Anglo-Irish Treaty (Ibid.). It also created division within
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the new state of Northern Ireland where the permanent majority favouring the union 
with Britain -  the Unionists -  institutionalised sectarianism to secure their dominance 
(Ibid.). This was achieved by discriminating against the now minority Catholic 
population in Northern Ireland in terms of employment, education, housing, voting 
and ‘law and order’ policy.13
The divisions and discrimination in Northern Ireland received minimal 
attention from the national and international media before 1968. Schlesinger (1987: 
206-7) argues it was only after the civil rights movement culminated in violent 
clashes that ‘the attention both of British and other news media became focused on 
Northern Ireland’. Smith (1972), Foot (1990) and Miller (1994) also contend that it 
was after 1968 that the national and international mass media really began to focus on 
what was happening in Northern Ireland. Butler (1995) argues th e  RUC attack 
against the civil rights demonstration in Derry on 5th October 1968 marks the precise 
start of the ‘Troubles’. He also argues it was the spurring event for ‘the beginning of 
television coverage of civil unrest in Northern Ireland’ (Butler, 1995: 1-2).
Butler (1995) recognizes, however, that there was some British broadcast 
coverage of the Northern Ireland situation before this, such as the This Week expose 
of Paisleyism and the 24 Hours report on gerrymandering in 1967. Similarly, Miller 
(1994) points out that local and national news had reported the growing unrest in 
Northern Ireland following the Divis riots in 1964. Both point out that on balance 
though the broadcast media produced very few programmes that covered the political 
situation in Northern Ireland before 1968. So, while it is not correct that there was no 
mention of the discord in Northern Ireland by the broadcast media, it is correct that 
there was very little. Butler (1995) criticises some of the claims made by Curtis 
(1984), but points out that she is substantially correct. He suggests that her labelling 
of the period between the arrival of broadcasting to Northern Ireland in 1924 and the 
violent culmination o f the civil rights movement in 1968 as the ‘silent years’ is valid.
It is important to note that the BBC had a monopoly on broadcasting in 
Northern Ireland until 1959 when ITV arrived in the shape of Ulster Television 
(UTV) (Curtis, 1984; Schlesinger, 1987).14 According to Richard Francis, former 
BBC Controller for Northern Ireland, the policy of the BBC in Northern Ireland 
involved a combination of highlighting the positive features over the negative, 
ignoring the contentious issue of partition and ‘the periodic denial of air time to 
people outspoken in their criticism of the status quo’ (Francis, 1977: 60). He also
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argues it was as late as the 1950’s and 1960’s that programmes began to subtly hint 
that tensions existed in Northern Ireland. After 1968 though, ‘there was no way in 
which the facts of unrest within the country could go uncovered’ (Ibid.). Smith 
(1972) suggests the discrimination faced by the Catholic community in Northern 
Ireland was able to continue because of the silence of the broadcast media.
Although there is broad agreement in the literature concerning the silence 
before 1968, there are differing explanations reasoning why this was the case. Smith 
(1972) discusses the period following partition and the establishment of the BBC 
radio station -  2BE -  in Belfast, 1924. He notes how this raised questions about the 
manner in which broadcasters should operate in a territory with such a divided 
population. Francis (1977: 60) concedes broadcasting was not expected to question 
‘the fundamental premise on which the new State was built’. He argues this was 
understandable because of the possibility that broadcasting could affect public 
behaviour, provoking (potentially violent) events, rather than reflecting them. He 
notes the difficulty in exercising ‘control of a free, pluralistic system when editorial 
decisions could put lives and livelihoods at risk’ (Francis, 1977: 60-1). However, he 
does not mention how silence on the issue of partition was advantageous to the 
Unionists who ruled the new state of Northern Ireland.
Schlesinger (1987) argues that avoiding discussion on the legitimacy of 
partition and the Border’s permanence meant a crucial aspect contextualising the 
political divisions in Northern Ireland was excluded. The Border partitioned Ireland 
in a way that secured a permanent majority in the North favouring the union with 
Britain (Foot, 1988; Jempson, 1993; Darby, 1995). Omitting this fact from the British 
broadcast media would have certainly benefited the Unionist and British governments 
by concealing the undemocratic manner in which Ireland was partitioned by the 
Government o f Ireland Act, 1920 (Magee, 2001). As Miller (1994) notes, the issue of 
partition is central to the case of Republicans because the last all-Irish elections before 
partition overwhelmingly returned a Sinn Fein government, who wanted complete 
independence from Britain. Magee (2001: 11-12) points out that in the ‘general 
election o f December 1918, the last occasion on which the electorate made its choice 
on an all-Ireland basis, Sinn Fein won 73 out of the 105 seats, 69% of the votes cast’. 
Sinn Fein clearly had wide-spread support across Ireland before the British 
government (with the Irish treaty delegates and their pro-treaty supporters) partitioned 
the thirty-two counties on 3rd May, 1921 (Moloney, 2007).
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Following partition then, it could be argued that the BBC’s ‘responsible’ and 
‘consensual’ Northern Ireland coverage did help to keep the society together. 
However, it simultaneously perpetuated the dominance of the Unionists in Northern 
Ireland, which entailed discrimination and violence against Catholics. Smith (1972) 
argues that broadcasters were often concerned by public reaction to programming, 
which they feared would manifest on the streets or in complaints. He suggests ‘a 
glance at the history of broadcasting in Ireland will show how carefully over the years 
the problem was dealt with by avoidance and retreat’ (Smith, 1972: 24).
Perhaps the broadcasters had just as much, or maybe more, to fear from 
Stormont politicians. Curtis (1984) recalls the pressure and flak the BBC received 
from Unionist politicians, which certainly appears to have contributed to the media 
silence before 1968. She argues there was ‘indignant reaction’ towards the BBC if it 
dared to show ‘fleeting glimpses of another version of reality’ (Curtis, 1984: 20). For 
example, in 1959 the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, Lord Brookeborough, 
intervened himself and managed to censor the BBC, which dropped Ed Murrow’s 
second talk programme, See it Now, after the first episode featured a guest who 
referred to IRA internees in the South as ‘young idealists’ (Ibid.). Brookeborough 
also successfully censored the BBC on another occasion in the same year. After the 
first of eight current affairs programmes by Alan Whicker was broadcast, Stormont 
threatened to remove broadcasting from the BBC altogether and as a result the 
remaining seven reports were never shown. Following this, the BBC ‘did not attempt 
another programme on the Six Counties until several years later’ (Ibid.: 21).
Another, yet related, explanation for the silence of the broadcast media about 
the situation in Northern Ireland before 1968 concerns the intimate relationship 
between the BBC and the Ulster regime and the effect this had on broadcasting in the 
Province. Cathcart (1984) recognises how the first Director of 2BE, Sir Gerald 
Beadle, was absorbed, without much hesitation, into the Unionist establishment. 
Within a few months he attempted to form closer links with Stormont and wrote a 
letter to the BBC’s Managing Director, Lord Reith, inquiring into the exact form of 
relationship between the BBC’s Belfast station and Stormont while suggesting it 
would be advantageous for the BBC to be regarded by Stormont as its mouthpiece.15
Schlesinger (1987: 207) also discusses the way in which the BBC’s hierarchy 
was tied into the Ulster regime, noting how the BBC ‘was subjected to pressure from 
the Unionists to broadcast in a manner which supported the status quo\ Smith (1972:
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18) argues the BBC mainly ‘spoke in tones of the Unionist establishment and worked 
in their interests’. Similarly, Curtis (1984: 19) discusses a BBC document from 1930, 
which states how the BBC Regional Service ‘reflects the sentiments of the people 
who have always maintained unswerving loyalty to British ideals and to British 
culture’. In other words, the BBC reflected most of the Protestant community in 
Northern Ireland who favoured the union with Britain.16
Butler (1995: 21) discusses the policy of successive British governments 
towards the question of Northern Ireland, which he summarises as keeping matters 
‘Irish at a safe distance from British politics’. He also suggests broadcasters in 
Northern Ireland were impacted by their relationship with the Unionist regime. It is 
clear that the lack of consensus in Northern Ireland led to a broadcasting system 
which was both fearful o f the government and in many ways intimately linked with it. 
Such a relationship had ramifications for the content and ‘pluralism’ of the broadcast 
media and was obviously not conducive to all the people of Northern Ireland though it 
was for the government o f the Unionists, by the Unionists and for the Unionists.
The ‘reference upwards’ system after 1971
Following 1968, the national and international media attention rapidly shifted to 
Northern Ireland and consequently Stormont could not be seen to be attacking ‘its 
own people’ just as the British government could no longer turn a blind-eye to it. 
Butler (1995: 21) suggests ‘the crisis in NI triggered a crisis for the broadcast media 
which, in turn, gave rise to a crisis in their relations with government’. After the 
Unionist prime minister, Terence O’Neil resigned in April 1969, the BBC altered the 
directive that all reporting should be channelled via the Northern Ireland Controller to 
include a statement that coverage should not exacerbate the situation. Butler (1995: 
61) suggests this was a result of the media-as-incendiary outlook of management and 
senior broadcasters and ‘was an obvious recipe for ultra-cautiousness’.
This fear eventually manifested in the establishment of the ‘reference 
upwards’ system in 1971, which saw the BBC and ITV tighten up their rules for 
broadcasting programmes on Northern Ireland. It required ‘reporters and editors to 
seek permission and advice from their superiors before embarking on stories 
connected with the North of Ireland’ (Jempson, 1993: 9). That year had seen the first 
British soldier killed since the British Army had entered Northern Ireland in August
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1969 (Moloney, 2007). This followed the RUC’s failure to suppress riots sparked by 
Orange Order marches around the Catholic Bogside area of Derry as well as the 
introduction of internment without trial (Curtis, 1984; Butler, 1995). In addition, 
Schlesinger (1987: 209) recalls that by 1971, ‘British troops, who had for a while 
been welcomed by the Northern Ireland Catholics, were regarded by them as the arm 
of the Unionist regime’. Although the British government did not like to admit it, 
Northern Ireland was rapidly becoming a war zone. Therefore, the flow of 
information, as is always the case in conflicts, was considered paramount.
Schlesinger (1987) argues the reporting of Northern Ireland was a form of war 
reporting and the ‘reference upwards’ system was an indication of this. In the 1967 
edition of the BBC’s Guide there was no mention of Northern Ireland, however the 
next edition, published in 1971, had its own section with five rules (the first four 
making ‘reference upwards’ a routine part of news production). According to Curtis 
(1984) the rules had two basic components. Firstly, all programme-makers were 
required to consult top management and obtain their approval for all programmes on 
Ireland. Writing at the time of the ‘reference upwards’ system, she discusses how 
every item on Northern Ireland, however minor, did not escape scrutiny and it was not 
only news and current affairs that were affected. In 1972, for example, Paul 
McCartney’s song, ‘Give Ireland Back to the Irish’, was banned by the BBC (Curtis, 
1984). Secondly, special restrictions applied to interviewing members of 
organisations that had been proscribed by the government. The main organisation 
that the government wished to silence was the IRA as it was the major organisation 
fighting the British army and challenging the legitimacy of the Unionist regime 
(Ibid.). As Smith (1972) suggests:
The system o f reference upwards operated (more or less) as a means to ban 
interviews with the IRA altogether. Permission had always to be sought and 
therefore was requested less and less often -  and when requested it was more 
and more frequently refused. (Smith, 1972: 31)
Curtis (1984) argues these restrictions on journalists and programme-makers were 
also largely the result of flak from Stormont and Westminster politicians as well as 
the British newspaper industry who heavily criticised broadcasters for giving a 
platform to Republicans and for publicising complaints about the security forces. 
Schlesinger (1987) recalls the BBC reporting of the British army using torture against
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Catholics interned without trial at Ballykinler interrogation centre in the early 1970s. 
The BBC was pressurised by members of the British government to discredit the 
victims and thus their accounts of torture. Although the BBC complied with the 
government’s requests, the Compton Report (1971) and the European Commission of 
Human Rights (1976) later revealed that the internees were indeed subjected to torture 
by the British army (Schlesinger, 1987; Rolston, 2002).
Schlesinger (1987: 205) argues that the Northern Ireland conflict has 
illustrated the power of the British government to limit what is, and more importantly 
what is not, broadcast by the media to the people of Northern Ireland and indeed the 
people of England, Scotland and Wales. He suggests this has been achieved ‘not 
through overt censorship, but rather through a mediated intervention, in which 
spokesmen in the sphere of politics have defined the permissible limits’, which the 
mass media has then reproduced (Ibid.).17
This was illustrated in late 1971 when Stormont and Westminster politicians 
with sections of the British newspaper industry put pressure on the BBC to censor The 
Question o f  Ulster, a current affairs programme about Northern Ireland. Schlesinger 
(1987: 214) discusses this episode at length and recalls how it emerged ‘at a time 
when the BBC [...] had just made clear its unequivocal support of the security forces’ 
efforts in Northern Ireland’. In a letter from the BBC chairman, Lord Hill, to British 
Home Secretary Reginald Maulding in November 1971, he had stated how one-sided 
the BBC was in its coverage of British and Republican combatants: ‘between the 
British Army and the gunmen, the BBC is not and cannot be impartial’ (cited in 
Smith, 1972: 24). This admission hints at the propagandistic approach to terrorism 
taken by the BBC during the Northern Ireland conflict and contradicts British 
government accusations o f the broadcast media being ‘irresponsible’ when trying to 
justify the introduction o f the broadcasting ban in 1988.
Smith (1972), Taylor (1978) and Schlesinger (1987) note how the BBC 
withstood the pressure from the Home Secretary and Northern Ireland Prime Minister 
Brian Faulkner (1971-2), eventually broadcasting The Question o f  Ulster. However, 
they also argue that whilst the BBC has championed this as demonstrative of their 
independence from the British state, the content o f the programme was actually 
‘straightforward, predictable and untroublesome’ (Smith, 1972: 31) and overall, ‘far 
from being exemplary this is, rather, a success story in the midst of a general defeat’ 
(Schlesinger, 1987: 242). Furthermore, Miller (1994) observes the fact that the
31
programme did not actually interview any IRA members. Schlesinger (1987: 219) 
argues this period was not a particularly independent one for the BBC and takes ‘the 
careful construction of that programme itself as a token of how gingerly the BBC was 
treading’. Taylor (1978: 69) adds, The Question o f Ulster ‘was notable more for the 
fact of its transmission than its content’.
On the other hand, this example still shows how the BBC could resist pressure 
from the British government and it was not the first and last time it did so. Francis 
(1977) argues that the BBC had a steady flow of analytical current affairs programmes 
concerning Northern Ireland, putting the figure at 349 features of ranging duration 
between 1971 and 1977. Of course, numbers aside, it is the substance of the 
programmes produced in this period that matter. Curtis (1984) argues the ‘reference 
upwards’ system filtered out any ‘undesirable’ programmes from an early stage, 
which she argues amounts to self-censorship. The point being that no matter how 
many programmes are produced, if the investigative and challenging reports are 
weeded out, then there is no critical analysis of the conflict. It seems that Schlesinger 
(1987) presents a realistic view of broadcasting and Northern Ireland when he argues 
that the constraints on broadcasters since 1971 did limit representations of the conflict 
and deterred investigative journalism on television. Taylor (1978) argues:
The deeper the crisis and the more controversial the methods used to meet it, 
the greater the strain on the institutions of broadcasting forced to choose 
between the journalist’s insistence on the public’s right to know everything 
and the government’s preference for it not to know much. (Taylor, 1978: 67-8)
It is not the case that broadcasters willingly produced insipid programmes. Rather it 
was the pressure from broadcast media management and the British government that 
led to the self-censorship of the British broadcast media workers. As will be 
illustrated in the following two examples of media interference, when the broadcast 
media did hold those in positions of power accountable, they were pressurised to 
desist by representatives of the British government. This illustrated how broadcasters 
did attempt to pursue their public service function and how ‘the restrictive rules [had] 
not closed off all the options for searching treatment’ (Schlesinger, 1987: xvii). 
However, it also revealed how the British government (and sections of the British 
newspaper industry) would put pressure on broadcasters to censor their own 
programmes if they did hold the powerful accountable.
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Real Lives -  At the Edse o f  the Union (1985):
Leapman (1986) and Viera (1991) document the Real Lives controversy, 
which occurred in 1985. This BBC documentary included interviews with Martin 
McGuinness o f Sinn Fein and Gregory Campbell of the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) who were both elected members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and 
advocated the use o f violence for political ends. Several writers discuss the political 
climate and the tensions that existed between the British government and the 
broadcasters leading up to Real Lives. Miller (1994) recalls the two controversies in 
1979 surrounding an Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) interview on the BBC’s 
Tonight programme18 and the BBC’s Panorama programme filming an IRA road 
block at Carrickmore.19
Miller (1994: 35) also cites ‘the 1984 Brighton bombing (in which Mrs 
Thatcher herself narrowly escaped death)’ as well as ‘the major rows over the 
Falklands [in 1982] and the coverage of the miners’ strike in 1984/85’ as reasons for 
the hostile relationship between the British government and the broadcasters. In 
addition, Leapman (1986) recalls that in June 1985, as Real Lives was being edited, a 
Trans World Airlines (TWA) aircraft was hijacked by members of Hizbollah and held 
at Beirut for several weeks, while hostages were released in return for demands such 
as the release of hundreds of Lebanese Shias held in Israeli prisons.20 The hostage 
crisis was covered live in the United States and broadcast worldwide on CNN 
(Edgerton, 1996). After American broadcasters allowed the hijackers to state their 
political motivations through interviews and press releases, Margaret Thatcher gave a 
speech at the American Bar Association in London arguing ‘terrorists’ and hijackers 
should be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ (Leapman, 1986).
As stated in the previous chapter, Margaret Thatcher articulated the orthodox 
perspective on the relationship between the mass media and terrorism in this speech 
by stating that a symbiotic relationship existed between the mass media and 
‘terrorism’. She was careful to dismiss the possibility of introducing direct censorship 
against the media but rhetorically pondered the case for the media agreeing to ‘a 
voluntary code of conduct’ (Thatcher, 1985). Understandably, this was interpreted as 
an instruction for the British media to practice self-censorship during the Northern 
Ireland conflict. Edgerton (1996: 115) argues Thatcher’s statement was her most 
threatening yet and was largely perceived to be aimed at encouraging the British 
media to ‘initiate their own voluntary ban on reporting acts of terrorism’.
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According to Leapman (1986), Paul Hamann, the producer of Real Lives, was 
worried by Thatcher’s statement because he believed it would influence his superiors 
to decide his film-making technique of letting interviewees talk freely without hostile 
questions and interruptions was not ‘responsible’ enough. Furthermore, Hamann was 
fearful that by portraying the real lives of the two politicians such as them spending 
time with their families, he might be accused of humanising McGuinness and 
Campbell. Hamann was right to be fearful. Miller (1994) suggests the scene from the 
programme that most incensed the British establishment was one showing 
McGuinness at home with one of his children sitting on his knee. He argues that ‘to 
portray McGuinness as a rational human being who lived in many deeply familiar and 
ordinary ways was beyond the pale of acceptable coverage’ (Miller, 1994: 38).
Although the BBC Controller Northern Ireland, James Hawthorne, did not see 
this scene as problematic he did ask a section of Real Lives that used old news film 
showing the brutality of the RUC against Catholic civil rights marchers be shortened. 
Leapman (1986) recalls that there was no BBC fall out from Thatcher’s ‘oxygen of 
publicity’ remark and the programme was scheduled for early August. However, 
Rupert Murdoch’s newspaper, The Sunday Times, soon began to stir up controversy, 
alerting British politicians to the programme and collecting statements of their 
reactions to it ‘giving space to terrorists’ (Leapman, 1986: 100). This included asking 
Margaret Thatcher a hypothetical question about how she would react to an interview 
with the chief of the IRA (implying that McGuinness held this position). What 
followed was a request from the British Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, urging the 
governors of the BBC to censor the documentary despite the fact that he had not 
actually seen the programme (Viera, 1991). Leon Brittan echoed Thatcher’s words 
that giving a platform to ‘terrorists’ would assist their objectives (Ibid.).
After viewing the documentary, the board of governors banned Real Lives: At 
the Edge o f  the Union. Schlesinger (1987) draws a parallel between Real Lives and 
The Question o f  Ulster, in that on both occasions a British Home Secretary intervened 
with a supposedly independent broadcaster. However, the difference was that this 
time the BBC crumbled under pressure from conservative newspapers and politicians. 
There was some resistance from media workers who organised a twenty-four-hour
*71strike on the day the documentary was supposed to be broadcast. Real Lives was 
eventually transmitted two months after being banned (Leapman, 1986; Viera, 1991).
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This Week -  Death on the Rock (1988):
Another programme, which actually did question the British government and 
military, namely its ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy, was part of a series on ITV called This 
Week. Death on the Rock focused on the extra-judicial executions of three IRA 
members in Gibraltar on 7th March, 1988. As Bolton (1990) notes, the IRA had been 
planning to plant a large bomb in the British colony of Gibraltar and the documentary 
focused on the official version of events from the British government and the differing 
version of eye-witnesses who had been interviewed during the research stage of the 
documentary. As Bolton (1990) and Miller (1994) highlight, the official version as 
expressed by Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, declared that the IRA 
volunteers had made threatening movements when challenged by the security forces. 
Such movements led them to consider that their own and other lives were in jeopardy 
so they shot and killed the IRA members. In contrast, eyewitnesses said they saw the 
IRA members clearly surrender, but the SAS combatants executed them regardless.
Bolton (1990), editor of This Week at the time, argues that the documentary 
team did not give a verdict on what they believed actually happened because they felt 
there was not enough evidence. However, the documentary did make clear that much 
of the official version was questionable, which he believes contributed to the 
subsequent anger expressed by the Thatcher administration and the British newspaper 
industry.22 According to Bolton (1990), Sir Geoffrey Howe phoned the Chairman of 
the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), Lord Thomson, two days before the 
date of transmission requesting that the programme be postponed to prevent it 
prejudicing the inquest.
Two days later the IBA, after legal consultation, decided that This Week -  
Death on the Rock should be broadcast and Howe was informed. Howe then phoned 
back a second time but was again unsuccessful in pressuring the IBA to censor the 
programme. Bolton (1990) recalls how the issue actually reached the House of 
Commons where the phrase ‘trial by television’ was mentioned and later extended by 
Thatcher. Although, there had been pressure from the British government, the IBA 
had resisted and triumphed. This example illustrates the lengths the British 
government went to stop the public from being informed about Gibraltar, but it also 
illustrates the resilience o f British broadcasters to government pressure.
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The British mass media and British law
Another element, which limited the ability of all British media workers to report the 
Northern Ireland conflict, concerns legislation. Miller (1994) argues that some 
legislation, especially ‘anti-terrorist’ legislation, was used to dilute and impede the 
flow of information about Northern Ireland, specifically ‘the Official Secrets Act (and 
the associated ‘D’ Notice committee), the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the 
Emergency Provisions Act’ (Miller, 1994: 30). For example, proscribing the IRA in 
Britain under the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 1974, made it difficult for journalists 
to interview IRA members, especially after the Act was amended in 1976 making it 
‘an offence [...] not to pass information to the police about any future act of terrorism 
or about people involved in terrorism without ‘reasonable excuse” (Ibid.: 31-2).
Curtis (1984) discusses the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, which 
hindered the ability of journalists to interview members of the IRA because section 5 
of the Act states it is an offence not to supply the police with any information relating 
to criminal activities. Hayes (2003) adds the 1981 Contempt of Court Act, which 
demanded journalists declare their sources in the interests of ‘national security’ or to 
prevent crime and disorder. He argues the subsidiary effect of such legislation ‘was to 
control the output of relevant official information, inhibit the utilization of ‘unofficial 
sources’ and thereby impede genuine investigative journalism’ (Hayes, 2003: 137).
Schlesinger (1987) and Miller (1994) discuss the possible ramifications of 
such legislation, recognising how after 1974 no more interviews with republican 
combatants took place in the British media until 1979, when a member of the INLA 
was interviewed on the BBC Tonight programme. After this interview was broadcast, 
Thatcher asked the Attorney-General, Sir Michael Havers, to consider taking legal 
action against the BBC. Schlesinger (1987) notes how Havers considered, but 
decided against, prosecuting under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1976) for 
withholding information likely to lead to the apprehension of a terrorist.
Similar criticisms and threats were made by Thatcher after the IRA roadblock 
in Carrickmore was filmed by the BBC programme Panorama (Edgerton, 1996). 
Again, Thatcher and Havers decided against prosecuting the BBC, but it sent a clear 
enough message, which meant the BBC did not resist having the untransmitted 
material seized by the police under Section 11 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(1976). Thus, it is possible to see how British ‘anti-terror’ legislation often doubled
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up as a method to restrict media freedom (Hussain, 2000). Significantly, this element 
of control o f the British mass media impacted media workers in the broadcast media 
and the print media, whereas most censorship of the media was aimed at the broadcast 
media, especially television programmes concerning the Northern Ireland conflict. 
However, there was no legislation that controlled the British broadcast media as much 
as the broadcasting ban.
The broadcasting ban (1988-1994)
On 19th October 1988, Douglas Hurd, the British Home Secretary, announced a ban 
on broadcasting statements from eleven Northern Irish political and military 
organisations (Eldridge et al., 1997). This included interviews and direct statements 
from representatives of Sinn Fein as well as the IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries such 
as the UDA (Henderson et al., 1990). The ban, which applied to all British 
broadcasters, also prohibited sympathisers of these organisations from having their 
statements broadcast (McLaughlin and Baker, 2010). Moloney (1991) argues that 
although the British government preferred to play down the implications of the 
broadcasting ban as mere ‘restrictions’, they amounted to the most stringent controls 
on the broadcast media since World War II. He adds, ‘never again could the boast be 
made that Britain enjoyed complete freedom of speech’ (Moloney, 1991: 10).
One writer describes the ban as ‘the most serious and direct sanction imposed 
by a British government’ (Lago, 1998: 677) and Taylor (1999: 250) argues it was an 
‘indication of how the [British] government attempted censorship as a weapon in the 
propaganda war’. Although more than 70 programmes are known to have been cut or 
delayed before the broadcasting ban was introduced (Rolston, 2002), the British 
government clearly believed it needed more control over the British broadcast media. 
The ban lasted for six years and was lifted following the IRA ceasefire (31st August, 
1994) and the beginning of the peace process (Eldridge et al., 1997; McLaughlin and 
Baker, 2010).
Contextualising the broadcasting ban:
Henderson et al. (1990) and Moloney (1991) both contextualise the lead up to 
the broadcasting ban and list several factors which they argue encouraged the British 
government to introduce direct censorship. Henderson et al. (1990: 1) argue the
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broadcasting ban followed ‘a year of confrontations between the government and the 
media and a number of ‘big’ stories from Northern Ireland’ such as the IRA bomb that 
killed 11 people at Enniskillen on 8th November, 1987. Moloney (1991) suggests the 
extra-judicial killings of three IRA members in Gibraltar on 7th March 1988 and its 
aftermath were critical, but he also recognises the continuing rise of Sinn Fein’s 
support following the 1981 Hunger Strikes in Long Kesh certainly had an impact too.
Ten Republicans died for political prisoner status, resisting British government 
attempts to criminalise the Republican Movement (Jempson, 1993; Edgerton, 1996; 
Rolston, 2002; Hayes, 2003). Solidarity with the hunger strikers was expressed in the 
victory of Bobby Sands at the 1981 by-election and the success of the anti-H Block 
candidates in the council elections a month later (Miller, 1994).24 As Moloney (1991) 
notes, this success inspired the ‘Armalite and ballot box’ strategy and helped Gerry 
Adams win a seat (West Belfast) in the 1982 Westminster general elections. Jempson 
(1993: 10) draws a link between the growing electoral successes of Sinn Fein and the 
British government’s introduction o f ‘the Elected Authorities (NI) Act of 1988, which 
banned anyone convicted of a criminal offence from holding elected office’.
Another factor that Moloney (1991) suggests was important was the 
Falklands/Malvinas conflict, which saw some British television programmes and 
individual journalists attacked for ‘unpatriotic’ coverage and questions. In addition, 
the neo-liberal assault on public services and attacks on trade unions by Thatcher 
extended to particular media institutions like the BBC and to trade unions 
representing newspaper workers. The Gibraltar controversy, Death on the Rock and 
the government’s reaction to it undoubtedly played a crucial role in the British 
government’s decision to introduce the broadcasting ban.
As Miller (1994) and Taylor (1999) note, the discovery of eye-witnesses to the 
executions of three surrendering IRA members by the programme-makers of Death on 
the Rock suggested a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy was in operation and infuriated the British 
government. The failed attempt to censor the documentary through what Moloney 
(1991) calls the traditional ‘nudge and wink’ pressure revealed the limitations of this 
indirect approach. According to Henderson et al. (1990: 2), the British Foreign 
Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, also attempted ‘to stop the BBC broadcasting a 
programme on the shootings made by BBC Northern Ireland’s Spotlight team’. This 
attempted censorship was unsuccessful as well.
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Furthermore, in Milltown cemetery on 16th March, 1988, during the funeral of 
the IRA members that were killed in Gibraltar, UDA member Michael Stone attacked 
mourners with grenades and pistol fire killing three (Miller, 1994). A few days later, 
two British soldiers were killed after driving into an IRA funeral procession travelling 
along Andersonstown Road towards Milltown Cemetery to bury those killed by 
Michael Stone. As Miller (1994) notes, the mourners feared another Loyalist attack 
was beginning, especially after one of the soldiers fired a shot from inside the 
surrounded car. The British soldiers were dragged out, beaten and carried away. All 
this was ‘captured on television and still cameras and broadcast around the world that 
night’ (Miller, 1994: 38-9). They were executed with their own weapons hours later 
by the IRA (Moloney, 1991). All this bloodshed had occurred in the nine days 
following the Gibraltar killings.
Moloney (1991) and Miller (1994) both discuss the aftermath of the killings of 
the British soldiers with regard to the media and its battle with the authorities. At 
first, television companies refused the RUC Chief Constable’s request to hand over 
untransmitted film of the events to the police. However, following Thatcher’s speech 
in the House of Commons that stated the media are either on the side of justice or on 
the side of terrorism, this changed (Butler, 1995). The police seized film from the 
BBC and ITN ‘quoting two pieces of anti-terrorism legislation, the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act and the Emergency Provisions Act’ (Moloney, 1991: 25).
The final series of events that Moloney (1991) argues laid the ground for the 
broadcasting ban related to the IRA summer offensive of 1988, which involved 
attacks on a British military base in Germany, as well as attacks against British 
military personnel in England and Northern Ireland. In May, Thatcher complained 
the media were giving the IRA too much publicity and ordered a high level security 
review. The broadcasting ban was favoured over internment because the latter had 
been a disaster for the British government in the 1970s.
The official line:
According to Henderson et al. (1990), the official reasoning for the 
broadcasting ban was based on two arguments. Firstly, Douglas Hurd, echoing 
Thatcher’s contention that broadcasters provide ‘terrorists’ with the ‘oxygen of 
publicity’, argued television had given an “easy platform” on which to “propagate 
terrorism”. Secondly, Hurd suggested that when members of the public watched
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statements from or interviews with organisations like Sinn Fein and the IRA it caused 
“offence”. Hurd’s first argument is critiqued by Henderson et al. (1990) who suggest 
that the “easy platform”, in reality, never actually existed.
As Moloney (1991: 10) points out ‘TV and radio companies had long since 
applied a voluntary prohibition on interviews with paramilitary groups, particularly 
republican ones’. IRA members had not been interviewed by the BBC and ITV since 
1974 and the INLA was last interviewed in 1979 following their assassination of 
Airey Neave (Moloney, 1991). This limited access to the media was similar for the 
legal political party, Sinn Fein. A study conducted by Henderson et al. (1990) of Sinn 
Fein appearances on network television news twelve months before the broadcasting 
ban highlights the limited access Sinn Fein had to the ‘terrorist propaganda platform’.
Sinn Fein representatives were interviewed on BBC news 17 times out of a 
total of 633 interviews concerning Northern Ireland (Henderson et al., 1990). 
Alternatively, representatives of the Conservative Party were interviewed on BBC 
news 121 times (Ibid.). In addition, Sinn Fein members were not allotted any studio 
interviews on British network television news in the year prior to the introduction of 
the broadcasting ban. Henderson et al. (1990: 29) argue this is significant because 
studio interviews ‘confer status’ to those interviewed.
According to Moloney (1991), the media rarely allowed Republican voices to 
be heard and when they were interviewed it was often in a hostile manner. This 
contention was supported by the Labour deputy leader, Roy Hattersley, who stated the 
total length of interviews with Sinn Fein and its supporters on ITV in the whole of 
1988 was a mere four minutes. ‘Three minutes and 59 seconds of that were, he 
claimed, hostile to Sinn Fein. “How much assistance does the Home Secretary think 
those four minutes gave the IRA?”, he asked’ (Moloney, 1991: 28-29). Similarly, 
Independent Television News (ITN) provided evidence that suggested if the 
broadcasting ban had been introduced a year earlier in 1987, it would only have 
‘affected 8 minutes and 20 seconds of over 1200 hours of ITN air time’ (Edgerton, 
1996: 125). This indicates how effective the indirect censorship of government flak 
and media self-censorship had already been in quelling the ‘oxygen of publicity’ prior 
to the direct censorship o f the broadcasting ban.
Hurd’s second argument for the broadcasting ban is also critiqued by 
Henderson et al. (1990) who quote a BBC and IBA source saying there is little 
evidence that audiences have been offended in the period before the ban. That said, it
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is possible that some Republican statements could have offended some parts of the 
British public, but no more so than Loyalist, RUC or British Army statements could 
have offended other parts of the same ‘British’ public, especially because over a third 
of Northern Ireland’s population is Catholic (many of whom identify themselves as 
Irish instead of British). It seems more likely that Hurd’s totalising of public opinion 
was a method of justifying the ban and expressing British government distaste for 
Republican voices in the British mass media.
Another justification given by the British government for the broadcasting ban 
was related to the censorship regulations in the Irish Republic and Hurd actually 
remarked how the ‘restrictions’ followed closely that of the Irish Republic’s in his 
speech on the day he introduced it (Henderson et al., 1990). It is true that the Irish 
Republic had used direct censorship against Republican voices since the early 1970s 
(Arthur, 1987; Baimer, 1996).25 In fact, the Irish broadcasting ban was harsher than 
the British broadcasting ban in a number of ways (Miller, 1990).26 The censorship in 
the Irish Republic was lifted in early 1994, which put pressure on the British 
government to lift its own broadcasting ban several months later on 16th September.
The impact of the broadcasting ban:
Moloney (1991) argues the vague language used in Hurd’s directive left the 
interpretation of the broadcasting ban largely to the broadcasters, which led to an 
over-cautious interpretation of it. Rolston (2002) argues that it was far easier for 
broadcasters to simply not bother interviewing Sinn Fein representatives than to risk 
contravening the new censorship legislation. This meant that the number of 
interviews with Sinn Fein declined dramatically across the British broadcast media. 
There were 93 appearances of Sinn Fein on British television news during the year 
before the ban was introduced, but in the year immediately following the ban this 
number ‘fell to 34, a drop of more than 63%’ (Henderson et al., 1990: 37).27
Consequently, Rolston (2002: 61-2) suggests ‘the ban played a crucial role in 
containment by making the possibility of open debate difficult’. Another outcome of 
the ban was the difficulty documentary-makers faced in making serious in-depth 
factual programmes on Northern Ireland. After the ban was introduced such 
programmes were no longer produced (Henderson et al., 1990). Instead, programme- 
makers turned to ‘docudramas’ or ‘faction’ because these genres allowed more space 
to contest the official view (Ibid.).
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There were opportunities for the broadcasters to circumvent the broadcasting 
ban. One strategy was to dub the broadcast statements o f the banned organisations by 
using actors with Irish accents, which were often out o f sync (Eldridge et al., 1997). 
Using subtitles was another strategy (Lago, 1998). For example, after the IBA banned 
The Pogues song about the Birmingham Six and Guildford Four, ‘ITN reported the 
IBA decision by showing footage of the Pogues in concert, rolling the words up on 
the screen and reciting them’ (Henderson et al., 1990: 45). Overall though, it would 
seem the broadcasting ban had a very serious impact on media output, encouraging 
self-censorship (Moloney, 1991) and ensuring the British government perspective 
dominated British broadcast media representations of the Northern Ireland conflict. 
The attacks on the broadcasters and individual journalists before the ban was 
introduced had weakened their ability to resist it and the NUJ could not manage to 
pull off a united strike like that of the Real Lives controversy (Ibid.).
The broadcasting ban was the clearest manifestation of how the British 
government sought to maintain its dominance in the Northern Ireland conflict by 
directly controlling the British broadcast media. As Lago (1998: 677) points out, such 
direct censorship meant the role of the media as the ‘Fourth Estate’ and as a watchdog 
on the powerful was limited because information about events and people in the North 
of Ireland was actively withheld. According to Baimer (1996), the logic behind this 
undemocratic course of action was a response to the orthodox view that the real 
winners of the media coverage of the conflict were the Republican Movement, rather 
than the British government. The literature and research reviewed so far in this 
chapter has largely suggested the opposite was the case.
Before the broadcasting ban came into force, the British government 
consistently pressurised British broadcasters to censor programmes that allowed 
Republican voices to be heard. Although British broadcasters successfully resisted 
this pressure on several occasions, on other occasions they gave in and altered or 
censored programmes about Northern Ireland. This was even more difficult after the 
introduction o f the ‘reference upwards’ system, which institutionalised self­
censorship in the British broadcast media. All these restrictions on media freedom in 
Britain can be traced back to orthodox scholarship on the mass media and ‘terrorism’. 
As was argued in the previous chapter, if the ‘oxygen of publicity’ argument is 
accepted and promoted by those in power (whether they believe it or not) then so will 
the ‘necessity’ o f the ‘suffocation of censorship’.
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Those subscribing to democratic principles would hope that if one section of 
the British mass media was being directly censored by the British government, the 
remaining sections of it would defend the independence of the ‘Fourth Estate’. For 
this reason, this research analyses British newspaper representations of the British 
government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban to discover the extent to 
which national newspapers supported and resisted such censorship.
The peace process (1994-2007)
The broadcasting ban ended and the peace process began (publicly) following the IRA 
ceasefire on 31st August, 1994. The peace process had been developing behind the 
scenes ever since Father Alec Reid approached Sinn Fein’s Gerry Adams and set up a 
secret dialogue with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Tom King, in 1987 
(Murray and Tonge, 2005; Moloney, 2007). Gerry Adams also began secret meetings 
with SDLP leader John Hume in 1988 (Moloney, 2007). In essence, these secret 
meetings led Republicans away from the Armalite and the ballot box strategy to one 
purely based on the latter (Spencer, 2003).
The Joint (or, Downing Street) Declaration, signed on 15 th December 1993, 
encouraged the IRA ceasefire. Spencer (2003) suggests the ability of the Irish 
government (with the support and clout of the US) to pressurise Britain into accepting 
the revised Republican demands, in turn encouraged Republicans to leave the path of 
political violence. The declaration stated that Britain recognised the right of the 
island of Ireland to self-determination, however, the consent principle was limited by 
the partitioned island voting separately (Darby, 2003; Spencer, 2003; 2005). 
Unsurprisingly then, the Declaration actually pleased many Unionists and angered the 
IRA grassroots because a united Ireland was now very unlikely (Moloney, 2007).
- Decommissioning of the IRA was central to the peace process too. On 7th 
March, 1995, the Secretary of State, Sir Patrick Mayhew, demanded the 
decommissioning of the IRA as a precondition for Sinn Fein’s entry into talks. 
However, the IRA could not and would not be seen to surrender (Moloney, 2007). In 
an attempt to find some middle ground, George Mitchell, head of the International 
Body on Arms Decommissioning, recommended on 24th January, 1996 that arms 
decommissioning and all-party talks should begin in parallel, but this was rejected by 
the British government (Darby, 2003). Soon afterwards, the IRA bombing of the
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London docklands area on 9th February, 1996 ended the ceasefire. The IRA argued 
they had resorted to such an action because of the lack of progress in negotiations 
resulting from Unionist and British intransigence (Spencer, 2005).
After several more attacks on cities in England and against the British Army 
and RUC in Northern Ireland, the IRA ceasefire was reinstated on 20th July, 1997, 
which was a couple o f months after Tony Blair replaced John Major as Prime 
Minister. Spencer (2005) suggests this change of government was very important to 
the negotiations because New Labour was not as dependent on Unionist voters as the 
Conservative Party and therefore was more flexible. Importantly, by mid-June 1997 
the new British government decided the IRA did not have to decommission before 
Sinn Fein could enter talks (Darby, 2003). However, decommissioning continued to 
be a demand o f Unionists (particularly the DUP) who were opposed to the peace 
process and opposed to sharing power with Republicans.
There were other important factors that shaped the peace process. The 
election of the new Taoiseach, Bertie Ahem, on 6th June, 1997 as well as the ongoing 
support of the Clinton administration and the growth of Sinn Fein’s support in 
Northern Ireland also contributed to the progress in negotiations (Spencer, 2005). 
These negotiations culminated in the Good Friday Agreement on 10th April, 1998, 
which was based on three strands:
The first strand focuses on the formation of a new assembly which fully 
represents the different communities and parties. The second seeks to facilitate 
stronger liaison and co-operation between Northern Ireland and Dublin. And 
the third is concerned with tightening relations between all parts of Britain and 
Ireland. (Spencer, 2005: 123)
A referendum was held on 22nd May, 1998 to ratify the Good Friday Agreement and it 
proved to be very popular amongst the electorate in the North and South of Ireland 
(Darby, 2003). 71% voted in favour of the Agreement in Northern Ireland and 94% 
voted in favour in the Irish Republic (Darby, 2003). However, there still remained 
two contentious issues dividing Irish Republicans and British Unionists in Northern 
Ireland. Firstly, there was the reform of the police, which was demanded by 
Republicans and secondly, there was the decommissioning of the IRA, which was 
demanded by Unionists. After years of negotiations, damaging revelations, hostile 
exchanges and boycotts both were achieved.
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On 4th November, 2001 the RUC became the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland and Sinn Fein members voted to support policing in Northern Ireland several 
years later on 28th January, 2007 (Moloney, 2007). On 26th September, 2005 General 
John de Chastelain, head of the Independent International Commission of 
Decommissioning, verified that the IRA had put all its weapons beyond use (Ibid.). 
Less than two years later, on 8th May, 2007, Ian Paisley of the DUP and Martin 
McGuinness of Sinn Fein were sworn in as first and deputy first minister of the new 
power-sharing government in Stormont (Coulter and Murray, 2008).
The peace process has had a significant impact on media representations of 
Northern Ireland. Hussain (2000) argues there has been a vast improvement regarding 
freedom of expression and that self-censorship has decreased in the British mass 
media, particularly since the broadcasting ban was lifted. An indication of this move 
away from indirect and direct censorship was the broadcasting of the first British 
television interview with IRA representatives since 1974, which occurred on 20th 
December, 1994 (see Miller, 1995a; 1995b). In addition, interviews with Republicans 
became less hostile as the peace process advanced, suggesting British mass media 
representations shifted in line with the changing position and approach of the British 
government (Miller, 2002). Indeed, Wolfsfeld (2001) argues that there was certainly 
elite consensus regarding the peace process in Northern Ireland, which was reflected 
in positive coverage of the negotiations.
Lago (1998: 679) conducted a comparative analysis of Sinn Fein interviews on 
British television and discovered that ‘with the start of the peace process there were 
significant changes both in the duration of the interviews and, perhaps more 
importantly, in the locations in which these took place’. In the year preceding the 
ban, Sinn Fein representatives appeared on television 93 times and were formally 
interviewed 29 times, but these interviews ‘were extremely short [...] and were 
mostly carried out in the street or outside an office’ (Lago, 1998: 678-679). The 
significance of this relates to the suggestion that studio interviews ‘confer status’ to 
those interviewed (Henderson et al., 1990: 29), whereas street interviews do not.
During the first year of the broadcasting ban, Sinn Fein representatives were 
not given a single formal interview by the BBC, ITN or Channel 4 and television 
appearances decreased by 63 per cent (from 93 appearances to 34) (Henderson et al., 
1990; Lago, 1998). However, between September 1993 and August 1994 Sinn Fein 
representatives were interviewed 67 times by these television channels (Lago, 1998).
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Not only were the interviews more frequent, they lasted much longer and ‘became 
more formal, with settings moving from the street outside offices to within offices and 
studios’ (Ibid.: 679). In other words, Sinn Fein was literally brought in from the cold 
once the broadcasting ban was lifted and the peace process accelerated. Lago (1998) 
argues the themes of television news interviews with Sinn Fein representatives also 
shifted from being preoccupied with violence before the ban was introduced 
(Henderson et al., 1990) to focusing on broader themes, such as the IRA ceasefire, the 
peace process and Gerry Adams’ visit to the USA, after the ban was lifted.
The peace process enabled people labelled as ‘terrorists’ to articulate their 
positions openly after decades of being excluded from news reports. It also meant 
dominant articulations of the conflict were questioned for the first time in the British 
media (Spencer, 2003). Having said that, it has also been suggested that old media 
habits die hard (Miller, 2002). One example revealing continuing media hostility to 
republicanism occurred on 17th November, 1994 when Gerry Adams appeared on 
Newsnight (BBC2) and Jeremy Paxman asked, ‘How does it feel visiting a country 
where most people think you are an apologist for murder?’ (cited in Lago, 1998: 682). 
Miller (2002) argues this ‘reflex hostility’ can be explained by acknowledging that 
during the Northern Ireland conflict, ‘broadcasters stated unambiguously that they 
were on the side of the state. But now in the new circumstances of peace there has 
been no repudiation of such institutionalised bias’ (Miller (2002: 125).
Interestingly, Spencer (2005) argues media representations of Northern Ireland 
actually had an impact on the peace process too. He suggests that because television 
news broadcast the contestations between parties and publicized the dynamic and 
direction of talks, it actually became a participant in the peace process and produced 
‘expectations and pressures which were absorbed into negotiations’ (Spencer, 2005: 
127). He adds, ‘the political arena became subject to a broader range of discourses 
trying to contest various positions and interests which were emerging in debates and 
negotiations about peace’ (Ibid.).
Spencer (2005) also contends that television news was particularly influential 
because of its ability to reach more people and the fact that audiences are more 
diverse compared to that o f newspapers. Unsurprisingly, there is evidence to 
suggest that British media freedom has greatly improved with the peace process and 
the lifting of the broadcasting ban. What becomes clear though is the lack of research 
that analyses British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban and the peace
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process. For legitimate reasons, scholars in the field analysing British mass media 
representations of the Northern Ireland conflict have mostly focused on British 
television representations of the conflict and the transition into the peace process. 
One major reason for this is the fact that most of the orthodox scholarship on the mass 
media and ‘terrorism’ has encouraged ‘Western’ governments to control the broadcast 
media, particularly television. In Britain, one of the few supposedly democratic 
societies to actually introduce direct censorship against this section of the mass media 
has meant therefore that scholars have analysed the impact of it on broadcasters.
Hence, researching British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban 
will make an original contribution to the field of the British mass media and Northern 
Ireland conflict as well as to the field of the mass media and ‘terrorism’ more 
generally. In this thesis, three research questions are explored. Firstly, how much 
coverage of the broadcasting ban was there in British newspapers when the British 
government introduced and lifted the ban? Secondly, how was the broadcasting ban 
represented in British newspapers when the British government introduced and lifted 
the ban? Thirdly, how can newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban be 
explained by analysing facets of the production and consumption of the British mass 
media as well as power relations inside and outside the news room?
The British mass media and the Northern Ireland conflict: summary
The history of the British mass media and the Northern Ireland conflict reveals the 
antagonism betwe en the British government and the British media. Contrary to 
orthodox writers’ claims, it was the British government, not the Republican 
Movement, which had the power to alter representations of the Northern Ireland 
conflict. On many occasions, the British government successfully pressured British 
broadcasters from offering another perspective. An obvious motivation for the British 
government restricting media freedom was to persuade people living in England, 
Scotland and Wales that the six counties of Northern Ireland should remain part of 
Britain instead of being reunited with Ireland as the Republican Movement desired.
There was little consensus in Northern Ireland after Ireland was partitioned, 
but the silent treatment the British mass media generally gave to Northern Ireland 
suggested there was. A significant body of research suggests that ever since the BBC 
was established there in 1924, it worked in the interests of the British government and
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the Unionists in Northern Ireland, who became the majority following partition, but 
had been the minority before. For decades the BBC monopolised broadcasting, which 
made it easier to maintain the silence. Ostensibly the media silence was to prevent 
disorder, violence and lives being lost, but it also prevented debate on serious issues 
such as partition and the discrimination faced by Catholics. It was only after the civil 
rights movement in Northern Ireland gained momentum in the mid to late 1960s and 
was attacked by the RUC that the British and international mass media were 
compelled to cover Northern Ireland.
As Northern Ireland descended into a war zone in the late 1960s and early 
1970s and the rest of the world became aware of what was happening there, the mass 
media became a central tool in the propaganda war. This explains why, after the 
pressure exerted by the British government, the ‘reference upwards’ system was 
introduced by the BBC and I TV in 1971. This system was a form of war reporting 
that operated to restrict what information could (and importantly, could not) be 
communicated by the British mass media. Unsurprisingly, it narrowed the parameters 
of debate in the British media (and therefore in British society), excluded Republican 
voices, encouraged journalists to engage in self-censorship and deterred investigative 
journalism. Essentially, despite resistance from some brave journalists and 
documentary makers working in the British mass media, it eroded media freedom.
Another tool the British government had at its disposal was the use of British 
law, which could be used to prevent the British mass media straying from the official 
narrative. Various sections in ‘anti-terrorist’ legislation made it difficult, if not illegal, 
to interview Republicans. In addition, on a few occasions the RUC used British 
legislation to seize journalistic material that was considered beneficial to the ‘enemy’. 
However, by far the most blatant piece of legislation used to control the British mass 
media-was the broadcasting ban. Interviews with Sinn Fein declined dramatically 
across the British broadcast media, self-censorship by journalists further increased, 
resulting in the British government perspective dominating British broadcast media 
representations of the Northern Ireland conflict.
The peace process paved the way for more media freedom and less censorship. 
The lifting of the broadcasting ban, the cessation of violence and the significant 
ideological compromises (Hayes and Bean, 2001) brought elite consensus, which was 
reflected in British mass media representations of the peace process (Wolfsfeld, 
2001). As the British government accepted leading Republicans so did the British
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mass media, which meant IRA representatives were interviewed on television for the 
first time in twenty years. Interviews with Sinn Fein representatives also increased 
and became less hostile as the peace process advanced. Not only were the interviews 
more frequent, they lasted much longer and took place in more formal settings such as 
television studios (Lago, 1998).
After exploring the relationship between the British government and the 
British mass media during the Northern Ireland conflict, it is hard to refute Baimer 
(1996). He argues it is undeniable that the British government interfered, indirectly 
and directly, with media coverage of Northern Ireland. Clearly, those in positions of 
power consider the mass media to be central to maintaining their control over society. 
This was illustrated by the many examples of indirect and direct censorship against 
mass media representations of the Northern Ireland conflict encouraged by 
representatives of Stormont and Westminster. Censorship during the Northern Ireland 
conflict was also encouraged by some mass media owners and managers as well as 
orthodox scholars. In this research, the extent to which the British newspaper 
industry covered the broadcasting ban and the way in which journalists represented 
such censorship are analysed to reveal how and why social actors from different 
sections of society attempted to build support for, and opposition to, such censorship.
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Chapter 3 — Methodological Approach
In this chapter, the research questions of this thesis are outlined as well as the 
sampling and data collection method for analyzing British newspaper representations 
of the broadcasting ban. The two research methods used in this research are 
introduced with an explanation of why content analysis and critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) have been chosen and combined. The strengths and weaknesses of such 
methodological approaches will also be explored followed by an explanation of how 
they are used in this research.
The first two chapters of this research have suggested that much of the 
orthodox scholarship, which focuses on the supposed dependence of ‘terrorists’ on the 
mass media, has encouraged ‘Western’ governments to blame the mass media for 
giving ‘terrorists’ the ‘oxygen of publicity’. This has then been used as a justification 
to pressurise the mass media to represent conflicts in a way that is more favourable to 
‘Western’ governments and the violence of their own combatants. In Britain this led 
to the suffocation of censorship being introduced by the British government in the 
form of the broadcasting ban. This followed many years of pressure against the 
British broadcast media, which encouraged self-censorship during the Northern 
Ireland conflict. It also led to the exclusion of Republican Movement representatives 
from the British mass media in general, which meant the British government’s 
perspective of the conflict dominated the coverage.
It has also been argued that orthodox writers and representatives of ‘Western’ 
governments adopt a propagandists approach, where ‘terrorism’ is the sole 
responsibility of an officially designated enemy. Some critical writers such as 
Chomsky (2002) go so far as to argue that this is largely true of the mass media in 
‘Western’ societies too. Whilst it is quite clear that orthodox writers and 
representatives of ‘Western’ governments apply double standards to acts of political 
violence against non-combatants, it is still not possible to make claims about whether 
the British mass media did during the Northern Ireland conflict. However, analysing 
British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban will reveal whether or not 
the British print media adopted a propagandists approach to terrorism during the 
Northern Ireland conflict. It will also reveal the extent to which British national 
newspapers supported and resisted the ban and the struggles that took place inside and 
outside the British newspaper industry.
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Research questions
The research questions of this thesis are threefold. Firstly, how much coverage of the 
broadcasting ban was there in British newspapers when the British government 
introduced and lifted the ban? Secondly, how was the broadcasting ban represented in 
British newspapers when the British government introduced and lifted the ban? 
Thirdly, how can newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban be explained by 
analysing facets o f the production and consumption of the British mass media as well 
as power relations inside and outside the news room?
Answering the first research question entails an analysis of the 
newsworthiness of the broadcasting ban in British newspapers by comparing 
broadcasting ban articles with other Northern Ireland conflict articles. Using content 
analysis, all newspaper articles relating to the Northern Ireland conflict are quantified 
and coded into subject categories and the imagery, genre, prominence and size of 
broadcasting ban articles and other Northern Ireland articles are contrasted. 
Newspaper articles representing and mentioning the broadcasting ban are also 
quantified within individual newspapers so that claims can be made about the 
newsworthiness o f the broadcasting ban across the range of newspapers in Britain.
Answering the second research question entails an analysis of representations 
of the broadcasting ban in British newspapers. This involves exploring how the social 
actors that introduced and lifted the ban as well as those that supported and resisted it 
were represented. It also involves analysing how the discourses emanating from these 
social actors functioned to build support and opposition to the ban and how journalists 
refracted such discourses. Using content analysis, all the discourses in newspaper 
articles representing the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting 
ban are quantified. The most frequently occurring discourses are then explored using 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) to explain how such discourses functioned to build 
support and opposition to the ban and why some discourses dominated over others.
Answering the third research question entails an analysis of the discursive and 
social practices impacting British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. 
Using CDA, the discursive practices involved in the production and consumption of 
newspaper journalism are explored by analysing the processes in which the authors 
encoded and the audience decoded newspaper articles representing the broadcasting 
ban. The social practices impacting newspaper journalism at the time the ban was
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introduced and lifted are also explored such as preceding government controls over 
the British mass media, major industrial disputes such as Wapping, and the resistance 
of media workers to indirect pressure against the British broadcast media. These are 
analysed in terms of struggles within the media and in society at large.
Sampling and data collection
The sample of this research consists of six national newspapers representative of the 
British newspaper industry: The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Mail, Daily Express, The 
Guardian, and The Daily Telegraph. These newspapers constitute two ‘popular’ 
newspapers, two ‘mid-market’ newspapers and two ‘quality’ newspapers. They are 
also representative of the political sympathies within such genres and had the highest 
circulations for the years being sampled (Willings Press Guide, 1989-1995). The time 
period of these newspapers collected for analysis ranges from 1st October 1988 to 6th 
November 1988 and 29th August 1994 to 4th October 1994. These dates are 
rationalised according to the dates the British government introduced (19th October 
1988) and lifted (16th September 1994) the broadcasting ban. The range of the two 
time periods is designed to capture any newspaper articles representing the Northern 
Ireland conflict and broadcasting ban in the eighteen days before and after the ban 
was introduced and lifted.
The unavailability o f newspaper articles on the Nexis newspaper archive for 
all the newspapers and dates of the sample resulted in the data collection being carried 
out at the British Library’s Newspaper Archive at Colindale. As the only newspapers 
available on Nexis for the duration of the sample in this research were The Guardian 
and The Times, it was not considered feasible methodologically to analyse two out of 
the six' sampled newspapers with the Nexis format and the remaining four sampled 
newspapers in their original composition. Once it was clear that most of the 
newspapers would have to be accessed on microfilm, it was decided that all six 
newspapers would be researched in the same way for consistency. In addition, after 
researching the circulation figures for all national newspapers during the period of the 
sample, it was apparent that it was The Daily Telegraph not The Times, which had a 
larger circulation in these time periods. This is why the former was selected over the 
latter as the newspaper representative of both the conservative and ‘quality’ press.
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Despite the haemorrhaging of time with such an old fashioned manual 
approach to data collection, the main advantage of acquiring data from the British 
Newspaper Archive was the original format of the newspaper articles. As the relevant 
newspaper articles collected for sampling were photocopied from microfilm reels of 
original newspapers, the format of them is the same as it was for members of the 
public that consumed them at the time of publication. This means the page layout is 
the same and the corresponding images are present as are the adjoining articles. All 
of which would not be available if Nexis could have been and was used. Deacon 
(2007) has underlined several weaknesses in using Nexis and has articulated the 
importance of the aforementioned point:
[T]he size and positioning of text and the use of photographs and illustrations 
are key mechanisms by which news-makers dramatize reports, assist readers’ 
comprehension, corroborate the ‘truth’ of a reported event and, sometimes, 
qualify, or even subvert, the linguistic substance of a related news item. 
(Deacon, 2007: 10)
Other problems researchers may encounter when using Nexis are related to the 
reliance on key word searches, which can create ‘false positives’ (when a searched 
word has multiple uses and therefore creates many more results than is accurate) and, 
worse, ‘false negatives’ (when a searched word is too specific and therefore excludes 
significant amounts of relevant coverage) (Soothill and Grover, 1997; Deacon, 2007). 
Furthermore, whereas it is possible to identify ‘things’, it is not possible to identify 
‘themes’ using key word searches (Deacon, 2007). This means ‘there are certain 
topics that may be readily analysed via manual content searches, but which can never 
be captured through exclusive dependence on key words’ (Ibid.: 8).
The way in which the data was collected was laborious yet thorough. Each 
microfilm was read page by page for any text that mentioned the Northern Ireland 
conflict. In order for a text to be selected, it had to concern this conflict or social 
actors involved with it as the news hook or at least feature as the majority of the 
story.29 Once a relevant text was identified a note was taken of the newspaper, date 
and page number and once the entire microfilm had been searched, the relevant 
newspaper articles were photocopied. This process was then repeated for the next 
microfilm. The microfilms were organised by newspaper title and each microfilm 
usually covered one month of newspaper output.
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All newspaper microfilms, except The Daily Telegraph, did not cover Sunday 
editions. Once this became apparent, a decision was made to exclude Sunday editions 
of the sampled newspapers to save time. Sunday editions were printed on separate 
microfilms and the extra time it would have taken to order, receive and analyse them 
was not available. In the case of The Daily Telegraph microfilms, which did have the 
Sunday editions, the Sunday edition articles were omitted. Obviously, the fact that 
the Sunday editions of the sampled newspapers have not been analysed is a limitation 
of this research.
It would have been difficult to have approached the sample in a broader way. 
This research would have been more extensive if the sample covered newspaper 
representations of the Northern Ireland conflict and the broadcasting ban during its six 
year existence rather than just before and after the British government introduced and 
lifted the ban. However, the method of data collection would have necessitated 
reading every page of the six newspapers on micro film during the long existence of 
the broadcasting ban to locate such articles. These would then all need to be 
photocopied from the micro film, which would have taken too long and cost too 
much. This is clearly a limitation of the sampling and data collection because 
although the introduction and lifting of the broadcasting ban is well covered by the 
sample, the six year period during the broadcasting ban is not. Another major 
limitation resulting from the arduous nature o f data collection is that whilst news 
articles, editorials and op-eds were all collected for coding, all supplements, letters to 
the editor and cartoons were not.
As acknowledged above, the method of data collection in this research had 
several disadvantages, but also several advantages. Using such a method proved to be 
an advantage with regard to the development of the coding sheet for content analysis. 
Reading every page of the sampled newspapers to identify articles relating to the 
Northern Ireland conflict meant the subjects o f the relevant newspaper articles soon 
became clear. Rough notes of potential subject categories were taken as the sample 
was collated and they were developed further once all the Northern Ireland conflict 
articles were photocopied. After drafting a coding sheet several times and then 
piloting it, ten Northern Ireland conflict subject categories were selected.31 These 
were used for coding all the newspaper articles in the sample of this research and will 
now be outlined.
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Northern Ireland conflict subject categories
The first subject category captures the 56 newspaper articles relating to the SAS 
executions of IRA members in Gibraltar and the subsequent inquiry. These 
executions as well as the following attack on mourners at the funeral of those IRA 
members by UDA/UFF member, Michael Stone, and the IRA executions of two 
British soldiers occurred in March 1988. However, the British government inquiry 
verdict that exonerated the SAS was published on 30th September 1988. As the 
sample period began on 1st October 1988, there was considerable attention to this 
subject in newspaper articles throughout the following days.
The second subject category covers the 22 newspapers articles relating to the 
attacking or killing of British combatants by the IRA. British combatants are 
considered to be British soldiers, RUC officers as well as prison officers. All of such 
articles occurred in the sample period covering the British government introducing the 
broadcasting ban. This is because the IRA had called a ceasefire on 31st August, 
1994, meaning that IRA members did not attack or kill any British combatants in the 
sample period covering the British government’s lifting of the broadcasting ban.
The third subject category encompasses the 28 newspaper articles relating to 
the attacking or killing of civilians by the IRA. It was the IRA attack at Enniskillen 
on Remembrance Sunday (8th November, 1987) that was mentioned most often in 
1988 newspaper articles. This IRA bombing killed eleven civilians (including Ronnie 
Hill who died after spending 13 years in a coma as a result of the attack), one RUC 
officer and injured sixty-three Protestant spectators. In 1994 newspaper articles, it 
was the IRA attack on Warrington city centre (20th March, 1993) that dominated, 
particularly one of the victims, Tim Parry, who was aged twelve when he was killed 
by the IRA attack. A three-year-old boy called Jonathan Ball was also killed in the 
bomb blasts at the Golden Square shopping mall and a further fifty-six were injured, 
but it was Tim Parry that received the vast majority of coverage.32
The fourth subject category captures the 24 newspaper articles relating to the 
attacking or killing o f civilians by the UDA, UFF and UVF. Most of the articles 
covering this subject appeared in 1994 because Loyalist organisations attempted to 
provoke the IRA into breaking their ceasefire by carrying out sectarian attacks on 
Catholics in Northern Ireland, bombing the Belfast Sinn Fein headquarters on 4th 
September, 1994, and attempting, but failing, to bomb a train at Connolly train station
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in Dublin on 12th September, 1994. The UFF shooting of 3 3-year-old John O’Hanlon 
was the first killing of a civilian by a loyalist organisation since the IRA ceasefire and 
was reported in several newspapers.
The fifth subject category focuses on newspaper articles relating to IRA 
suspect(s)/member(s) being arrested, imprisoned, released and extradited. It also 
covers IRA prisoner controversy such as IRA members escaping from prison, the 
discovery of IRA weapons in prison such as Semtex and the many newspaper articles 
that suggested IRA prisoners were given too many comforts such as free phone calls. 
There were 169 newspaper articles that covered such subjects.
The sixth subject category covers the 48 newspaper articles relating to the 
alleged Tom King assassination plot and trial. On 28th October 1988, three Irish 
citizens, Finbarr Cullen, Martina Shanahan, John McCann, were each given 25 year 
prison sentences for conspiring to murder Northern Ireland Secretary, Tom King. 
However, they were all released on 27th April 1990 after their convictions were 
overturned by the Court of Appeal.
The seventh subject category encompasses the 37 newspaper articles about the 
return of Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party to the Brighton Grand Hotel 
for the Conservative Party Conference on the fourth anniversary of the IRA attack 
there on 12th October 1984. Five prominent members of the Conservative Party were 
killed in the attack and a further thirty-four were injured. This anniversary of the 
bombing, frequently marked in the lead up to the British government’s introduction of 
the broadcasting ban recalled the horror of the attack in vivid and extensive detail, 
reminding the British public of the threat the IRA posed, but also underlining the 
alleged defiance and bravery of the British government by returning to the Grand 
Hotel four years after the IRA bombed it.
The book launch of Norman Tebbit’s memoirs, which coincided with the 1988 
Conservative Party Conference, could explain the high number of articles reliving the 
IRA attack four years before. However, it would seem that the timing of the decision 
to introduce the broadcasting ban one week after the four year anniversary of the 
attack may have been motivated by reminding the British public of the IRA’s 
potential to commit atrocities and the British government’s resoluteness to this threat. 
This would certainly help to lay the foundations for building support for the 
broadcasting ban. Of course, this is only speculation and cannot be verified without 
conducting thorough analysis on the newspaper articles representing this anniversary.
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The eighth subject category covers newspaper articles that focus on the British 
government’s introduction (19th October, 1988) and lifting (16th September, 1994) of 
the broadcasting ban. Obviously, it is this subject category that will be explored in 
extensive detail both quantitatively and qualitatively in this research. There were 101 
newspaper articles concerning the broadcasting ban, plus 44 mentions of the 
broadcasting ban in newspaper articles which mainly focused on another subject 
relating to the Northern Ireland conflict.
The ninth subject category is the broadest because it covers everything relating 
to the Peace Process including the IRA ceasefire (31st August 1994), the UFF/UVF 
ceasefire (13th October 1994), Gerry Adams’ visit to the US as well as anything else 
relating to the Peace Process. There were 384 newspaper articles concerning the 
Peace Process as the main subject of story.
The tenth is the final subject category and covers any newspaper articles about 
the Northern Ireland conflict, which occurred twenty times or less. There were 119 
articles that were categorised as ‘other’. These included articles referring to other 
attacks or killings of civilians by other combatants such as British soldiers and RUC 
officers (3 articles) or by unidentified combatants (4 articles). Articles about 
combatants attacking or killing combatants were also coded as ‘other’ such as 
UDA/UFF members being killed by other UDA/UFF members for suspected 
disloyalty (9 articles) and IRA members killing other IRA members for the same 
reason (2 articles). Also coded as ‘other’ were the 9 newspaper articles that referred 
to Ian Paisley’s ‘anti-christ’ outburst against the Pope on 11th October 1988 in the 
European Parliament, Strasbourg.
The two newspaper articles concerning acts of collusion between UDA 
members, the Force Research Unit (FRU) of the British Army and the RUC as well as 
the subsequent Stevens Inquiry were coded as ‘other’ too. Newspaper articles coded 
as ‘other’ also included those representing the debate over establishing a Conservative 
Party in Northern Ireland (6 articles), the British government ending suspects’ right to 
silence (12 articles) and forcing Northern Ireland local elections candidates to swear 
an oath renouncing violence (2 articles).33 Also coded as ‘other’ were newspaper 
articles that discussed reforms in the education system, electoral system or ‘law and 
order’ policies o f Northern Ireland. There were 10 newspaper articles representing 
Northern Ireland reforms.
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Combining research methods
Two research methods are combined in this analysis: content analysis and critical 
discourse analysis (CDA). Deacon et al. (1999: 114-5) argue that ‘too often, 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to the study of written texts have been 
regarded as mutually incompatible’. However, they suggest that when research 
methods are combined the weaknesses of each can be balanced out by the strengths of 
the other. Hansen et al. (1998) add weight to this notion of ‘eclectic methodological 
combination’ (Deacon et al., 1999: 162). They suggest the weaknesses of content 
analysis such as it’s fragmenting of textual wholes and ‘number crunching’ of 
narratives and its lack of a theory of meaning can be ‘enriched by the theoretical 
framework offered by other more qualitative approaches’ (Hansen et al., 1998: 91). 
At the same time, Hansen et al. (1998) argue content analysis brings ‘methodological 
rigour, prescriptions of use, and systematicity rarely found in many of the more 
qualitative approaches’ (Ibid.). These research methods will now be analysed in 
terms of their strengths and weaknesses and their application in this research.
Content Analysis
Content analysis is used in this research to quantify British newspaper representations 
of the Northern Ireland conflict during the periods when the British government 
introduced and lifted the broadcasting ban. The genre, size and prominence of all 
Northern Ireland articles are coded and counted as well as the dates of articles and 
occurrence of connecting images. Newspaper articles that did not focus on the 
broadcasting ban as the main subject of story, but did nonetheless mention it are also 
quantified. Finally, and most importantly, content analysis allowed the discourses 
present in the broadcasting ban articles from both time periods to be quantified. From 
this it was possible to discover which subjects dominated newspaper articles covering 
the Northern Ireland conflict and which discourses dominated newspaper articles 
representing the broadcasting ban.
Berelson (1952: 18) famously asserted that ‘content analysis is a research 
technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest 
content of communication’. It has long been accepted that content analysis is far from 
‘objective’. The positivism of content analysis, which sought to ‘bring the rigour and
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authority of ‘natural’ scientific inquiry to the study of human and social phenomena’ 
(Deacon et al., 1999: 115) is largely rejected today (McNabb, 2010). The main reason 
content analysis is not value-free is because ‘the findings of a particular content 
analysis are directly related to the definitions of the various content categories 
developed by the researcher’ (Dominick, 1978: 106-7). In other words, ‘the 
questions you ask of your material will influence the answers you get and the 
conclusions you reach’ (Deacon et al., 1999: 132).
Furthermore, as content analysis is concerned with the manifest content of 
communication, it overlooks the latent intentions of the text producer and the latent 
responses of the audience (Richardson, 2007). This also means ‘the recording of texts’ 
manifest content must necessarily ignore textual absences’ (Richardson, 2007: 20; 
original emphasis). Therefore, content analysis ‘is not well suited to studying ‘deep’ 
questions about textual and discursive forms’ (Deacon et al., 1999: 117).
Despite the weaknesses of content analysis, this methodology can be applied 
systematically. Even though the samples and variables are determined (unavoidably) 
by subjective decisions made by the researcher, it is still possible to apply them in a 
consistent manner and therefore ‘capture a sense of patterns or frequencies of 
meaning across a large sample of texts’ (Richardson, 2007: 21). Content analysis thus 
‘ensure[s] a degree of rigour, precision and trustworthiness with respect to the 
resulting data’ (Deacon et al., 1999: 133). In addition, although content analysis does 
not account for textual absences, this is corrected by combining content analysis with 
CDA, which does focus on textual absence amongst many other things such as 
paradigmatic relations (relations of choice).
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
To begin with, it should be recognised that CDA is one of many forms of discourse 
analysis (Fairclough, 1994; 2002). Wetherell et al. (2004: 4-5) discuss six different 
discourse traditions, which are based on different theories of how ‘knowledge is built, 
subjectivity is constructed and society is managed’: (1) conversation analysis and 
ethnomethodology, (2) interactional sociolinguistics and the ethnography of 
communication, (3) discursive psychology, (4) critical discourse analysis and critical 
linguistics, (5) Bakhtinian research, and (6) Foucauldian research. It is also important 
to note that ‘there are many types of CDA, and these may be theoretically and
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analytically quite diverse’ (van Dijk, 2003). That said, ‘given the common 
perspective and the general aims of CDA, we may also find overall conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks that are closely related’ (Ibid.).
The theory of CDA:
Theoretical approaches in CDA ‘come from an indefinite number of sources’ 
(Bloor and Bloor, 2007: 4). Depending on the critical discourse analyst, there are 
several influences; from Volo§inov and Bakhtin to Gramsci, Foucault and Baudrillard 
(Jones, 2004; Blommaert, 2005). Fairclough (2003: 2) argues that ‘social analysis 
and research always has to take account of language’ because it ‘is an irreducible part 
of social life, dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life’. Clearly, 
‘language is a medium of power that can be used to sediment inequalities of power 
and legitimate iniquitous social relations’ (Richardson, 2007: 14). Therefore, as 
Wodak (1995) argues, the purpose of CDA is to analyse ‘opaque as well as 
transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control 
as manifested in language’ (cited in Blommaert, 2005: 24-25).
‘Texts’ are viewed as a site of social struggle by critical discourse analysts 
(Fairclough, 1995; 2003). This notion follows the ideas of Volosinov and Bakhtin 
who positioned themselves against Saussure’s view of language.35 Saussure (1986) 
suggested that meaning is created through a series of differences from an arbitrary 
system of signs. Instead, VoloSinov and Bakhtin argued:
The meanings of words are derived [...] from the accumulated dynamic social 
use of particular forms of language in different contexts and for different and 
sometimes conflicting purposes. The nuances and connotations of words 
reflect this social and often contested history. (Maybin, 2004: 65)
Therefore, ‘[a] sign does not simply exist as a part of reality -  it reflects and refracts 
another reality. Therefore, it may distort that reality or be true to it, or may perceive it 
from a special point o f view, and so forth’ (VoloSinov, 1973: 10). Just as one 
person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter, one person’s propaganda is another’s 
candour. During the Northern Ireland conflict, representatives of the British elite 
would describe a man who kills another person (whether civilian or combatant) with 
an SA80 rifle as a ‘soldier’, but would describe a man who kills another person 
(whether civilian or combatant) with an AR-18 (ArmaLite) rifle as a ‘terrorist’.
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This ideological lexical choice may be accepted or rejected by ordinary 
English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish people, who would be subjected to the discourse 
through consumption of various media texts from newspaper articles to news 
broadcasts. The signs ‘soldier’ and ‘terrorist’ are obviously ideological and when 
applied in the above manner refract the reality from one group’s perspective, giving 
different meaning to the same actions. Thus, ‘[everything ideological possesses 
semiotic value’ (Ibid.; original emphasis) and ‘[t]he word is the ideological 
phenomenon par excellence’ (Ibid.: 13; original emphasis).
Bakhtin referred to the authoritative, fixed and inflexible discourses as 
‘centripetal’ forces and argued they were in constant tension with ‘centrifugal’ forces, 
which are alternative discourses based on differing views and experiences of the 
world that contradict the authoritative discourse (Maybin, 2004). Centripetal forces 
aim to unify and centralise discourse whereas the purpose of centrifugal forces is to 
decentralise discourse (Crowley, 1989). Bakhtin called this discursive conflict 
‘heteroglossia’ and argued that the battle over meaning continues, widening and 
deepening, as language develops through time:
Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where 
centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. [...] Every 
utterance participates in the “unitary language” (in its centripetal forces and 
tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia 
(the centrifugal, stratifying forces). (Bakhtin, 1981: 272)
Therefore, the ‘contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies 
in the life of language’ (Bakhtin, 1981: 272) must be exposed before it is possible to 
explain and analyse discourse. Bakhtin’s (1981) approach is somewhat abstract, but it 
still identifies how the dominance of particular discourses in society reflect the 
balance of social forces at a given place and time. Texts are thus battlegrounds where 
the strengths and weaknesses of social forces are played out. Fairclough (1995) 
points out that all texts are constructed by part repetition and part creation and the 
degree of either depends upon the social conditions surrounding discursive events. 
Centripetal pressures on the production of texts arise from ‘orders of discourse’:
An order o f discourse is a network of social practices in its language aspect. 
The elements o f orders of discourse are not things like nouns and sentences 
(elements o f linguistic structures), but discourses, genres and styles [...]. 
These elements select certain possibilities defined by languages and exclude
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others -  they control linguistic variability for particular areas of social life. So 
orders of discourse can be seen as the social organization and control of 
linguistic variation. (Fairclough, 2003: 24)
The emphasis on dominance in CDA surfaces here because whereas ‘some ways of 
making meaning are dominant or mainstream in a particular order of discourse, others 
are marginal, or oppositional, or ‘alternative” (Fairclough, 2002: 124). Centrifugal 
pressures on the production of texts arise from contradictions and conflicts in society 
which influence alternative discourses. CDA examines top-down relations of 
dominance, but it recognises the ability of, and encourages, the dominated to resist.
Van Dijk (1993: 300) defines dominance ‘as the exercise of social power by 
elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, including political, 
cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality5. Power is seen as asymmetrical. 
The dominant in society have more power in actually creating and shaping texts as 
well as over how they are distributed and consumed. Very few people have enough 
money to set up a new national daily newspaper (Curran, 1996). Therefore, ‘freedom 
of the press is largely reserved for those that own one5 (Abbott Joseph Liebling cited 
in McChesney and Nichols, 2002: 26) and such wealthy people ‘have every motive to 
be dishonest on certain important topics5 (Orwell, 1945a: 307). In resistance to this, 
CDA provides an analytical framework for ‘studying language in its relation to power 
and ideology5 (Fairclough, 1995: 1). CDA can be regarded ‘as a resource for people 
who are struggling against domination and oppression in its linguistic forms5 (Ibid.).
The practice of CDA in this research:
This research follows the approach of Fairclough (1994; 1995; 2003) and 
Richardson (2004; 2007) for several reasons. Norman Fairclough founded the entire 
CDA programme (Blommaert, 2005) and has provided an accessible and applicable 
three-dimensional method of analysing discourse critically. John Richardson has re­
produced this three-dimensional approach excellently and his actual CDA work often 
analyses British newspaper representations of conflicts waged by the British 
government, providing ideas and approaches for the methodology of this research.
The three dimensions in which Fairclough (1994; 1995; 2003) and Richardson 
(2004; 2007) analyse discourse are (1) textual analysis, (2) discursive practices and 
(3) social practices. In other words, CDA begins with textual analysis and gradually 
extends ‘outwards to include more complex discursive and social practices5
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(Richardson, 2007: 37). Discourse is approached as a circular process whereby social 
practices influence texts through shaping the way they are produced and texts help 
influence society through shaping the way they are consumed (Richardson, 2007).
Analysing texts:
Textual analysis, the first dimension of CDA, combines both content analysis 
and CDA. On its own, content analysis is inadequate because it only registers what is 
present in the text. However, in combination with CDA’s more interpretative 
approach of examining texts in terms of ‘what is included and what is excluded, what 
is made explicit or left implicit, what is foregrounded and what is backgrounded' 
(Fairclough, 1995: 104), it is possible ‘to examine the role that journalism plays in 
maintaining and/or transforming social inequalities' (Richardson, 2007: 38). It is only 
possible to understand the choices made in constructing a text by analysing what 
discourses are present in the text and, crucially, what discourses are absent from the 
text. CDA examines the functions of these choices and the interests they serve.
There are many aspects to consider when analysing discourse in newspaper 
texts. Fairclough (1995) and Richardson (2007) argue textual analysis should 
commence with small-scale analysis by examining individual words and sentences, 
then gradually working towards large-scale analysis, which concludes with an 
explanation of how the narrative functions in the text. In light of the micro-analysis 
of individual words in texts, Richardson (2007) recognises that ‘words convey the 
imprint of society and of value judgements in particular [...]. All types of words, but 
particularly nouns, adjectives, verbs and adverbs carry connoted in addition to 
denoted meanings' (Richardson, 2007: 47). He also points out that:
The words used to communicate the message(s) o f a text -  whether about an 
individual, a group of people, an event, a predicted or expected event, a 
process, a state o f affairs or any of the other subjects and themes of newspaper 
texts -  frame the story in direct and unavoidable ways. (Richardson, 2007: 47)
Therefore, it is clear why textual analysis must focus on lexical choice to begin with. 
Van Dijk’s (1998, 2006) ‘ideological square’ is a useful concept for describing the 
way in which lexical choice reflects the beliefs of a speaker or writer and their 
determination to fix particular meanings. His ideological square predicts that 
discourses referring to different racial or national groups (especially during conflicts)
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will involve contrasting positive aspects about an imagined ‘us’ with negative aspects 
about an imagined ‘them’. Taking the example of the dominant discourses following 
the attacks against the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in 2001, it is clear that:
[Nationalist, anti-terrorist, anti-Islam, anti-Arab and racist ideologies were 
rife, emphasizing the evil nature of terrorists, and the freedom and democratic 
principles of the ‘civilized’ nations. Thus, if Bush & Co. want to manipulate 
the politicians and/or the citizens in the USA into accepting going to war in 
Iraq, engaging in world-wide actions against terrorists and their protectors 
(beginning with Afghanistan), and adopting a bill that severely limits the civil 
rights of the citizens, such discourses would be massively ideological. That is, 
they do this by emphasizing ‘Our’ fundamental values (freedom, democracy, 
etc.) and contrast these with the ‘evil’ ones attributed to Others, (van Dijk, 
2006: 374)
This positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation is attempted through 
text and talk by using referential and predicational strategies. Such strategies are used 
to assign particular meanings to people and can be seen as an attempt to construct a 
discourse for “us” (positive) and “them” (negative). Journalists have a choice of how 
they refer to, and describe, social actors or social events (as well as whether to include 
or exclude them altogether) and this choice will reflect their opinions or value 
judgements of such people and encourage the audience to view them either positively 
or negatively (Richardson, 2007). These subjective choices can be analysed by 
considering whether media texts constitute the four comers of the ideological square:
1. Express/emphasize information that is positive about us.
2. Express/emphasize information that is negative about them.
3. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about them.
4. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about us.
(Oktar, 2001: 319)
CDA is used in this research to deconstruct how the most prevalent discourses 
functioned to build support for, or opposition to, the broadcasting ban. The way in 
which journalists foregrounded and named the Republican Movement in broadcasting 
ban articles is explored to assess whether journalists used the propagandists approach 
to terrorism and whether the ‘ideological square’ manifested as a result of their 
choices. The ways in which journalists expressed British government discourses 
justifying the broadcasting ban as well as additional discourses justifying and 
opposing the broadcasting ban emanating from other social actors are also analysed.
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All significant discourses are explored by deconstructing and contextualising 
them using a combination of textual analysis approaches that focus on lexical choices, 
the foregrounding and backgrounding of social actors and discourses by journalists. 
Intertextual analysis is also used to explain the origins of the discourses and how they 
were refracted by journalists. For each discourse theme, the source of the discourse is 
explained before illustrating how it manifested in British newspapers articles from the 
time periods when the British government introduced and lifted the ban.
CDA is also used to explore a selection of individual newspaper articles 
representative of the ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’ and ‘quality’ newspaper genres. The 
textual analysis focuses on the most significant newspaper articles during the sample 
period in which the British government introduced the broadcasting ban, shifting from 
a general thematic analysis to a meticulous sentence by sentence analysis. This 
entails deconstructing each newspaper article from the headline through to the 
narrative of the entire article.
The naming and framing of social actors and their reported speech by 
journalists is examined as well as representations of the broadcasting ban discourses 
to explain how they operated interdiscursively in building support or opposition to the 
British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban. To reveal the choices 
made by journalists in creating these newspaper articles, alternative constructions will 
be considered throughout as well as the potential impact of the actual representations 
compared to the alternative representations.
Analysing discursive and social practices:
The second dimension of CDA, discursive practices, ‘involves attention to 
processes of text production, distribution and consumption’ (Fairclough, 1995: 9). As 
Richardson (2007: 39) points out, ‘[i]t is at this stage that analysis becomes discourse 
analysis rather than textual analysis’. Discursive practices concern the processes in 
which the authors and audience of texts draw on already existing discourses for 
certain situations, which change through time and across societies and shape how 
texts are encoded and decoded. This entails not only analysing the newspaper article 
in its finished form, but explaining journalistic routines and processes involved in 
producing it as well as the circumstances and practices of newspaper readers 
(Fairclough, 1995). Richardson (2007: 40) acknowledges that ‘discursive practices 
are a two-way street’ between producer and text as well as text and consumer.
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Regarding the relationship between producer and text, he suggests:
Clearly, and most obviously, the producer and the mode of production encode 
meaning into the text (choosing one story over another, choosing to 
foreground one view rather than another, choosing one word over another, 
etc.); but the text also acts on the producer, shaping the way that information is 
collected and presented due to the conventions of the text-genre under 
construction. (Ibid.)
Similarly, the relationship between text and consumer works both ways:
First, the messages of the text (which may or may not be ideological) attempt 
to shape the understandings of the reader [...]. When a text is consumed, 
[however,] this is done by readers who have perspectives, agendas and 
background knowledge that may differ radically from that encoded in the text. 
Hence, the reader of a newspaper may resist, subtly counter or directly 
misunderstand the encoded meaning of the report. (Ibid.: 40-41)
The third dimension of CDA, social practices, is where ‘discourse analysis becomes 
critical discourse analysis’ (Ibid.: 42). Analysis of social practices broadens the 
analysis of a text even further and situates it in society as a whole. This dimension 
goes one step further than the analysis of discursive practices by considering ‘the 
structures, the institutions and the values that, while residing outside of the newsroom, 
permeate and structure the activities and outputs of journalism’ (Ibid.: 114). It 
explains and expands the insights from the other two dimensions in relation to wider 
society by looking outside the text and examining ‘the relationships between 
journalism and the social formation as a whole’ (Ibid.).
Again, a dialectical relationship exists in sociocultural practice between 
society and discourse and between discourse and society: ‘the historic, economic, 
political and ideological features of society [...] forms a backdrop that both structures 
and enables the work of journalists’ (Ibid.: 43). Journalists, though limited by the 
structures of society, still have some power to act upon it because of their relative 
autonomy as workers. In other words, ‘reporting practices are not completely open, 
nor are they completely controlled by social circumstance’ (Ibid.: 115).
Indeed, from time to time, journalists have resisted the market and the state 
controlling the freedom of journalists to write and say what they want (Sparks, 2007). 
The resistance of broadcast media workers against the British government’s 
introduction of the broadcasting ban being a particularly relevant example here and
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one that Sparks (2007) recalls. As journalists (with editorial approval) write the news 
and have the final say on what is included and excluded they can ‘act upon the world, 
producing and reproducing social realities through either maintaining or transforming 
social beliefs’ (Richardson, 2007: 115).
In this research, the second and third dimensions of CDA are used to analyse 
and explain the discursive and social practices impacting British newspaper 
representations of the broadcasting ban. The structuring influences within British 
journalism are analysed, including the generic conventions between and within 
newspapers as well as the political allegiances of newspapers. The impact of these 
structural influences on newspaper content is explained in terms of newspaper reader 
considerations, news values, source values and intertextuality. These aspects are then 
explored in terms of other significant factors existing outside the newsroom, which 
also impacted newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban.
Social practices such as the British government indirect pressure and ‘anti­
terrorism legislation’ being used against the British mass media throughout the 
Northern Ireland conflict and the introduction of direct censorship during the latter 
years o f it are analysed to explain how these, in turn, shaped discursive practices. 
Industrial disputes within the newspaper industry in the lead up to the broadcasting 
ban are also explored to explain the weakness of print media workers compared to 
broadcast media workers during that period. These government controls, industrial 
disputes, and the resistance of media workers are analysed in terms of struggles within 
the media and in society at large.
The politics of CDA:
Several criticisms are made of CDA.36 These range from the interpretive and 
ideological nature of research that is said to originate from the political stance taken 
by the critical discourse analyst (Widdowson, 1995; Schegloff, 1997) to the limited 
analysis of producers and consumers of texts (Widdowson, 2003; Philo, 2007). 
However, it is the explicit political stance taken by critical discourse analysts and the 
impact this is said to have on analyses, which provokes the most criticism (Wodak, 
2002; Blommaert, 2005; Bloor and Bloor, 2007).
Widdowson (1995: 159) argues that the name ‘critical discourse analysis’ is a 
contradiction in terms because it is ‘an exercise in interpretation’ making it ‘invalid as 
analysis’. He suggests that because critical discourse analysts take explicit position it
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means texts are interpreted in ways that reinforce such positions. Fairclough (1996: 
49) argues this is a misrepresentation of CD A resting ‘upon a confusion between two 
senses of interpretation’. Revealing how discourse functions in texts is different to 
reading it in a subjective way and then presenting it as the only possible reading. 
CDA recognises that everyone interprets or makes meaning from texts differently 
depending on the context and interpreter and aims to ‘show connections between both 
properties of texts and practices of interpretation’ (Ibid.: 50).
Schegloff (1997: 183) argues CDA ‘risks ending up merely ideological’ by not 
closely analysing the conversations of ordinary people (presumably those who 
consume the texts under scrutiny in a particular CDA). Although he recognises CDA 
has a different project to conversation analysis (CA), he suggests that if critical 
discourse analysts were to analyse ‘the local co-construction of interaction’ (Ibid.), 
they would find that ‘over and over again close examination of brief exchanges [...] 
yield rather more complex, and differently complexioned, understandings’ (Ibid.: 
180). He explicitly states that the reason this is not done by critical discourse analysts 
is due to ‘the common impatience, and often intolerance, of close analysis’ (Ibid.) as 
well as ‘the fact that such analysis often yields results uncomfortably at variance with 
commonsense understanding or ideological predilections’ (Ibid.). Unlike Widdowson 
(1995), Schegloff (1997) does not specify which particular approach or practitioner of 
CDA he is criticising (Wetherell, 1998; Billig, 1999a), but like Widdowson (1995), he 
does suggest CDA looks for what it wants to find.
Widdowson (1995) also criticises CDA for its vague use of the concept of 
discourse and the multiple meanings given to it within CDA. He argues ‘discourse is 
something everybody is talking about but without knowing with any certainty just 
what it is: in vogue and vague’ (Widdowson, 1995: 158). It is true that discourse is 
analysed by many in academia and has become popular in the fields of humanities and 
social sciences, however, differing definitions of discourse do not equate to ignorance. 
Instead, it illustrates that definitions of discourse are dependent on the differing 
theories of each discipline. Definitions of seemingly simple concepts are often 
contested and used differently by different people such as the concept of ideology 
(Fairclough, 1996). Therefore, trying to come up with a single definition for a 
concept used in various ways is a ‘hopeless and fruitless task, unless one wishes to 
brick oneself up within the four walls of one’s discipline’ (Fairclough, 1996: 54). It is 
far more constructive to explain how you understand and use the concept of discourse.
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In terms of CDA, Richardson (2007) contrasts the formalist definition of 
discourse with that of functionalists. He suggests that formalists ‘define discourse as 
a particular unit of language’ (Richardson, 2007: 22) whereas functionalists define 
discourse as more than a unit of language, connecting discourse with its linguistic 
form as well as its function in social relations (language in use). It is important to 
make this distinction because the functionalist definition of discourse recognises that 
‘language is used to mean something and to do something [...], linked to the context 
of its usage [and] linked to wider inter-personal, institutional, socio-cultural and 
material contexts’ (Ibid.: 24).
The functionalist approach to discourse is used in this research to understand 
and explain how discourses relating to the broadcasting ban functioned to build 
support and opposition for British government censorship. Analysing text and talk in 
this way meant it was possible to reveal choices made by social actors, which 
appeared to be neutral statements of fact, but actually served ideological purposes. 
For example, when Home Secretary Douglas Hurd introduced the broadcasting ban on 
19th October 1988, he stated that there was a similar ban in the Irish Republic. Whilst 
this was true, it was also a discursive choice that served his own side in the struggle 
over the meaning of the broadcasting ban. In contrast, opponents of the ban chose to 
underline that Ireland was the only country in Europe to practice such censorship and 
argued the ban made Britain similar to Apartheid South Africa and the Soviet Union.
Another criticism of CDA relates to its ‘text only’ analysis (Philo, 2007). 
Widdowson (2003: 366) states that ‘producers and consumers of texts are never 
consulted’ and Threadgold (2003) argues serious ethnographies are needed to 
strengthen any inferences made by CDA. Philo (2007) contrasts the approach of 
CDA to that of the Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG), arguing that the latter 
is more vigorous because it analyses processes of production and reception as well as 
conducting textual analyses. This criticism of CDA is certainly justified in general. 
GUMG analyses of textual production and consumption entail interviewing 
journalists, politicians and members of the general public, whereas practitioners of 
CDA often do not directly speak to such people. That said, as Philo (2007) 
recognises, some CDA does analyse the production and consumption of texts. In this 
research, although it would be interesting, it is not possible to analyse the production 
and consumption of Northern Ireland conflict newspaper articles as the time period of 
this research is too long past for such analysis. Nevertheless, it is a limitation.
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In this research, it is argued the strengths of CDA outweigh its weaknesses. 
Being aware of, and explicitly stating, your own political perspective in research is 
beneficial because, firstly, those that do are more honest to their audience and to 
themselves. Secondly, exposing and criticising ‘the power elites that enact, sustain, 
legitimate, condone or ignore social inequality and injustice’ (van Dijk, 1993: 252), 
means that such practices can be resisted and changed. As Antonio Gramsci (1917) 
put it: ‘I am alive, therefore I take sides’ (cited in Young, 1998: 58).
It is hard to be impartial in a world of war, injustice and inequality. Therefore, 
it is hard to believe when some academics and journalists who write about aspects of 
that world claim to be objective. CDA seeks to show that text and talk is rarely 
neutral and that a particular discourse serves a particular interest. Discourses of 
impartiality often serve to perpetuate a particular interest in a more astute way as ‘the 
more one is aware of political bias the more one can be independent of it, and the 
more one claims to be impartial the more one is biased’ (Orwell, 1949: 505). 
Discourses of impartiality are similar to absent discourses altogether because ‘[a]t 
times to be silent is to lie. For silence can be interpreted as acquiescence’ (Miguel de 
Unamuno cited in Thomas, 2003: 487).
Indeed, a further strength of CDA concerns its acknowledgement of absent 
discourses. As was noted earlier, content analysis only analyses manifest content, but 
CDA analyses paradigmatic relations (relations of choice). This involves exploring 
‘significant absences’ in texts (Fairclough, 2003). Texts are analysed in terms of 
‘what is actually present and what might have been present but is not’ (Fairclough, 
2003: 36) and this is done on different levels:
[T]he text includes certain grammatical structures and a certain vocabulary 
and certain semantic relations and certain discourses or genres; it might have 
included others, which were available and possible, but not selected. (Ibid)
By focusing on what elements of social events and which social actors are excluded, it 
is possible to understand how texts work ideologically. For example, in the build up 
to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Anglo-American mass media consistently failed to 
inform its audience about the CIA bringing the Ba’athists to power and Saddam 
Hussein being a Western ally for many years despite being a brutal dictator that 
gassed ‘his own people’ (Keeble, 2004). Similarly, the Anglo-American mass media 
generally excluded social actors who were opposed to invading Iraq (Kumar, 2006).
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Methodological approach: summary
The sample o f this research is representative of the British newspaper industry in 
terms of newspaper genre, political sympathy and circulation. However, the time 
period in which Northern Ireland conflict and broadcasting ban newspaper articles 
were collected is limited for two reasons. Firstly, the duration of the broadcasting ban 
is not covered by the sample. Secondly, Sunday editions o f the sampled newspapers 
are not included in the time periods before and after the British government 
introduced and lifted the broadcasting ban.
Another major limitation resulting from the manual method of data collection 
is that whilst news articles, editorials and op-eds were all collected for coding, all 
supplements, letters to the editor and cartoons were not. That said the range of the 
two time periods used in this research capture relevant newspaper articles in the 
eighteen days before and after the ban was introduced and lifted. Therefore, these 
time periods are thorough and more than adequate for the purposes of this research, 
that is, discovering how the British government’s broadcasting ban was represented 
by British newspapers and whether journalists supported or resisted such censorship.
Combining content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) strengthens 
the methodological approach of this research because the weaknesses of such 
quantitative and qualitative research methods can be balanced out by the strengths of 
the other. Therefore, content analysis, which only captures manifest data, can be 
strengthened by CDA, which analyses what is absent as well as present in data. 
Likewise, CDA cannot be used to analyse large bodies of data, especially when they 
are collected manually as is the case in this research. However, content analysis can 
systematically quantify important aspects within all newspaper articles collected in 
this research, including the discourses, which CDA can then deconstruct in detail.
'"Content analysis is used in this research to quantify British newspaper 
representations of the Northern Ireland conflict during the periods when the British 
government introduced and lifted the broadcasting ban. This reveals which subjects 
dominated newspaper articles covering the Northern Ireland conflict. The genre, size 
and prominence o f all Northern Ireland articles are coded and counted as well as the 
dates o f articles and occurrence of connecting images. The discourses present in the 
broadcasting ban articles from both time periods are quantified also to reveal which 
discourses dominated newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban.
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Despite early positivist claims regarding the ‘objectivity’ of content analysis, 
it is now largely accepted that this is not the case because all the questions asked of 
the data are chosen by the researcher. This is unavoidable and should not be 
considered a limitation. Proponents of CDA actually embrace the inevitable choices 
made in research and encourage the taking of sides in social problems such as 
discrimination and abuse against people based on their ethnicity, nationality, gender, 
class, sexual preference, etc. Obviously, CDA practitioners should side with the 
oppressed and fight the oppressor by explaining how discourse functions to normalise 
such inequality in society so that it can be challenged and overcome in the material 
world as well as how it is normalised discursively.
Although criticisms of the explicit political stance taken by critical discourse 
analysts can easily be rebuffed, a genuine limitation of CDA is the lack of 
ethnographic and audience research. Analysing processes of production through 
ethnographies or interviews of journalists working for various newspapers and 
consumption of texts through audience research of newspaper readers provide much 
deeper insights into the circuit of communication. However, in this research, it is not 
possible to analyse the production and consumption of Northern Ireland conflict 
newspaper articles as the time period of this research is too long past for such 
methodologies. Nevertheless, it is a limitation of the methodological approach.
The approach to CDA in this research is modelled on the three-dimensional 
method of analysing discourse critically used by Norman Fairclough and John 
Richardson. This entails approaching newspaper articles in terms of (1) textual 
analysis, (2) discursive practices and (3) social practices. It is the textual analysis of 
newspaper articles representing the Northern Ireland conflict and broadcasting ban 
where content analysis and CDA are combined. The analysis of discursive and social 
practices involves examining the processes in which authors and audiences encode 
and decode texts based on already existing discourses and situates them in the 
structures, institutions and values of a society.
CDA is used in this research to deconstruct how the most prevalent discourses 
functioned to build support for, or opposition to, the broadcasting ban as well as how 
journalists represented them and the social actors involved in the Northern Ireland 
conflict. All the significant discourses are explored by deconstructing and 
contextualising them using a combination of textual analysis approaches that focus on 
lexical choices, the foregrounding and backgrounding of social actors and discourses
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by journalists and intertextual analysis to explain the origins of the discourses and 
how they were refracted by journalists. A selection of individual newspaper articles 
representative of the ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’ and ‘quality’ newspaper genres are also 
explored to explain how they operated interdiscursively in building support or 
opposition to the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban.
The discursive and social practices impacting British newspaper 
representations of the broadcasting ban are analysed in this research to explain the 
structuring influences within British journalism such as the generic conventions 
between and within newspapers as well as the political allegiances of newspapers. 
These aspects are then explored in terms of other significant factors existing outside 
the newsroom, which also impacted newspaper representations of the broadcasting 
ban. Social practices such as government controls, industrial disputes, and the 
resistance of media workers are analysed in terms of struggles within the media and in 
society at large. The content analysis and CDA findings of this research are outlined 
in the next four chapters.
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Chapter 4 -  Content Analysis: Textual Analysis I
In this chapter, the subject categories of all newspaper articles representing the 
Northern Ireland conflict during the sample periods of this research are quantified and 
presented. Following this, there is a focus on the newspaper articles representing the 
broadcasting ban, quantifying how many featured the ban as the main subject of story 
and how many referred to it in a different subject of story related to the Northern 
Ireland conflict. The generic composition, image presence, prominence and size of 
broadcasting ban newspaper articles are then explored before quantifying all the 
discourses present in the broadcasting ban newspaper articles from the time periods in 
which the British government introduced and lifted this censorship.
Graph 1 -  Subjects of Northern Ireland conflict newspaper articles
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There were 101 broadcasting ban newspaper articles out of the total sample of 988 
relating to the Northern Ireland conflict, which is 10.2%. As illustrated above in 
Graph 1, several subjects relating to the Northern Ireland conflict featured more than 
the subject of the broadcasting ban. The ‘Peace Process’ was the main subject of 
story for many newspaper articles with a total of 384 across the six newspapers in the 
sample, which is 39% of the total articles relating to the Northern Ireland conflict. 
There were also 169 articles (17%) covering IRA ‘law and order’ stories and 119 
articles (12%) coded as ‘other’.
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Graph 2 — Broadcasting ban newspaper articles in each newspaper
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Graph 2 reveals that The Guardian featured the most broadcasting ban newspaper 
articles with 28 of the total 101 broadcasting ban articles, or 27.7%. In descending 
order, from the highest to the lowest number of broadcasting ban articles, the 
remaining newspapers were The Daily Telegraph with 23 broadcasting ban articles 
(22.8%), Daily Express with 17 (16.8%), Daily Mirror with 12(11.9%), Daily Mail 
with 11 (10.9%) and The Sun with 10 (9.9%). Predictably, there were considerably 
more newspaper articles about the broadcasting ban when it was introduced by the 
British government. There were 73 newspaper articles in which the broadcasting 
ban was the main subject of story (72.28% of the total ban newspaper articles) in the 
sample period covering its introduction in 1988 and 28 newspaper articles 
representing its lifting in 1994 (27.72% of the total ban newspaper articles).
Graph 3 -  Broadcasting ban mentions in each newspaper
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Although there were 101 broadcasting ban newspaper articles (10.2% of total 
Northern Ireland conflict articles) in the sample, the broadcasting ban was mentioned 
in a further 44 newspaper articles (4.5% of other Northern Ireland conflict articles) 
where the main subject of the story was something else related to the Northern Ireland 
conflict. As Graph 3 illustrates, The Daily Telegraph had the most mentions of the 
broadcasting ban in newspaper articles in which the ban was not the main subject of 
the story with 11 (25% of total Northern Ireland conflict articles that mentioned the 
ban). In descending order, from the highest to the lowest mentions of the 
broadcasting ban in Northern Ireland conflict articles, the remaining newspapers were 
the Daily Mail and Daily Express, which both had 9 articles (or 20.5% of total 
Northern Ireland conflict articles mentioning the ban), The Guardian had 8 articles 
(18.2%), The Sun had 4 (9.1%) and there were 3 in the Daily Mirror (6.8%).
Graph 4 — Broadcasting ban mentions in subject categories
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Graph 4 reveals that the broadcasting ban was mentioned most often in newspaper 
article? where the main subject of story was the ‘Peace Process’.38 The broadcasting 
ban was mentioned in 31 ‘Peace Process’ articles (70.5% of total Northern Ireland 
conflict newspaper articles mentioning the ban). The next highest number of 
references to the broadcasting ban occurred in newspaper articles where the main 
subject of story was ‘Other’ with 12 (26.1%).39 There was one IRA ‘law and order’ 
newspaper article that mentioned the ban, which is 2.3% of the total Northern Ireland 
conflict articles mentioning the ban.
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Graph 5 -  Images with broadcasting ban and total newspaper articles
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Most broadcasting ban articles did not feature corresponding images. Graph 5 
illustrates that 23 broadcasting ban articles had corresponding images (22.8%) and 78 
did not (77.2%). This is a very low amount compared to the total of Northern Ireland 
conflict articles which did (41%) and did not (59%) feature corresponding images. 
Tattersall (2008) argues it is images (as well as headlines) that act as ‘entry points’ 
and attract readers to particular newspaper articles. Therefore, it is an interesting find 
that so many broadcasting ban newspaper articles did not have corresponding images.
Graph 6 -  Genre of broadcasting ban and total newspaper articles
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Graph 6 reveals the vast majority of broadcasting ban articles in the sample were 
news articles. From the 101 broadcasting ban articles, 77 were coded as news articles 
equating to 76.2%. There were 16 editorials (15.8%) and 8 op-eds (7.9%) concerning 
the broadcasting ban as the main subject of story. Comparing the genre of 
broadcasting ban and total Northern Ireland conflict newspaper articles, it is possible 
to see that the ratio between news articles, editorials and op-eds is consistent. Of the 
Northern Ireland conflict newspaper articles collected in the sample, there were 830 
news articles (84%), 86 editorials (8.7%) and 72 op-eds (7.3%). The major difference 
between the genre of broadcasting ban articles and Northern Ireland conflict articles is 
the frequency of editorials, with the former having 6% more editorials than the latter.
Graph 7 -  Prominence of broadcasting ban and total newspaper articles
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The majority of broadcasting ban articles appeared between pages 2 and 10. There 
were 34 broadcasting ban articles on pages 4-10, which is 33.7% of all broadcasting 
ban articles. The next highest occurrence of broadcasting ban articles, with 33, 
appeared on pages 2-3 (32.7% of all broadcasting ban articles). Continuing in 
descending order, there were 13 broadcasting ban articles on pages 21+ (12.9%), 11 
lead the front page (10.9%), there were 5 on pages 11-20 (5%) and 5 appeared on the 
front page (5%), but did not lead.40 Comparing the prominence of broadcasting ban 
articles to that of the total Northern Ireland conflict articles, it is possible to see that 
the occurrence of broadcasting ban articles and total Northern Ireland conflict articles 
are most consistent between pages 2 and 10. 35.4 % of the total Northern Ireland 
conflict articles appeared on pages 4-10 and 31.8% of them were on pages 2-3.
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However, Graph 7 also shows there is a difference between the prominence of 
broadcasting ban articles and total Northern Ireland conflict articles for the other page 
number categories. Considerably fewer Northern Ireland conflict articles lead the 
front page (6.4%) than broadcasting ban articles. This was also true for articles on 
pages 21+ (7.1%). However, the reverse was true for the non-leading front page 
articles (9.3%) as well as those on pages 11-20 (10%) with the total Northern Ireland 
conflict articles featuring considerably more articles in these page number categories 
than broadcasting ban articles.
Graph 8 -  Size of broadcasting ban and total newspaper articles
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Graph 8 illustrates that most broadcasting ban newspaper articles were smaller than an 
eighth of a page in size. There were 70 broadcasting ban articles of this size, or 
69.3% of total broadcasting ban articles. The next smallest size of articles, between 
an eighth and a quarter of the page, had the next highest number of occurrences of 
broadcasting ban articles with 21 (20.8% of total broadcasting ban articles). 
Continuing this trend, there were 9 broadcasting ban articles that were between a 
quarter and a half of the page in size (9.2%) and one that was between half and a 
whole page (1%). The sizes of broadcasting ban articles were consistent with most 
other subject categories relating to Northern Ireland conflict. 618 (62.6%) of the total 
988 Northern Ireland conflict articles were less than an eighth of a page in size, 225 
(22.8%) were between an eighth and a quarter of a page, 91 (9.2%) were between a 
quarter and a half of a page, and 54 (5.5%) were between half and a whole page.
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Thus far, the content analysis in this research has highlighted that there are few 
Northern Ireland conflict newspaper articles that focus on, or refer to, the 
broadcasting ban. This claim is based on three considerations: firstly, the time 
periods that were sampled, secondly, the newspapers that were sampled and, thirdly, 
the number of newspaper articles concerning other Northern Ireland conflict subjects. 
The time periods in which the broadcasting ban was introduced and lifted were 
meticulously searched for broadcasting ban articles and the sampled newspapers were 
representative of the British national newspaper industry. Every page of the news, 
editorial and op-ed sections of the sampled newspapers was studied for eighteen days 
(excluding Sundays) before and after the introduction and the lifting of the 
broadcasting ban. Despite this, there were only 101 newspaper articles in which the 
main subject of story concerned the broadcasting ban. In addition, more than half of 
these articles appeared in just two of the six sampled newspapers: The Guardian and 
The Daily Telegraph (the newspapers representative of the ‘quality’ press).
The comparatively high number of newspaper articles concerning other 
Northern Ireland conflict related subjects also strengthens the claim that there were 
few articles that focus on, or refer to, the broadcasting ban. Considering the sample of 
this research was designed to capture broadcasting ban newspaper articles, many more 
newspaper articles featuring other Northern Ireland conflict related subjects were 
present. The total number of newspaper articles collated in this research suggests that 
a lot of print media attention was given to the Northern Ireland conflict and the peace 
process generally, but there was little media attention given to the broadcasting ban.
References to the broadcasting ban were also few with just 44 mentions in all 
newspaper articles concerning the Northern Ireland conflict. Although these 
broadcasting ban mentions have been identified and acknowledged, there will be no 
further investigation of them as the main focus of this research regards newspaper 
articles in which the broadcasting ban was the main subject of story. Likewise, the 
generic composition, image presence, prominence and size of broadcasting ban 
articles have been explored and documented, but will no longer be discussed as it is 
now necessary to turn to the discursive composition of newspaper articles 
representing the introduction and lifting of the broadcasting ban.
When the British government introduced the broadcasting ban in 1988 British 
newspapers expressed discourses emanating from many social actors, including 
journalists (particularly those working in the British broadcast media), representatives
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of some of the eleven banned organizations as well as British politicians. Although, 
there was a lot of opposition to the British government’s broadcasting ban, there was 
also a lot of support for it when it was introduced, including the overt support of 
several British newspaper editorials. However, this support declined once the ban 
was put into practice. By the time the British government lifted the broadcasting ban 
in 1994, British politicians and newspapers we re unanimousl y against it. Every 
discourse that was present in the 101 newspaper articles representing the introduction 
and lifting of the broadcasting ban has been categorised and quantified, revealing 
which discourses were most prevalent in newspaper articles representing the 
broadcasting ban.
Table 1 -  Discourses in broadcasting ban newspaper articles during 1988
Discourses Frequency Percentage
IRA/SF are the main targets of the ban 51 12%
IRA is a terrorist organisation/SF is an IRA front 44 10.4%
Terrorists must be starved of the oxygen of publicity 34 8%
A similar ban already exists in Irish Republic 24 5.6%
Ban is beneficial to the IRA 20 4.7%
Ban just one of several anti-terrorism policies 18 4.2%
Ban is undemocratic/threat to civil liberties 17 4%
Ban is too vague/confusing for broadcasters to interpret 16 3.8%
Broadcasters are irresponsible (especially the BBC) 16 3.8%
Ban is not enough, SF should be proscribed 14 3.3%
Offence to public 11 2.6%
Ban is justified/right/sensible 11 2.6%
Ban is unjustified/wrong/foolish 11 2.6%
Ban will not stop the IRA or SF 11 2.6%
Gerry Adams is an elected MP/SF is a political party 10 2.4%
Public capable of making own judgement 8 1.9%
Ban will make media reporting of NI incomplete 8 1.9%
IRA/SF appearances harm themselves 8 1.9%
Ban is not censorship 7 1.6%
IRA/SF media appearances give them respectability 7 1.6%
Ban makes Britain comparable to South Africa 7 1.6%
Ban makes Britain look repressive and ridiculous 6 1.4%
Ban sets a damaging precedent 6 1.4%
Ban is censorship 6 1.4%
IRA/SF media appearances are rare/hostile already 5 1.2%
Ban is worthless in the real fight against terrorism 5 1.2%
Other 44 10.4%
Total 425 100%
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Table 1 reveals there was a broad range of discourses circulating in the newspaper 
articles representing the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban 
that functioned to build support and opposition to such censorship. This is 
understandable because there were a lot more newspaper articles representing the 
British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban than there were when it 
was lifted. There was also a division amongst elite social actors as to whether media 
censorship was the best solution for dealing with the Northern Ireland conflict. In 
1988, 26 discourses were expressed frequently enough to be considered worthy of 
their own category for quantification. Those discourses amounting to 1% or less of 
the total discourses were coded as other and together constituted 44 of the total 425 
occasions on which all discourses were expressed, or 10.4%.
In descending order, from the highest to the lowest number, the ten most 
frequently expressed discourses in newspaper articles representing the British 
government introducing the broadcasting ban were as follows. The most frequently 
expressed individual discourse was one that constructed the IRA and Sinn Fein as the 
main targets of the broadcasting ban. This discourse was expressed on 51 occasions, 
or 12% of the total broadcasting ban discourses expressed during 1988. The next 
most frequently expressed discourse was one that represented the IRA as a terrorist 
organisation and Sinn Fein as an IRA front, which featured on 44 occasions (10.4%). 
The discourse arguing that ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ 
was expressed on 34 occasions (8%). There was also a discourse acknowledging that 
a similar ban already exists in the Irish Republic, which was expressed 24 times 
(5.6%) and there was another expressed frequently that represented the broadcasting 
ban as a propaganda gift for the IRA with 20 occurrences (4.7%).
There were 18 occurrences (4.2%) of the discourse that represented the 
broadcasting ban as just one of several anti-terrorism policies being introduced (these 
policies, which included an end to suspects’ right to silence, were most often 
represented as a reaction to an upsurge in IRA violence during the summer of 1988, 
most notably the IRA attack on British soldiers in Ballygawley). The next most 
frequently expressed discourse, with 17 occurrences (4%) represented the 
broadcasting ban as undemocratic and/or a threat to civil liberties. There were 16 
expressions (3.8%) of the following discourses that referred to broadcasters (albeit in 
completely different ways) with one discourse representing the ban as too 
vague/confusing for broadcasters to interpret and the other discourse representing
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broadcasters as irresponsible (especially the BBC). The next most frequently 
expressed discourse, with 14 occurrences (3.3%) argued the broadcasting ban did not 
go far enough and that Sinn Fein should be proscribed. Although there are many 
more interesting discourses in newspaper articles representing the British government 
introducing the broadcasting ban, it is these ten discourses that were most frequently 
expressed and therefore can be considered most significant.
Table 2 -  Discourses in broadcasting ban newspaper articles during 1994
Discourses Frequency Percentage
IRA/SF are the main targets of the ban 28 13%
Ban lifted as part of Ulster package 28 13%
Ban should be lifted now/Lifting the ban is welcomed 28 13%
Ban was a farce because of dubbing 21 9.8%
SF/IRA must use peaceful methods now ban is lifted 19 8.8%
Terrorists must be starved of the oxygen of publicity 12 5.6%
IRA is a terrorist organisation/SF is an IRA front 12 5.6%
Ban stopped broadcasters questioning SF properly 8 3.7%
Irish actors improve the image of SF 8 3.7%
Ban made media reporting of NI incomplete 8 3.7%
Ban is propaganda gift for the IRA 5 2.3%
Ban introduced after Ballygawley 4 1.9%
Ban no longer serves its purpose 4 1.9%
Irish ban has already been lifted 4 1.9%
Ban lifted too quickly 4 1.9%
Ban was counter-productive (no reason stated) 3 1.4%
Public capable of making own judgement 3 1.4%
Other 16 7.4%
Total 215 100%
As illustrated in Table 2, there was a narrower range of discourses circulating in the 
newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban, 
which can be explained by elite social actors being united on the need to lift the 
broadcasting ban. By the time the British government lifted the ban in 1994, there 
was no support for such media censorship, which meant far fewer newspaper articles 
represented the British government lifting the broadcasting ban than when it was 
introduced. There were 16 discourses expressed frequently enough to be considered 
worthy of their own category for quantification. Those discourses amounting to 1% 
or less of the total discourses were coded as other and together constituted 16 of the 
total 215 occasions on which all discourses were expressed, or 7.4%.
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Several of the discourses present in newspaper articles representing the British 
government introducing the broadcasting ban were also present in those representing 
its lifting. The joint-first most prevalent discourse expressed in newspaper articles 
representing the lifting of the broadcasting ban was also the one constructing the IRA 
and Sinn Fein as the main targets of it. This discourse was expressed on 28 occasions, 
or 13% of the total broadcasting ban discourses expressed during 1994. Interestingly, 
the discourse representing the IRA as a terrorist organisation and Sinn Fein as an IRA 
front as well as the discourse arguing terrorists must be starved of the ‘oxygen of 
publicity’ were expressed far less often in 1994 with only 12 occurrences (5.6%) 
each; making them the joint-seventh most frequently expressed discourses as opposed 
to 1988 when they were the second and third most prevalent discourses respectively.
The remaining most frequently expressed discourses in newspaper articles 
representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban were as follows. One 
of the other joint-first most prevalent discourses, with 28 occurrences (13%), 
emphasised that the ban was lifted as part of a package for Ulster by the British 
government.41 The other argued that the broadcasting ban should be lifted (in 
newspaper articles before 16th September, 1994) or that its lifting is welcomed (in 
newspaper articles after 16th September, 1994). This discourse clearly supported the 
lifting of this censorship as did the next most prevalent discourse, expressed 21 times 
(9.8%), which argued the broadcasting ban was a farce because of Irish actors 
dubbing the voices of Sinn Fein representatives.
The next three most prevalent discourses also centred on the Republican 
Movement. The discourse calling for Sinn Fein and the IRA to commit to purely 
peaceful methods now that the ban had been lifted featured on 19 occasions (8.8%) in 
newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban. 
As already mentioned the discourse representing the Republican Movement 
pejoratively and the discourse arguing terrorists must be starved of the ‘oxygen of 
publicity’ were expressed 12 times (5.6%). The remaining three discourses of the 
most prevalent ten discourses in newspaper articles representing the British 
government lifting the broadcasting ban were all expressed on 8 occasions (3.7%). 
These discourses argued the ban had stopped broadcasters questioning Sinn Fein 
properly (in other words holding them to account for IRA actions), that Irish actors 
had actually improved the image of Sinn Fein representatives, and that the 
broadcasting ban had made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete.
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Content Analysis -  textual analysis I: summary
The content analysis findings reveal that broadcasting ban newspaper articles 
accounted for a small amount of British newspaper coverage of the Northern Ireland 
conflict. In addition to this there were few mentions of the broadcasting ban in 
newspaper articles where the main subject of the story was something else related to 
the Northern Ireland conflict. Considering the representative sample of newspapers 
and the specific focus of the time period as well as the number of newspaper articles 
concerning other Northern Ireland conflict related subjects within them, it can be said 
that the broadcasting ban was not considered newsworthy by the British newspaper 
industry in general. More specifically, the newsworthiness of the broadcasting ban is 
dependent on the sampling period and on the newspaper genre.
There were considerably more newspaper articles concerning the broadcasting 
ban when the British government introduced it, rather than when the British 
government lifted it. This is predictable because newspaper articles reflected the 
division amongst elite social actors over whether to support the broadcasting ban at 
the beginning. There were also considerably more newspaper articles concerning the 
broadcasting ban in newspapers representative of the ‘quality’ press, which accounted 
for more than half of the broadcasting ban newspaper articles. This can be explained 
by the assumed audience demographic of such a newspaper genre, that is, editors of 
The Guardian and the Daily Telegraph expect their readers to be more educated and 
more interested in serious news.
Another finding from the content analysis in this research concerning 
corresponding images of newspaper articles could also suggest the British newspaper 
industry did not consider the broadcasting ban to be particularly newsworthy in 
general. There were very few broadcasting ban articles that featured corresponding 
images compared to the total of Northern Ireland conflict articles that did. That said, 
the other findings from the content analysis in this research concerning the genre, 
prominence and size of newspaper articles were consistent for those concerning the 
broadcasting ban and the other Northern Ireland conflict subject categories.
The content analysis also revealed that there was a broader range of discourses 
circulating in the newspaper articles when the British government introduced the 
broadcasting ban in 1988 compared to when it was lifted in 1994. This is 
understandable because there were a lot more newspaper articles representing the
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British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban than there were when it 
was lifted. There was also a division amongst elite social actors as to whether media 
censorship was the best solution for dealing with the Northern Ireland conflict at the 
beginning. By the time the British government lifted the ban, there was no support 
for such media censorship, which meant far fewer newspaper articles and a narrower 
range of discourses. Now that the discourses circulating in newspaper articles 
representing the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban have 
been quantified, it is possible to explore them qualitatively by using CDA in the 
following three chapters.
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Chapter 5 -  Critical Discourse Analysis: Textual Analysis II
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has been used here to qualitatively explore British 
newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban in the periods when the British 
government introduced and lifted the ban. In the previous chapter, all the discourses 
present in broadcasting ban articles were quantified so now it is possible to 
deconstruct how the most prevalent discourses functioned to build support for, or 
opposition to, the broadcasting ban. In this chapter, the way in which journalists 
foregrounded and named the Republican Movement in broadcasting ban articles is 
explored as well as the way they expressed British government discourses justifying 
the broadcasting ban and other discourses justifying and opposing the broadcasting 
ban emanating from additional social actors.
All the significant discourses are explored by deconstructing and 
contextualising them using a combination of textual analysis approaches that focus on 
lexical choices, the foregrounding and backgrounding of social actors and discourses 
by journalists. Intertextual analysis is also used to explain the origins of the 
discourses and how they were refracted by journalists. For each discourse theme, the 
source of the discourse is explained before illustrating how it manifested in British 
newspapers articles from the time periods when the British government introduced 
and lifted the broadcasting ban.
Foregrounding and naming the Republican Movement
The most prevalent discourse and most likely to be articulated first in newspaper 
articles represented the ban as mainly targeting the IRA and/or Sinn Fein. In this 
section, the way in which such foregrounding operated interdiscursively with the 
pejorative naming of the Republican Movement is explored. Several scholars have 
already acknowledged that the British government attempted to de-politicise and de- 
legitimise the motivations of the Republican Movement by representing them as 
‘terrorists’ and ‘criminals’ (Schlesinger et al., 1983; Curtis, 1984; Miller, 1994; 
Cottle, 1997; McGovern, 2010).
As a consequence of journalists’ reliance on elite social actors as sources, it is 
hardly surprising that newspaper articles also foregrounded and named the Republican 
Movement in ways that benefitted the British government. It is significant, however,
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as it would have normalised the British government’s position on the conflict and the 
broadcasting ban. Using excerpts from newspaper articles representing the British 
government introducing and lifting the ban, the way in which journalists foregrounded 
and named the Republican Movement will now be analysed. The potential 
consequences of such representations on British newspaper readers will then be 
considered to suggest how these dominant discourses operated interdiscursively in 
both time periods to build support as well as opposition for the broadcasting ban.
Introducing the ban (1988):
Although foregrounding the Republican Movement was consistent across both 
sample periods, constructing members of the Republican Movement pejoratively was 
far more common during the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting 
ban. The discourse constructing the IRA and/or Sinn Fein as being the main targets of 
the broadcasting ban was expressed on 51 occasions (12%) in newspaper articles in 
this period. The next most prevalent discourse, with 44 occurrences (10.4%), 
represented the IRA as a ‘terrorist’ organisation and Sinn Fein or Gerry Adams as an 
IRA ‘front’, ‘mouthpiece’ or ‘apologist’. As the similar number of occurrences 
suggests, these discourses were often expressed together. Arguably, these discourses 
functioned to support the British government introducing the broadcasting ban 
because such foregrounding and naming singles out Republican organisations as the 
main threat to the public. A threat which, according to this discourse, the British 
government has responded to by banning representatives of Republican organisations 
from making direct television and radio broadcasts.
The IRA and Sinn Fein were consistently foregrounded as the main targets of 
the broadcasting ban and represented as ‘terrorist’ organisations either through 
collocation or direct naming. Significantly and in contrast to the representation of 
Loyalist organisations, it is often the journalists directly naming Republican 
organisations pejoratively as opposed to them reporting the speech of a social actor 
doing so. For example, the headline and opening sentence of the following Daily 
Mirror article, which was published a day after the British government introduced the 
broadcasting ban, identifies the IRA and its ‘front-men’ as the main targets of the ban 
as well as labelling them ‘Irish terrorists’: ‘A ban on TV and radio interviews with 
Irish terrorists and their supporters was announced by Home Secretary Douglas Hurd 
yesterday’ {Daily Mirror, IRA’S FRONT-MEN GAGGED BY HURD, 20.10.88).
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Considering this newspaper was the least supportive of the British 
government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban, it is interesting that the Daily 
Mirror journalist still perpetuates the discourse of the Republican Movement (the IRA 
and its ‘front-men’) as ‘terrorists’. Indeed, it is this discourse that journalists could 
not and did not step outside of. Therefore, not one broadcasting ban article 
represented Irish Republican Army combatants as ‘guerrillas’, ‘insurgents’, ‘freedom 
fighters’ or ‘soldiers’. Instead, IRA members were consistently represented as 
‘terrorists’. This suggests Chomsky’s (2002) contention about the propagandists 
approach to terrorism being adopted by governments, large sections of academia and 
the mass media in ‘Western’ societies is correct when considering the discourses 
expressed by the British government, orthodox academics and the British journalists 
during the Northern Ireland conflict.
The Guardian also perpetuated this dominant discourse that represented 
members of the Republican Movement as ‘terrorists’. However, this occurred far less 
compared to newspapers that enthusiastically supported the ban and was mostly 
achieved through collocating the IRA and Sinn Fein with ‘terrorism’ as opposed to 
directly naming them as ‘terrorists’. For example, Sinn Fein is represented as a 
‘terrorist organisation’ through collocation in the first sentence of this Guardian 
newspaper article: ‘The Home Secretary, Mr Douglas Hurd, defended his ban on 
television and radio interviews with Sinn Fein and other terrorist organisations’ {The 
Guardian, HURD DEFIANT OVER TV BAN ON TERRORISTS, 03.11.88).
The IRA is also represented as a ‘terrorist organisation’ in the first sentence of 
this Daily Telegraph article: ‘The Government is considering banning press and 
television interviews with the IRA and other terrorist organisations’ {The Daily 
Telegraph, CABINET STUDIES BAN ON INTERVIEWS WITH TERRORISTS,
17.10.88). The headline of the following Guardian editorial foregrounds the IRA and 
then the first sentence of the editorial collocates the IRA (as opposed to Loyalist 
organisations) with ‘terrorist outrages’ and Northern Ireland’s ‘monstrous death toll’:
Whenever a terrorist outrage occurs in Northern Ireland there is wide cross- 
party agreement that every measure which might conceivably impede the IRA 
and mitigate the province’s monstrous death toll must be properly explored. 
{The Guardian, MR HURD’S BLANKET OF IRA SILENCE, 20.10.88)
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In the following Sun article, the headline foregrounds the IRA as the main target of 
the ban and in the second sentence the IRA are referred to as a ‘terror group’: 
‘Democrat Mr Dukakis criticised the Prime Minister for the Government’s ban on air 
time for terror groups like the IRA’ {The Sun, DUKAKIS IN IRA SWIPE AT MRS T,
27.10.88). In a Sun e ditorial that criticises BBC journalists resisting the British 
government’s broadcasting ban, it states: ‘The action is in protest at the Government’s 
ban on interviews with IRA terrorists’ {The Sun, TELLY BERKS, 28.10.88). 
Although the examples thus far have illustrated how the IRA were foregrounded and 
collocated or directly named as ‘terrorists’, on occasion they were also represented as 
‘gangsters’, ‘terrorist Godfathers’ and ‘extremists’ in the Daily Mail as well as 
‘bombers’ and ‘killers’ in the Daily Express*2
Sinn Fein and Gerry Adams were also constructed pejoratively by journalists 
representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Rather than 
being represented as a ‘terrorist organisation’ directly, Sinn Fein and Gerry Adams 
were more likely to be represented by journalists as an IRA ‘front’, ‘mouthpiece’ or 
‘apologist’, which as illustrated above was considered to be a terrorist organisation by 
British journalists. For example, in the following Daily Express editorial, Sinn Fein is 
represented as both a ‘terrorist front organisation’ and ‘enemy mouthpiece’ because it 
is foregrounded as the main target of the ban in the first sentence:
The long-overdue ban on broadcasts by Sinn Fein and other terrorist front 
organisations has provoked the predictable howls of anger and brought out the 
usual tired arguments. {Daily Express, CLOSING DOWN THE ENEMY 
MOUTHPIECE, 20.10.88)
In a newspaper article in The Daily Telegraph, Sinn Fein representatives are referred 
to as IRA apologists: ‘The “fawning apologies” of the IRA apologists after an outrage 
would not be broadcast’ {The Daily Telegraph, RIPPLE OF FEAR WAS SPREAD 
BY IHA ACCESS TO TV SAYS HURD, 03.11.88). In a Daily Mail editorial, Sinn 
Fein are represented as ‘front men for the IRA’ and ‘soft-voiced apologists for 
murder’ in an attempt by the newspaper’s editor to persuade Daily Mail readers to 
support the ‘muzzling’ of Sinn Fein:
Front men for the IRA are not allowed to promote their politics of terror on 
television or radio in the Irish Republic. So why should they still get away 
with it here? Most decent men and women have never understood why the
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soft-voiced apologists for murder should be invited by broadcasters to put 
terror’s point of view as if it were just another. {Daily Mail, MURDER’S 
VOICE TO BE MUZZLED, 20.10.88)
This ideological construction of the Republican Movement is evident on multiple 
levels, as is the attempt to persuade Daily Mail readers to support the British 
government introducing the broadcasting ban. The foregrounding and naming of the 
Republican Movement’s actions are essential to encourage support for British 
government censorship. It is only Republicans who possess a ‘politics of terror’ and 
are ‘apologists for murder’. It is only Republicans who need to be ‘muzzled’ with 
such treatment having obvious connotations of what is done to dangerous and 
aggressive dogs. Therefore, not only are the political motivations of Republicans 
reduced to a ‘politics of terror’, they are de-humanised by being represented as 
dangerous animals. The editorial also suggests those who fail to understand why 
Republicans should be ‘muzzled’ lack decency, which clearly functions to persuade 
readers to support the British government’s broadcasting ban. It could, however, be 
argued that there is nothing ‘decent’ about British newspapers encouraging the British 
public to support direct censorship of the British broadcast media.
‘Terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ labels clearly have negative connotations of 
inexcusable acts of violence against civilians that spread shock and fear amongst the 
wider civilian population. However, Sproat (1991) maintains it is theoretically 
impossible to label particular organisations and individuals as ‘terrorist’ because it is 
individual acts that constitute terrorism. IRA members that killed British civilians 
certainly did commit acts of terrorism, however, IRA members also killed British 
combatants, which arguably does not constitute an act of terrorism. This is because 
combatants on both sides of a conflict die by the sword as they have chosen to live by 
it; that is the risk they knowingly take.
For British journalists to apply ‘terrorist’ labels to combatants (the IRA) and 
non-combatants (Sinn Fein) alike in one side of the conflict is therefore not a neutral 
reflection of reality, but a propagandists approach to terrorism (Chomsky, 2002). It 
is an ideological choice that builds nationalism and refracts reality in the interests of 
those supporting the continuing union of Northern Ireland and Britain. George 
Orwell (1945b) explains that double standards and indifference to reality are 
prerequisites of nationalism. His reference to India in the following excerpt could 
easily be replaced with Ireland in previous decades and Afghanistan today:
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All nationalists have the power of not seeing resemblances between similar 
sets of facts. A British Tory will defend self-determination in Europe and 
oppose it in India with no feeling of inconsistency. Actions are held to be good 
or bad, not on their own merits, but according to who does them, and there is 
almost no kind of outrage — torture, the use of hostages, forced labour, mass 
deportations, imprisonment without trial, forgery, assassination, the bombing 
of civilians — which does not change its moral colour when it is committed by 
‘our’ side. (Orwell, 1945b: 362-363).
Representing IRA members as ‘gangsters’ and ‘terrorist Godfathers’ conceals any 
political motivations they have and, at best, discredits their claims to have any. This 
is because such labels denote criminal activity. ‘Gangsters’ and ‘Godfathers’ connote 
a mafia lifestyle of violent mob wars motivated by securing monopolies on drug 
dealing and loan sharking. According to Curtis (1984) such mafia metaphors entered 
British media discourse in the 1970s and were used frequently by ‘Labour Northern 
Ireland Secretary Roy Mason, whose strategy was to deal with the IRA revolt as if it 
were purely a criminal matter’ (Curtis, 1984: 324). The British government’s naming 
strategy clearly functions to suppress the Republican Movement’s motivations for 
violence that were rooted in the historical injustices and tyranny of the British Empire 
when colonising, occupying and dividing Ireland.
Referring to members of the Republican Movement as ‘extremists’, ‘bombers’ 
and ‘killers’ also functions to detach their political and historical motivation from the 
knowledge of British newspaper readers. Representing people as ‘extremists’ 
immediately ‘others’ and alienates ‘them’ from ‘us’ because it suggests such people 
exist and behave outside of normality, that is, ‘they’ are too ‘extreme’ to accept the 
status quo ‘we’ apparently do. In this case, ‘they’ (members of the Republican 
Movement) do not accept Britain’s presence in the North of Ireland (just as they did 
not in the South of Ireland).
Labeling Republicans as ‘extremists’ suggests this political position is 
abnormal and therefore wrong. ‘Extremist’ is a propagandists construction that relies 
on a more emotional and less rational appeal than ‘terrorist’ labels because at least 
‘terrorism’, although subjectively applied, refers to an action. ‘Extremism’ on the 
other hand is harder to define and is a label often used merely to delegitimise a 
political position. Reducing IRA members to ‘bombers’ and ‘killers’ also encourages 
newspaper readers to think about their actions as opposed to their political motivation 
by turning verbs denoting attacking and killing into nouns.
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Instead of choosing to construct Sinn Fein as the political wing of the 
Republican Movement, which had democratically elected representatives nationally 
and locally, the lexical choices that were used in the above newspaper representations 
connote concealment and duplicity. Describing Sinn Fein as a ‘front’, ‘mouthpiece’ 
or ‘apologist’ for the IRA suggests it is merely a fa$ade created to legitimise and 
promote ‘terrorism’, or an instrument that just follows and echoes IRA orders as 
opposed to a political party serving and representing the will of its constituents. Such 
discourses foregrounding and naming the Republican Movement pejoratively 
dominated newspaper articles representing the British government’s introduction of 
the broadcasting ban and, arguably, functioned interdiscursively to support it.
Foregrounding members of the Republican Movement as the main targets of 
the ban whilst representing them as ‘terrorists’, ‘extremists’ ‘gangsters’, ‘godfathers’, 
‘murderers’, ‘bombers’ and ‘killers’ (in other words, perpetrators of violent crime) 
hardly encourages British newspapers readers to view such a movement as anything 
other than bloodthirsty. Further still, continually emphasising the violence of the 
Republican Movement whilst representing Sinn Fein as nothing more than a ‘front’, 
‘mouthpiece’ and ‘apologist’ hardly encourages British newspaper readers to view 
Sinn Fein as a legitimate and democratic political party that is a victim of British 
government censorship. It would appear that simultaneously emphasising the 
violence committed by one side of the conflict and suppressing the political 
motivations behind it functions to delegitimise the Republican Movement, thereby 
legitimising various actions against it such as the broadcasting ban.
Clearly, two comers of Van Dijk’s (1998, 2006) ‘ideological square’ have 
been revealed in this textual analysis of British newspaper representations of the 
broadcasting ban. The negative other-representation is achieved through emphasising 
the violence with referential and predicational strategies that construct the Republican 
Movement as criminal, bloodthirsty and irrational whilst suppressing their political 
motivations by excluding any reference to partition or the history of the British 
occupation of Ireland before and after partition. In contrast, Loyalist organisations 
were very rarely identified as being targeted by the ban and if they were it was only 
after the IRA and/or Sinn Fein had been identified as the main target first. As Elliott 
(1979) puts it in relation to the British side of the propaganda war, whereas the 
Loyalists are the ‘uglies’, it is the Republicans who are the ‘baddies’ and need to be 
singled out. Of course, the status of the ‘goodies’ is reserved for British combatants.
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The other two comers of Van Dijk’s (1998, 2006) ‘ideological square’, which 
are constituted by emphasising information that is positive about ‘us’ and suppressing 
information that is negative about ‘us’ were not identifiable in British newspaper 
representations of the broadcasting ban. Instead, there was a general backgrounding 
of the ‘uglies’ and an almost complete absence of the ‘goodies’. The only reference 
to British combatants was in their capacity as victims of the ‘baddies’ such as the 
eight British soldiers killed by Republican combatants at Ballygawley in August 
1988. Rather than an overt positive self-representation then, there was a suggestion 
that British combatants were on the sidelines of the battlefield rather than active 
participants, which is in itself a positive self-representation that fits the narrative of 
British soldiers as peace-keepers separating the ‘uglies’ and the ‘baddies’ in Northern 
Ireland. The absence of British combatants in any role other than victims of IRA 
violence meant it was impossible for them to be represented as anything other than 
respectable soldiers in British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. If a 
literal approach to the study of terrorism is applied to the actions of combatants on 
both sides of any conflict, it is plain to see it is never good versus evil, from the 
Northern Ireland conflict to the conflicts in Iraq or Afghanistan today.
If British journalists wanted to represent all the combatants who killed and 
died in the Northern Ireland conflict in a more neutral way they could have at least 
acknowledged that the ‘goodies’ colluded with the ‘uglies’ to kill the ‘baddies’ 
(whether it was Republican combatants or civilians being killed). However, to break 
the Manichean view of those fighting, killing and dying for a United Irish Republic 
and those fighting, killing and dying for a United British Kingdom would challenge 
the British nationalism of the British newspaper industry and the inevitable 
propagandistic approach to terrorism used to achieve it. The backgrounding of 
Loyalist organisations meant that the ‘uglies’ were rarely represented as ‘terrorists’ 
and if they were as in the final two sentences of the following Daily Mail article, it 
was not the journalist labelling members of Loyalist organisations as ‘terrorists’, it 
was the social actor whose words were used as reported speech by the journalist:
Labour’s Northern Ireland spokesman Mr Kevin McNamara, said he did not 
think a ban would affect opinion in Ulster. If the Government was even- 
handed, it would include Loyalist terrorists, as did RTE, the Republic’s 
broadcasting authority. (Daily Mail, HURD TO WIPE ADAMS OFF TV 
SCREEN, 19.10.88)
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It is significant that the vast majority of newspaper articles representing the 
introduction of the ban immediately identified the IRA and Sinn Fein as the main 
targets of it even though it applied to both Republican and Loyalist organisations. 
However, there is a practical explanation for this foregrounding in some of the 
broadcasting ban articles. It is clear from the newspaper articles printed in the days 
before the British government introduced the broadcasting ban that journalists had 
assumed the ban would only apply to Republican organisations. They also seemed to 
believe that the British government was going to ban Republicans organisations from 
newspaper interviews as well as television and radio broadcasts. For example, two 
days before the British government introduced the ban, The Sun informs its readers:
Tough new measures against the IRA and its supporters are to be introduced in 
a major crackdown against terrorism. Ulster Secretary Tom King is poised to 
outlaw TV, radio and newspaper interviews with the IRA and Sinn Fein. (The 
Sun, IRA FACES THE BOOT FROM TV, 17.10.88)
This belief that the ban would target Republican organisations only and will apply to 
both print and broadcast media in Britain is unanimous across newspapers before the 
British government officially introduced it. Some of the newspapers attribute it to a 
television appearance on BBC’s ‘On the Record’ programme by Northern Ireland 
Secretary Tom King on 16th October, 1988 {Daily Mirror, ‘BAN KILLERS FROM 
TELLY’, 17.10.88). The following day, the Daily Mail writes:
The strongest signal yet that the Government is out to deny the terrorists 
publicity came yesterday from Ulster Secretary Tom King. Asked in a BBC 
TV interview whether a media ban was being considered, Mr King declared: 
‘Nothing is excluded.’ He refused to comment further. {Daily Mail, MAGGIE 
TO STARVE IRA OF PUBLICITY, 17.10.88).
Tom King’s vague statement about forthcoming ‘anti-terrorism’ policies could 
explain why journalists made incorrect assumptions about the ban, which accounts for 
the foregrounding of the IRA and Sinn Fein in broadcasting ban newspaper articles 
before it was introduced. However, after the ban was introduced such foregrounding 
continued throughout newspaper articles. It could be argued that representing 
Republican organisations as being the main targets of the ban exposes the British 
government’s attempt to silence Republican voices, especially those democratically 
elected Sinn Fein candidates. However, the most prevalent discourses, which
95
interconnected most closely, were those that were hostile to Republican organisations. 
Indeed, there was only one example across all the British newspaper articles that 
represented the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban as a 
planned and tactical method of reversing Sinn Fein electoral breakthroughs and that 
Margaret Thatcher’s contention that the ‘terrorists’ had no support in Northern Ireland 
had been proven wrong. This discourse was expressed by Gerry Adams when he was 
allowed to speak in The Guardian, illustrating it was possible for journalists to do so:
Mr Gerry Adams, the president of Sinn Fein, said: “Eight years ago Mrs 
Thatcher claimed that the Republican Movement had no support. Now they 
are directly censoring a legal political party which has an electoral mandate. If 
they had an argument to counter the Sinn Fein view then they should be 
putting it instead of censoring us.” (The Guardian, BROADCAST BAN 
LEADS TERROR FIGHT, 20.10.88)
If this had been a prevalent discourse expressed by journalists or by them allowing 
Gerry Adams to, which consistently appeared with the discourse foregrounding the 
IRA and/or Sinn Fein as the main targets of the ban, then this would have changed the 
context to a discourse opposing the ban. However, the discourse foregrounding 
Republican organisations was most often expressed alongside discourses that 
constructed the Republican Movement pejoratively and other dominant discourses 
that supported the introduction of the broadcasting ban such as the next most 
prevalent discourse that argued terrorists must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’.
The common sense explanation of such foregrounding and naming would 
suggest it is hardly surprising that British newspapers identified the IRA and Sinn 
Fein as the main targets of the ban because it was Republican combatants that were a 
threat to British politicians, combatants and civilians. However, such a discourse is 
based on a particular definition of ‘Britain’ and a particular understanding of the 
Northern Ireland conflict, which reveals the “us” and “them” dichotomy as 
ideological narratives of the conflict itself.
It is important to acknowledge the normalisation of British nationalism in 
foregrounding those attacking “us” (anyone considered ‘British’) and backgrounding 
those who attack “them” (Catholics in Northern Ireland), whether that be combatants 
of the British Army (UDR), RUC, UDA/UFF and UVF. It is also important to 
remember that IRA attacks on “us” in the ‘mainland’ only took place in England 
(never in Scotland or Wales) and that British involvement in Ireland did not begin in
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the late 1960s, nor was Britain a neutral arbiter separating the warring ‘tribes’ of 
Northern Ireland (Miller, 1998). In short, the Northern Ireland conflict was a legacy 
of the British Empire just as the Israeli occupation of Palestine is today.
Discourses which acknowledged the central grievance of the Republican 
Movement, which was not centuries old, but less than 50 years old when the Northern 
Ireland conflict began in 1968 were almost entirely absent. There was just one 
broadcasting ban newspaper article in which the centrality of partition to the conflict 
was acknowledged. The Daily Mirror was the only newspaper which took an overt 
editorial position against the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting 
ban and was also the only newspaper to acknowledge some of the historical context to 
the conflict (even if excluding British agency in partition and the undemocratic 
manner in which it was achieved):
[WJhen we deal with the symptoms of the problems of Northern Ireland 
instead of the causes -  which lie in the bizarre decision of nearly 60 years ago 
to divide the island artificially -  then we demonstrate that we would best serve 
the future of Ireland by departing from it for ever. (Daily Mirror, 
BANKRUPT, BASE, BAD, 21.10.88).
This single editorial illustrates that it was possible to inform newspaper readers as to 
why the Republican Movement existed and what motivated them. However, the vast 
majority of British newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban did not 
mention any of the political and historical motivations of the Republican Movement. 
Arguably, the interdiscursive construction foregrounding and pejoratively naming the 
Republican Movement functioned to support the British government’s introduction of 
the broadcasting ban. Journalists could have foregrounded the Republican Movement 
alongside discourses emphasising their political and historical motivations or 
represented the British government’s broadcasting ban as a strategy to silence such 
crucial context. However, journalists did not express these discourses, which would 
have better informed British newspaper readers.
Lifting the ban (1994):
Newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the 
broadcasting ban also constructed the ban as mainly targeting the IRA and Sinn Fein. 
However, the discourse foregrounding Republican organisations was not consistently 
interconnected with the discourse representing the IRA as a ‘terrorist’ organisation
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and Sinn Fein or Gerry Adams as an IRA ‘front’, ‘mouthpiece’ or ‘apologist’. There 
were 28 occurrences (13%) of the discourse that represented the IRA and Sinn Fein as 
being the main targets of the broadcasting ban, yet there were only 12 expressions 
(5.6%) of the discourse that constructed the IRA as a ‘terrorist’ organisation and Sinn 
Fein or Gerry Adams as an IRA ‘front’, ‘mouthpiece’ or ‘apologist’. Again, this was 
done through collocation or direct naming. For example, in a Guardian article that 
foregrounds Sinn Fein and Gerry Adams as the main targets of the ban throughout, 
they are collocated with terrorism in the following two sentences:
The ban was imposed by Government directive in October 1988, in an attempt 
to deny terrorists “the oxygen of publicity”. An exception is made for 
members of Sinn Fein at election time, but only when discussing issues 
unrelated to the violence. {The Guardian, BIRT CALLS FOR BROADCAST 
BAN TO BE LIFTED, 01.09.94)
There were a few occurrences of journalists directly naming the IRA or Sinn Fein 
pejoratively, but significantly less than when the British government introduced the 
broadcasting ban six years before. For example, a day after the ban was lifted, a Daily 
Express journalist refers to IRA members as ‘terrorists’: ‘The historic breakthrough 
came on a day which began with Ministers alarmed at decisions on IRA terrorists by 
the U.S. and Irish authorities’ {Daily Express, ULSTER MOVE AS U.S. FREES IRA 
GUNMAN, 17.09.94). However, such constructions are exceptions in newspaper 
articles representing the British government lifting the ban as opposed to the norm in 
newspaper articles representing its introduction.
In addition, the most hostile constructions of the Republican Movement in 
newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban 
are from the same newspapers that were most supportive of its introduction. For 
example, a Daily Mail editorial, which claims Irish actors ‘must love’ speaking the 
words "of banned Sinn Fein representatives, also labels Gerry Adams as an apologist 
for murder: ‘They are regularly called in to repeat the words -  and how 
sympathetically they do it -  uttered by Adams and other apologists for murder’ {Daily 
M ail TRUST THE PEOPLE, 16.09.94).
The discourse foregrounding the IRA and Sinn Fein in newspaper articles 
representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban is not considered a 
supporting discourse because it did not interconnect with the discourse representing
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such organisations in negative ways. Instead, it is considered an opposing discourse 
because the context of it was changed by it frequently appe aring with prevalent 
opposing discourses. An example of this is the discourse that constructed the ban as 
being a farce and a disaster, mostly attributed to the use of actors to dub those banned 
from speaking in the broadcast media. This discourse is explored in more depth 
below, but before this, it is worth considering why British journalists largely 
backtracked from referring to members of the Republican Movement as ‘terrorists’.
An obvious explanation is because the IRA declared a ceasefire on 31st August 
1994, shortly before the broadcasting ban was lifted, which made it difficult (though 
not impossible as illustrated above) to continue labelling the Republican Movement 
pejoratively. That said, this does not sufficiently explain such labelling continuing 
because it was not a reflection of reality in the first place, it was an ideological 
refraction of reality emanating from the British government. Acknowledging this 
suggests a more likely explanation is that while elite social actors were united in their 
opposition to the Republican Movement and divided on the merits of the broadcasting 
ban in 1988, they were divided on the issue of publicly entering talks with the 
Republican Movement and united on the evident failures and shortcomings of the ban 
by 1994. In other words, it would appear that the discourses of elite social actors 
were most often expressed in newspaper articles during both sample periods.
Starving the ‘terrorists’ of the ‘oxygen of publicity’
The discourse that argued ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ was 
expressed consistently as a justification for the British government introducing the 
broadcasting ban. This discourse can be traced back to the speech Margaret Thatcher 
made in 1985 at the American Bar Association in London following the hijacking of 
Trans 4Vorld Airlines Flight 847. She argued that a symbiotic relationship existed 
between the media and ‘terrorism’ and that ‘terrorists’ should be starved of the 
‘oxygen of publicity on which they depend’ (Thatcher, 1985). Although the meaning 
of this discourse is rarely explained or contextualised in the newspaper articles, it was 
often attributed to Margaret Thatcher. It was a dominant discourse in newspaper 
articles representing the British government introducing the ban and was also 
expressed as the main justification when newspaper articles representing the British 
government lifting the ban discussed the origins of the censorship.
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Arguably, the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ 
discourse functions to support the introduction of the broadcasting ban because it 
perpetuates Margaret Thatcher’s contention that the British media had consistently 
given the Republican Movement a platform to express their views. As this discourse 
was dominant in newspaper articles and was mostly repeated without challenge by 
journalists, it stifled alternative discourses that emphasised the need to understand and 
alleviate the causes of the conflict. Interestingly, in the same speech at the American 
Bar Association, Margaret Thatcher said: ‘In our societies we do not believe in 
constraining the media, still less in censorship’ and, quoting Benjamin Franklin, 
‘[t]hose who would give up essential liberty to preserve a little temporary safety 
deserve neither liberty nor safety’ (Ibid.). However, none of the journalists chose to 
acknowledge these points in the newspaper articles, which would have undermined 
the thrust of Margaret Thatcher’s argument and the legitimacy of the British 
government’s decision to introduce the broadcasting ban three years later.
In addition, by excluding the history of the British government indirectly 
censoring the British media throughout the Northern Ireland conflict, journalists failed 
to acknowledge and inform their readers that the direct censorship of the broadcasting 
ban was merely an extension of this policy. There was only one journalist that made 
this connection as well as listing examples of British government interference with the 
British media and the learned practice of self-censorship by journalists. Richard 
Norton-Taylor of The Guardian writes:
For 17 years, television executives and editors have censored programmes 
about the IRA and Sinn Fein. They have been supported by large sections of 
the British press. {The Guardian, POLITICS CONFRONT PROGRAMME 
CHIEFS, 20.10.88)
He also acknowledges that some Labour politicians were not averse to government 
control of the British media during the Northern Ireland conflict:
In 1976, Roy (now Lord) Mason, Labour’s new Northern Ireland Secretary, 
pressed for a total ban on the reporting of IRA activities. Echoing ministers’ 
traditional tendency to exaggerate, reflected in much of the press, he accused 
the BBC of providing a “daily platform” for the IRA. (Ibid.)
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Interestingly, this journalist critiques the British newspaper industry itself for joining 
British politicians in claiming British broadcasters had been irresponsible or that they 
should censor particular programmes featuring Republican voices. Indeed, the 
discourse representing British broadcasters (especially the BBC) as irresponsible was 
expressed 16 times (3.8%) in newspaper articles covering the British government 
introducing the ban, which obviously compounds the discourse arguing the ‘terrorists’ 
must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’. Although it was mostly journalists 
repeating social actors expressing the broadcasters (especially the BBC) are 
irresponsible discourse through reported speech, a Daily Express editorial did too:
[The BBC] rushed to give Adams a final platform before the broadcasting 
shutters went down. In an interview expressly to seek his reaction to the ban -  
and broadcast before it was officially announced in Parliament -  the Sinn Fein 
leader was able to cock a snook at the Government. So much for the argument 
that the broadcasters can be trusted to see that they do not give the men of 
violence publicity. {Daily Express, CLOSING DOWN THE ENEMY 
MOUTHPIECE, 20.10.88)
This Daily Express excerpt certainly supports Norton-Taylor’s (1988) suggestion that 
some British newspapers would prefer to defend the British government than British 
broadcasters. In fact, the Daily Express, like the Daily Mail and The Sun, took an 
editorial position that was overtly supportive of the British government introducing 
the broadcasting ban and critical of any media workers resisting the censorship. This 
is hardly surprising considering the conservative allegiances of these newspapers, but 
it does further evidence their role in helping representatives of the British government 
to persuade British citizens to accept this form of direct censorship, which had not 
existed in Britain since World War II.
The ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse is also 
based j)n  several ideological presuppositions. Arguably, this discourse builds on 
those foregrounding and naming the Republican Movement as possessing a monopoly 
on acts of ‘terrorism’ and being the threat to Northern Ireland and Britain. There is a 
presupposition that the reader knows and accepts the identity of the ‘terrorists’, the 
meaning of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and that the former do indeed thrive on the 
latter. This discourse, therefore, further normalises the discourse of Republicans as 
‘terrorists’. Representing the ‘terrorists’ as thriving on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ also 
operates on the false premise that those trying to maintain a British United Kingdom
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do not. The British government and military thrived on the oxygen of publicity 
throughout the Northern Ireland conflict and it was constantly given to them by the 
British broadcast media.
Introducing the ban (1988):
The discourse arguing ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ 
was the third most prevalent discourse in newspaper articles representing the British 
government introducing the broadcasting ban. It was expressed on 34 occasions (8%) 
in this time period. Interestingly, when the broadcasting ban was announced in the 
House of Commons on 19th October 1988, Douglas Hurd did not actually mention the 
‘oxygen of publicity’, nor did any of the other speakers in the Commons debate that 
followed. Hurd did, however, attempt to justify introducing the ban by arguing:
The terrorists themselves draw support and sustenance from access to radio 
and television—from addressing their views more directly to the population at 
large than is possible through the press. The Government have decided that the 
time has come to deny this easy platform to those who use it to propagate 
terrorism. (Hansard, 1988: 893)
On an intertextual level, this connects with Margaret Thatcher’s symbiotic 
relationship argument between the media and ‘terrorism’ because it suggests that the 
‘terrorists’ do thrive on the media and the media do provide an ‘easy platform’. The 
discourse based on Douglas Hurd’s above statement in broadcasting ban newspaper 
articles -  the ban will take away the easy platform used to propagate terrorism -  was 
still coded as the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse in 
this analysis because it clearly derives from Margaret Thatcher’s argument. In the 
few times that the discourse based on Hurd’s statement was expressed by journalists, 
it appeared near to Margaret Thatcher’s statement, which simplified what Hurd had 
said in the Commons to the ‘oxygen of publicity’ catchphrase. In the following Sun 
article, for example, Hurd’s Commons statement expressing the ‘terrorists’ must be 
starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse follows the journalist’s reduction of 
Margaret Thatcher’s discourse to the ‘oxygen of publicity’ catchphrase:
Mrs Thatcher insisted on the ban to deprive the IRA o f the “oxygen of 
publicity.” Mr Hurd told MPs that TV appearances by terrorists justifying 
murder caused “grave offence.” He added: “The government has decided that
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the time has now come to deny this easy platform to those who use it to 
propagate terrorism”. (The Sun, FURY AS BBC BEAT HURD BAN ON 
IRA’S CLAPTRAP, 20.10.88)
It is interesting to note though that the discourse based on Hurd’s Commons statement 
was only expressed six times out of the 34 expressions of the ‘terrorists’ must be 
starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse in newspaper articles representing the 
British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban. This is significant because 
the discourse emanating from, and attributed to, Margaret Thatcher was expressed in 
newspaper articles much more often. This may have been a result of journalists being 
aware of editor preference for concision or because of the elevated status of Margaret 
Thatcher as Prime Minister. It could also be due to the House of Lords debate on 
broadcasting and terrorism, which followed the Commons debate. In the Lords 
debate, the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse was 
expressed on two occasions. However, this was only acknowledged in one newspaper 
(The Daily Telegraph) article as most articles discussed the Commons debate and not 
the Lords debate:
In the Lords, Lord MASON of BARNSLEY said he believed it was defensible 
in a democratic society to stifle all outlets for terrorist groups bent on 
undermining the State and smashing our democratic institutions. If we cut off 
the oxygen of propaganda on television that should cover the other media as 
well. (The Daily Telegraph, TV AND RADIO BAN ON TERRORISTS HAS 
MIXED LABOUR RECEPTION, 20.10.88)
Another, more feasible, explanation for the dominance of this discourse is the high 
number of broadcasting ban articles written before the British government officially 
introduced the ban. This explains why most manifestations of the ‘terrorists’ must be 
starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse were drawn from, and attributed to, 
Margaret Thatcher and Tom King. For example, a journalist in the Daily Express 
writes: ‘The measures are part of the Prime Minister’s plan to deprive the bombers of 
what she has called the “oxygen of publicity’” (Daily Express, KING SET TO CURB 
REPORTS ON IRA, 17.10.88).
As acknowledged earlier, journalists had assumed the broadcasting ban would 
only apply to Republican organisations, which can explain the foregrounding of the 
IRA in the previous Daily Express article and in the following Daily Mirror article: 
‘Premier Margaret Thatcher and Ulster Secretary Tom King believe the measures
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would starve the terrorists of the “oxygen of publicity” {Daily Mirror, IRA TERROR 
GAG IS ON THE WAY, 19.10.88). However, after the ban was officially introduced 
by Douglas Hurd, this foregrounding continued as did expressions of the ‘oxygen of 
publicity’ catchphrase: ‘The IRA, Sinn Fein and other outlawed Ulster groups and 
their supporters will be denied what Mrs Thatcher has described as the ‘oxygen of 
publicity’ {Daily Mail, TV AND RADIO IN ROW OVER GAG ON THE IRA, 
20. 10.88).
Journalists sometimes expressed Douglas Hurd’s own version of the 
‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse after he had 
introduced the ban: ‘Mr Hurd told the Commons the time had come to deny the “easy 
platform” of TV and radio to those who “propagate terrorism.’” {Daily Express, ROW 
AS BBC FLOUT HURD TERROR BAN, 20.10.88). In most newspaper articles, 
journalists preferred to use the ‘oxygen of publicity’ catchphrase and mostly repeated 
the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse without 
challenging its premise. This is illustrated in the above examples as well as in the 
following Daily Telegraph article:
The TV and radio ban is regarded by Ministers as an important way of 
starving the IRA of what Mrs Thatcher has described as the “oxygen of 
publicity”. {The Daily Telegraph, BROADCAST BAN COVERS ELEVEN 
IRISH GROUPS, 20.10.88)
On one occasion, the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ 
discourse was challenged by Paul Foot in an op-ed piece for the Daily Mirror. He 
pointed out the double standards of the British government, which was holding talks 
with, and giving the ‘oxygen of publicity’ to, Adolfo Calero, leader of the Contras. 
This non-state organisation was ‘waging violent war in an attempt to overthrow the 
Nicaraguan Government which was elected with 67 per cent of the vote’ {Daily 
Mirror, CONTRA-DICTORY, 27.10.88). In contrast, the ‘terrorists’ must be starved 
of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse was embellished by a Daily Mail editorial 
arguing the ban did not go far enough and that Sinn Fein should be banned altogether:
[A]s long as the laws of this land allow the likes of Gerry Adams a legitimate 
platform, they will gratefully gulp down the oxygen of publicity and spew out 
the propaganda of tenor. {Daily Mail, DEPRIVE TERROR OF THIS 
MEGAPHONE, 17.10.88)
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Such discursive practices illustrate the structuring influence of particular newspapers 
as well as text-genres within newspapers (Richardson, 2007). The owner and editor 
of the Daily Mail would not allow a journalist like Paul Foot to work for them 
because it is a staunchly right-wing newspaper. Acknowledging British government 
complicity with the Contras is impossible for the Daily Mail because it is a 
reactionary newspaper that has a long history of supporting undemocratic and even 
fascist forces when they are perceived to be beneficial for the economic interests of 
the British elite (Bingham, 1998; Simpson, 2010).
The generic conventions of news articles structure what the journalist can say 
too because news articles only allow the journalist to amplify what particular social 
actors have said, whereas the generic conventions of op-eds and editorials allow 
opinions of the authors to be expressed. Although journalists choose which social 
actors to include and exclude, the generic conventions of news articles do not allow 
them to overtly support or oppose these social actors other than by subtlety framing 
reported speech through use of quoting verbs and the naming of social actors from 
which such reported speech originated.
Op-eds and editorials do, however, allow overt support and opposition to be 
expressed by the journalists and editors. Therefore, a revolutionary socialist journalist 
employed by the Daily Mirror, a then left-leaning tabloid, can express an alternative 
discourse that functions to oppose the broadcasting ban by drawing attention to the 
double standards of the British government. Likewise, the right-wing editor of the 
Daily Mail can embellish a dominant discourse to persuade its readers to support the 
broadcasting ban by using hyperbolic language to further demonise the Republican 
Movement whilst amplifying British government justifications for introducing the 
broadcasting ban and arguing the ban does not go far enough.
Lifting the ban (19941:
The discourse arguing ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ 
was expressed less often in newspaper articles representing the British government 
lifting the broadcasting ban. It was expressed on 12 occasions (5.6%) during this time 
period. However, in 1994, when journalists recalled British government justifications 
for introducing the ban, the discourse that argued ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the 
‘oxygen of publicity’ was expressed most frequently and was often attributed to 
Margaret Thatcher. For example, a Daily Mail editorial recalled that the ban ‘was
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introduced by Margaret Thatcher six years ago in an attempt to deny terrorists ‘the 
oxygen of publicity”  (Daily Mail, TRUST THE PEOPLE, 16.09.94). Another 
justification for the ban that was sometimes expressed alongside this discourse was 
the Bailygawley attack on British soldiers by IRA members:
It was imposed in October 1988, following the IRA’s murder of eight soldiers 
near Bailygawley, County Tyrone. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said she 
wanted to starve the terrorists of the ‘oxygen of publicity’. (Daily Mail, I 
WAS RUSTY. BUT NEVER MIND - THE ACTOR WILL CLEAN IT UP 
FORME, 17.09.94)
Similarly, The Guardian recalls the broadcasting ban was ‘introduced by Margaret 
Thatcher to deny terrorists the “oxygen of publicity” after the Bailygawley army bus 
bombing in 1988 which killed eight soldiers’ (The Guardian, GERRY ADAMS MAY 
SOON GET HIS VOICE BACK, 01.09.94). The collective memory of the British 
newspaper industry regarding the British government’s introduction of the ban is 
interesting because it includes Margaret Thatcher’s catchphrase, but excludes the 
history and context of its emergence. The closest any journalist comes to connecting 
the British government’s introduction of the ban’s direct censorship to the British 
government’s attempts to indirectly censor the British media throughout the Northern 
Ireland conflict appeared in The Guardian:
Behind the order lay the imprint of Margaret Thatcher who in 1985 tried to 
have a Real Lives documentary, On the Edge of the Union, banned on the 
grounds it indirectly furthered terrorism. In her famous phrase, she said: “We 
must not give them the oxygen of publicity.” (The Guardian, 
CONTRADICTIONS DUMPED IN THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY,
17.09.94)
The absence of context to the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ 
discourse in newspaper articles representing the lifting of the broadcasting ban is 
significant because it excludes the long history of British government interference 
with the British media before the broadcasting ban. As mentioned earlier, there was a 
tendency to exclude this important context in newspaper articles representing the 
British government introducing the broadcasting ban too. This can be explained by 
the brevity of the majority of newspaper articles representing the British government 
introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban, especially in the ‘popular’ and ‘mid­
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market’ newspapers. As outlined above, one Guardian newspaper article did actually 
acknowledge this context of British government interference with the British media 
during the introduction of the ban illustrating it was possible for other journalists to do 
so i f  they were allowed to do so. However, it would have obviously depended on how 
much copy the editor granted to the journalist and how much the editor decided 
newspaper readers wanted to (or should) know about the ban.
It is also true that many of the explanations for the British government 
introducing the broadcasting ban were excluded in newspaper articles when the ban 
was introduced. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that journalists simplified 
explanations for the ban six years later when ‘remembering’ why it was first 
introduced. However, limiting explanations for the ban to discourses representing it 
as a solution to the ‘terrorists’ thriving on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and, to a lesser 
extent, a reaction to an IRA attack on British soldiers at Bailygawley is misleading. 
By excluding alternative discourses, journalists simplified the circumstances in which 
the British government introduced the broadcasting ban.
Journalists could have explained the ban as the British government’s reaction 
to Sinn Fein electoral breakthroughs, or acknowledged that the British media rarely 
gave the Republican Movement a platform before the ban and if they did it was 
hostile. They could have also informed their readers that the British government had 
introduced the broadcasting ban after decades of indirectly pressuring the broadcast 
media to self-censor particular voices and programmes. However, journalists rarely 
expressed these discourses. Instead, British government discourses dominated 
newspaper articles such as the next discourse analysed here, which emphasised the 
similarity between the British broadcasting ban and the Irish broadcasting ban.
There’s a similar ban in the Irish Republic
Aside from the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse, 
there were two other discourses expressed by the British government to justify 
introducing the broadcasting ban. When Douglas Hurd announced the introduction of 
the ban in the House of Commons on 19th October 1988, he also argued that ‘terrorist’ 
appearances in the media ‘caused widespread offence to viewers and listeners 
throughout the United Kingdom’ (Hansard, 1988: 893) whilst underlining that the 
Irish Republic had a similar ban:
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These restrictions follow very closely the lines of similar provisions which 
have been operating in the Republic of Ireland for some years. Representatives 
of these organisations are prevented from appearing on Irish television, but 
because we have had no equivalent restrictions in the United Kingdom they 
can nevertheless be seen on BBC and ITV services in Northern Ireland, where 
their appearances cause the gravest offence, and in Great Britain. The 
Government’s decision today means that both in the United Kingdom and in 
the Irish Republic such appearances will be prevented. (Ibid.)
Although both of these discourses were expressed in newspaper articles representing 
the British government introducing the ban, the discourse that featured most often is 
explored here. The discourse stating that the Irish Republic had a similar ban was 
expressed on 24 occasions (5.6%) in newspaper articles representing the introduction 
of the ban whereas the discourse arguing media appearances of ‘terrorists’ caused 
offence to the public was only expressed on 11 occasions (2.6%). Arguably, when 
Douglas Hurd underlined that the Irish Republic had a similar ban, he was attempting 
to normalise the British broadcasting ban by recognising that in another country with 
a comparatively reduced threat from ‘terrorism’ there was already a long standing 
media ban on the organisations proscribed in Northern Ireland.
It is clear from newspaper articles printed before the broadcasting ban was 
introduced that the discourse acknowledging there’s a similar ban in the Irish 
Republic was already circulating, but it is hard to know when it entered the discursive 
economy and from which social actors it originated. There is a possibility that Tom 
King expressed it when being interviewed in a BBC interview on 16th October, which 
would explain why journalists did so during the next few days. However, there is no 
evidence for this and it could have been a comparison that journalists observed 
independently. Nonetheless, Douglas Hurd’s statement in the House of Commons 
clearly_resulted in this discourse being expressed by journalists in the days after the 
British government introduced the broadcasting ban.
Although Douglas Hurd was stating a fact in the House of Commons, there 
was a similar broadcasting ban in the Irish Republic, which had been in place since 
1972, he was also choosing to exclude other facts. For example, he could have said 
that no other country in Europe practised direct censorship on the broadcast media, 
except for Ireland, or that the British broadcasting ban was the strictest form of 
censorship since World War II. Choosing to express these facts, however, would not 
have been conducive to persuading British politicians, journalists and citizens to
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accept such media control. Clearly, by acknowledging the former and omitting the 
latter, Douglas Hurd was attempting to justify the ban. The discourse acknowledging 
there’s a similar ban in the Irish Republic functions to reassure the British public that 
‘we’ are not the only ones to have such media ‘restrictions’ and that another 
democratic society, which actually shares a border with Northern Ireland also has a 
similar approach to fighting ‘terrorism’. Representations of this discourse in 
broadcasting ban newspaper articles will now be examined. This analysis also 
includes the ways in which the order of discourse was altered when centrifugal 
pressures from social actors opposed to the broadcasting ban produced alternative 
discourses that challenged and subverted dominant, centripetal discourses expressed 
by social actors supporting the ban.
Introducing the ban (1988):
The discourse acknowledging that there was a similar ban in the Irish Republic 
was the fourth most prevalent discourse expressed in newspaper articles representing 
the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. As most expressions of this 
discourse featured in news articles, this dominant discourse was largely perpetuated 
without critique. For example, a Daily Mirror journalist writes: ‘He [Douglas Hurd] 
said the move was similar to a ban imposed by the Irish government’ {Daily Mirror, 
IRA’S FRONT-MEN GAGGED BY HURD, 20.10.88). In this excerpt the discourse 
is attributed to the social actor from which it originated as it is in the following 
Guardian article, which states the British broadcasting ban ‘resembled the ban which 
has prevented the IRA and UDA appearing on television in the Republic of Ireland, he 
[Douglas Hurd] said’ {The Guardian,, HURD DEFENDS BAN ON TERROR 
BROADCASTS, 20.10.88).
In the following Daily Telegraph excerpt the longevity of the Irish 
broadcasting ban is highlighted by the journalist, which arguably encourages the 
reader to think that not only has Ireland got a broadcasting ban, but it is longstanding, 
further building support for one in Britain: ‘Mr Hurd told the Commons that the 
restrictions followed closely a similar ban in the Irish Republic since the 1970s’ {The 
Daily Telegraph, BRO ADCAST BAN COVERS ELEVEN IRISH GROUPS,
20.10.88). In other newspaper articles, the discourse acknowledging that there was a 
similar ban in the Irish Republic was expressed without acknowledging its origin 
being the British government.
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Arguably, this makes the discourse more persuasive in building support for the 
ban because it reassures newspaper readers that there was a precedent for such media 
control without mentioning it was the British government that had highlighted this. 
For example, a journalist in The Guardian writes: ‘A similar ban already applies in 
the Irish Republic’ (The Guardian, BROADCAST BAN LEADS TERROR FIGHT,
20.10.88). This followed the journalist quoting Douglas Hurd’s other justifications 
for the ban he expressed in the Commons the day before, which indicates the 
journalist is re-presenting his discourse acknowledging there is a similar ban in the 
Irish Republic. The absent agency of the discourse would make its expression appear 
to be a neutral fact to newspaper readers, rather than an ideological choice by Hurd to 
encourage support for the ban, which the journalist has then regurgitated.
Similarly, The Sun ends one article by simply writing: ‘Terror groups have 
been barred from Irish TV for 17 years’ (The Sun, FURY AS BBC BEAT HURD 
BAN ON IRA’S CLAPTRAP, 20.10.88). By excluding the social actor that 
expressed this discourse and by mentioning the duration of the broadcasting ban in the 
Irish Republic it implicitly suggests that it has been successful in Ireland and, 
therefore, could be in Britain. Foregrounding Republican organisations and 
collocating them with ‘terrorism’ operates interdiscursively in the above Sun article, 
which arguably helps to justify the ban by focusing on the organisations that attack 
‘us’ and labelling ‘them’ pejoratively. A journalist in the Daily Mail also foregrounds 
Republican organisations as the main targets of the ban, representing them as 
‘extremists’ rather than ‘terrorists’ through collocation:
Mr Hurd’s move, predictably, started a row last night but he is determined to 
starve the extremists of ‘the oxygen of publicity’. Sinn Fein and IRA 
spokesmen are already banned from radio and TV in the Irish Republic. (Daily 
Mail, HURD TO WIPE ADAMS OFF TV SCREEN, 19.10.88)
Whilst many of the other examples foregrounded Republican organisations as being 
the main target of the ban in the headlines this Daily Mail excerpt does so in the 
discourse that acknowledges there is a similar ban in the Irish Republic too. The 
Daily Mail journalist may have still assumed the British broadcasting ban would only 
apply to Republican organisations because the article was written before the ban was 
announced. However, he would have known that the Irish broadcasting ban applied to 
all organisations (Republican and Loyalist) proscribed in Northern Ireland since 1976
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when the Irish broadcasting ban was extended.43 It is interesting therefore that the 
Daily Mail journalist chooses to foreground Sinn Fein and the IRA as if they are the 
only organisations impacted by the Irish broadcasting ban.
Arguably, choosing to interdiscursively foreground and name the Republican 
Movement pejoratively whilst emphasising there is a similar ban in the Irish Republic 
is a corollary of the same discourses represented by the Daily Mail's editor two days 
before. The Daily Mail editor also acknowledged there is a similar ban in the Irish 
Republic, but in a way that more obviously functions to persuade Daily Mail readers 
to support the broadcasting ban. Rather than stating there is a similar ban in the Irish 
Republic as a fact, which the journalist does, the editor actually asks Daily Mail 
readers to contemplate the following leading question: ‘If they can operate such a ban 
successfully in the Irish Republic, why not in the United Kingdom?’ (Daily Mail, 
DEPRIVE TERROR OF THIS MEGAPHONE, 17.10.88). The editorial overtly 
represents the Irish broadcasting ban as successful and illustrative that one could 
therefore also be successful in the UK. This type of rhetorical questioning is repeated 
in another Daily Mail editorial a day after the ban was introduced to persuade its 
readers to support the British government introducing the broadcasting ban:
Front men for the IRA are not allowed to promote their politics of terror on
television or radio in the Irish Republic. So why should they still get away
with it here? (Daily Mail, MURDER’S VOICE TO BE MUZZLED, 20.10.88)
The foregrounding and pejorative naming of Republican organisations and their 
actions is intensified here to further influence the reader to support the ban. As 
discussed earlier, collocating the Republican Movement (the IRA and its ‘front’, Sinn 
Fein) with negative actions such as terror and murder clearly functions to delegitimise 
and discredit them. With this, it is now possible to see how this discourse interacts 
with the ‘similar ban in the Irish Republic’ discourse. Without first delegitimizing the 
Republican Movement, it would be difficult to remind and persuade Daily Mail 
newspaper readers why they should support British government censorship. It would 
also be difficult to achieve this without reminding them that the Irish Republic has a 
similar ban, thus legitimising and normalising it in Britain.
A ban on abortion could be ‘legitimised’ using the same logic if the Daily 
Mail so wished; ‘there’s a similar ban in the Irish Republic so why not here?’ The 
state should not impinge on a woman’s right to choose what she does with her own
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body as it should not impinge on the public’s right to an uncensored media is the 
glaringly obvious and civilised answer. Although, there were obvious attempts by 
sections of the British newspaper industry to persuade British newspaper readers to 
support the British government introducing the broadcasting ban by emphasising there 
was a similar ban in the Irish Republic, some journalists did challenge the censorship 
by subverting this discourse.
Subverting the discourse:
The order of discourse acknowledging there is a similar ban in the Irish 
Republic was subverted to oppose the British government’s introduction of the 
broadcasting ban in very interesting ways. For example, an op-ed in The Guardian 
does express the discourse that acknowledges there is a similar ban in the Irish 
Republic, but immediately afterwards also acknowledges that South Africa and the 
Soviet Union also use censorship:
We are talking, however, about a proposition entirely new to the British 
media. Ireland prohibits by law radio and television interviews with members 
of Sinn Fein. South Africa prohibits the quoting of all banned persons, now a 
massive group of people. The Soviet Union, even in the era of Glasnost, 
imposes well-policed limits on the voices of dissent. (The Guardian, A GAG 
THAT CANNOT SILENCE EXPLOSIONS, 18.10.88)
By 1988, Apartheid South Africa and the Soviet Union were well known for being 
undemocratic societies that crushed dissent. Therefore, comparing the British 
government controlling the media to them instead of the Irish Republic, quickly shifts 
the legitimacy of the broadcasting ban. As a result, the British government is 
represented as acting undemocratically, which functions to oppose the ban. Similarly, 
in a Guardian news article a journalist altered Hurd’s discourse that originally 
functioned to support the ban into a discourse opposing it by emphasising that out of 
all of Europe, only the UK and Ireland have media bans on dissident organisations:
The Spanish Embassy yesterday denied Home Office claims that its country 
had similar media restrictions on the political wing of Eta, the Basque terrorist 
organisation. The only other European country which has such restrictions 
appears to be the Irish Republic. {The Guardian, JOURNALISTS PLAN 
ACTION AGAINST GAG, 21.10.88)
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The discourse that acknowledges there is a similar ban in the Irish Republic is 
completely turned on its head by doing this. The meaning of the discourse is reversed 
from one that represents the ban positively because another country has a similar ban 
to one that represents the ban negatively because the vast majority of European 
countries do not practice ‘such restrictions’. Importantly, this excerpt is taken from a 
news article, which illustrates that the ban could be challenged by journalists within 
this genre, not just in editorials and op-eds.
However, the ability of journalists to challenge the broadcasting ban in news 
articles would certainly be impacted by the stance of their employer and the 
newspaper’s editor chosen by that employer. The Guardian took an editorial position 
that was fairly ambivalent towards the ban itself, but clearly expressed support for 
media workers resisting it, which can account for this rare example of a journalist 
challenging dominant discourses in a news article. Another clear challenge to the 
discourse that acknowledged there was a similar ban in the Irish Republic was 
expressed in a Guardian op-ed. The journalist represents the Irish broadcasting ban 
as problematic for journalists:
The distinction between the illegal activity of broadcasting an interview with a 
spokesperson for Sinn Fein or the Ulster Defence Association and legally 
broadcasting a report of what they say has bedevilled journalists at RTE, the 
Irish state broadcasting service, who have been reporting under broadcasting 
restrictions for nearly 20 years. The experience of journalists in the Republic, 
working under section 31 of the Broadcasting Act, which bans interviews with 
the IRA and Sinn Fein, has not been happy. (The Guardian, JOURNALISTS 
WALK TIGHTROPE ON COVERAGE OF SINN FEIN, 20.10.88)
This directly counters the Daily Mail editorial above, which represents the Irish 
broadcasting ban as successful without mentioning the experience of journalists 
working in such conditions. Again, it is possible to observe the impact of a particular 
newspaper’s position on the ban and how this impacts the way discourses are 
refracted. It also illustrates how news articles are dominated by elite sources, which 
means alternative discourses are stifled. If Irish media workers had been called on to 
speak, then the British government discourse underlining that there is a similar ban in 
the Irish Republic could have been challenged by those directly impacted by it.
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Lifting the ban (1994):
Just as the discourse recognising there was already a similar ban in the Irish 
Republic could function to support the British government’s introduction of the ban, 
acknowledging that the Irish Republic had already lifted its broadcasting ban 
functioned to support the British government’s lifting of the ban. Although there 
were only 4 occasions (1.9%) in which journalists expressed such a discourse in 
newspaper articles representing the British government’s lifting of the ban, it is still 
interesting to acknowledge how comparisons with the Irish Republic operated.
The day after the IRA ceasefire, for example, a Guardian journalist wrote: 
‘The Irish government removed its reporting restrictions on Sinn Fein in January’ 
{The Guardian, GERRY ADAMS MAY SOON GET HIS VOICE BACK, 01.09.94). 
Although it is simply a fact, this sentence ends an article in which all discourses 
expressed are critical of the ban and support the lifting of it. The consequence of 
choosing to express this fact is that it adds to the other discourses supporting the 
lifting of the ban, suggesting that if the Irish Republic has already lifted its censorship, 
then so should Britain. It operates in the opposite way to expressions of the discourse 
acknowledging there was a similar ban in the Irish Republic, which functions to 
support the British government’s introduction of the ban in 1988.
Tactical opposition to the broadcasting ban
Opposition to the British government’s broadcasting ban was expressed in discourses 
that can be considered either ‘tactical’ or ‘principled’. Miller (1990) argues 
journalists tended to use two main arguments when discussing the ban: either the ban 
is a tactical mistake or that it limits understanding of the conflict in Ireland and is 
therefore wrong in principle. He explains that those journalists arguing the ban is a 
tactical mistake are not opposed to the ban because it is an attack on media freedom, 
but because the role of the British national(ist) media, as with all wars waged by the 
British government, is to discredit “the enemy”. Therefore, ‘they see the ban as a 
means of inhibiting the ‘exposure’ of Sinn Fein’ (Miller, 1990: 41-42).
Miller’s (1990) argument and opposition categorisation is persuasive and 
discourses expressed by non-journalist social actors can also be categorised in such a 
way. For example, most British politicians from rival parties of the government 
shared the same belief that it was in Britain’s ‘national interest’ to maintain Northern
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Ireland as part of Britain and therefore those resisting this were “the enemy”. They 
differed, however, on which particular policy would maintain the status quo and 
defeat, or at least appease, the Republican Movement. In contrast, some journalists, 
particularly those in the NUJ and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, 
did not necessarily share the belief that Britain should maintain its presence in Ireland 
and instead wanted to defend the independence of the British media above all else. In 
other words, opposing discourses were refracted by the interests of particular social 
actors and groups. The most prevalent discourses illustrating this distinction between 
tactical and principled opposing discourse will now be examined.
The ban is beneficial to the IRA:
The most prevalent discourse tactically opposing the British government’s 
introduction of the broadcasting ban represented the ban as being beneficial to the 
IRA. This discourse was expressed throughout 1988, but it also manifested in 
newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the ban in 1994. Roy 
Hattersley, the Labour shadow Home Secretary, was most often acknowledged as the 
social actor expressing this discourse, but Hugh Dykes, a Tory backbencher, Paddy 
Ashdown, the Liberal Democrats leader, and Seamus Mallon, the deputy leader of the 
Social Democratic and Labour Party, were also quoted expressing it.
It was Hugh Dykes that British newspaper articles attributed this discourse to 
first of all, which is based on a statement he made a day before Douglas Hurd 
officially introduced the broadcasting ban in the House of Commons. Although Hugh 
Dykes’ full, original statement is now unavailable because it was expressed in a press 
release instead of Parliament, Roy Hattersley, Paddy Ashdown and the Labour MP 
Ken Livingston expressed the discourse that argued the ban is beneficial to the IRA in 
speeches they made in the House of Commons on 19th October, 1998. Roy Hattersley 
said the following:
Has he [Douglas Hurd] considered the damaging way in which his proposal 
will be used at home and abroad, especially in the United States, to portray the 
Government as the enemy of free expression? Has he weighed that publicity 
coup for the IRA against the advantage of keeping its representatives off 
television? (Hansard, 1988: 894)
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In this excerpt from Roy Hattersley’s statement, he represents the ban as a ‘publicity 
coup’ for the IRA, which suggests the British government has handed over a 
propaganda victory to the IRA by introducing the ban. Although this may well be the 
case and this discourse does oppose the broadcasting ban, it does so tactically because 
it still suggests the British government is not ‘the enemy of free expression’, rather 
the ban will be used by the IRA to portray the government as such. Hattersley also 
emphasises the American dimension to the Northern Ireland conflict, implicitly 
acknowledging that the Republican Movement was heavily funded by sympathetic 
Irish Americans who connected Irish and American independence from Britain. 
Arguably, Roy Hattersley is also drawing attention to the First Amendment of the US 
Constitution that protects freedom of speech and the press and how this will further 
encourage already sympathetic Americans to donate to the Irish Northern Aid 
Committee (Noraid). In fact, Ken Livingstone explicitly made this argument in the 
House of Commons during the same debate:
Before taking this decision, did the Home Secretary receive any briefing from 
the intelligence services on the likely impact of this decision on the flow of 
funding from Canada and North America for the IRA? If he did not, why not? 
(Hansard, 1988: 901)
He then makes the point that the IRA sustained itself before television even existed:
How was it that the IRA managed to sustain itself, decade after decade, from 
the 1922 bombing campaign through into the 1930s and 1950s, without access 
to television? (Ibid.)
Interestingly though, he is not called on to speak in a single newspaper article, which 
means*the discourse representing the ban as beneficial to the IRA never explains this 
with regard to the American dimension. Similarly, though Roy Hattersley was often 
called on to speak in newspaper articles, only once was this aspect of his statement 
acknowledged. This is significant because it is clearly a crucial aspect of the 
discourse when it was expressed in the House of Commons. Arguably, 
acknowledging the American dimension further functions to resist the British 
government introducing the ban because it suggests that some in the US, especially 
Irish Americans, who are already opposed to the British presence in Northern Ireland 
will be even more steadfast in their opposition.
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Although the US media is not protected against corporate control, the First 
Amendment does protect it from direct government interference. The broadcasting 
ban was a direct attack on media freedom by the British government and so would be 
seen as such by Americans. Therefore, excluding this aspect of the discourse from 
newspaper representations would reduce the impact of this opposing discourse. In 
contrast to Ken Livingstone, Paddy Ashdown did not mention the American 
dimension when arguing the ban was beneficial to the IRA:
The Government seem to have taken the worst of all possible measures. They 
have given the IRA a propaganda coup. They have left it open to it to put its 
view through the newspapers; they have left Sinn Fein still a legal organisation 
which is denied the right of access to a free press; and they have established a 
dangerous precedent by using the Broadcasting Act in this manner. (Hansard, 
1988:895)
In his House of Commons statement Paddy Ashdown represents the broadcasting ban 
as a "propaganda coup’ for the IRA, which operates in a similar way to what Roy 
Hattersley said because it opposes the British government strategy whilst still 
connecting the Republican Movement with negative actions and attributes. A ‘coup’ 
has negative connotations and generally means an unpopular taking of power usually 
by combatants without the support of the citizenry. Likewise, ‘propaganda’ has 
negative connotations and generally means lying and deception.
Paddy Ashdown does not really express a clear reason as to why he believes 
the ban is a propaganda coup for the IRA, but he does show his opposition to the ban 
by saying the British government ‘seem to have taken the worst of all measures’ 
(Ibid.). That said, his rationale for this expresses the discourse that suggests the ban 
did not go far enough, that it should apply to the British print media and that Sinn 
Fein should be proscribed altogether. Seamus Mallon’s rationale for his expression of 
the discourse representing the ban as benefitting the IRA is much clearer because he 
argues it will lead to an increase in electoral support for the proscribed organisations:
Will the Secretary of State accept that the real damage will be done, not to the 
UDA or the Provisional IRA, but to the highest standards of judicial and legal 
practice in this country? Does he accept that he is doing exactly what the 
gangsters in the Provisional IRA and the UDA want him to do? Those 
organisations will be laughing all the way to the European election and the 
district council elections because they now have the street issue that they did 
not previously have. Would the Secretary of State care to speculate about how
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many of the hard-line activists in west Belfast, South Armagh and Derry will 
lay down their guns because they cannot watch Gerry Adams on television? 
(Hansard, 1988: 897)
Although many social actors expressed the discourse representing the ban as 
beneficial to the IRA, all manifestations of this discourse can be considered tactical, 
rather than principled in their opposition to the British government’s broadcasting 
ban. Instead of suggesting the ban was a mistake because it is undemocratic to censor 
the media, this discourse suggests it was a mistake because rather than stopping the 
Republican Movement, it will bolster its support (whether from American citizens and 
politicians or from people living in Ireland or Britain). Broadcasting ban newspaper 
articles representing this discourse will now be explored with a more detailed 
explanation of how it functioned to oppose the broadcasting ban on a tactical level.
Introducing the ban (1988):
The discourse that represented the ban as beneficial to the IRA was the fifth 
most prevalent discourse expressed in newspaper articles representing the British 
government introducing the broadcasting ban. It was expressed 20 times (4.7%) in 
this time period and all occurrences except one featured in news articles. Although 
the meaning of this discourse remained similar throughout newspaper representations, 
it was expressed in different ways because the various social actors from which this 
discourse emanated constructed it in their own way. For example, a journalist in the 
Daily Mirror writes:
Rebel Tory MP Hugh Dykes has declared: “Banning IRA sympathisers from 
being broadcast would play into the IRA’s hands. It would look as if the 
Government fears the IRA can persuade people of their sick cause.” {Daily 
Mirror, IRA TERROR GAG IS ON THE WAY, 19.10.88)
The verbatim reported speech of Hugh Dyke expresses the discourse that suggests the 
ban will actually help the IRA rather than defeat them. This can be considered a 
tactical opposing discourse because although critical of the ban, it still represents the 
Republican Movement as having a “sick cause”. This emotional and propagandists 
construction depoliticises and transforms any rational motivations the Republican 
Movement had into evil, sinister or insane ones. A Daily Mail journalist also 
represented Hugh Dykes’ comments, but included more of what he said:
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The move was attacked by Hugh Dykes, the ‘wet’ Tory MP for Harrow East. 
He said: ‘It would play into the IRA’s hands and could increase support for 
them in Northern Ireland. It would look as if the Government fear the IRA 
can persuade people of their sick cause’. (.Daily Mail, HURD TO WIPE 
ADAMS OFF TV SCREEN, 19.10.88)
By including the fuller statement of Hugh Dykes, the journalist in the Daily Mail 
explains how the ban would play into the IRA’s hands, whereas the Daily Mirror 
journalist does not. However, the way in which both journalists want their readers to 
interpret Hugh Dykes’ statement is revealed by the way in which he is named. 
Whereas he is represented as a rebel in the Daily Mirror, he is represented as ‘wet’ in 
the Daily Mail. A rebel generally has positive connotations of standing up to injustice 
(depending on the context in which it is used) and is therefore supportive of this social 
actor resisting the British government’s broadcasting ban.
Labelling Hugh Dykes as the ‘wet’ Tory MP for Harrow East in 1980s Britain 
suggests this social actor is considered to be a ‘moderate’ Tory ideologically 
positioned outside Thatcher’s close circle of Tory allies as opposed to being one of 
the ‘dries’ who shared her right-wing ideological convictions (Vinen, 2009). The 
inverted commas around ‘wet’ acknowledge the special political vocabulary derived 
from private school terminology that suggests a ‘weak’ and ‘pathetic’ politician who 
is not ‘strong’ or ‘brave’ enough to support British government censorship.
These contrasting representations of the same social actor saying the same 
thing can be explained by the position taken by the respective newspapers on the 
British government’s broadcasting ban. Whereas the Daily Mirror overtly opposed 
the ban, the Daily Mail overtly supported it. This was illustrated in a Daily Mirror 
editorial that endorsed the discourse representing the ban as benefitting the IRA by 
arguing ‘when we hand propaganda gifts to the IRA we should wonder what we are 
doing’ (Daily Mirror, BANKRUPT, BASE, BAD, 21.10.88). The Daily Mail, on the 
other hand, did not express this discourse in any of its editorials.
Other newspaper manifestations of the discourse representing the ban as 
beneficial to the IRA were also refracted in interesting ways. As alluded to earlier, 
Roy Hattersley’s House of Commons statement was represented several times in 
broadcasting ban newspaper articles, but a crucial aspect of his reasoning for calling 
the ban a ‘publicity coup’ for the IRA was included in some articles, but excluded in
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others. For example, a journalist in The Guardian quoted Roy Hattersley at length 
and therefore acknowledged the American dimension of IRA support may increase 
because of the broadcasting ban:
The shadow Home Secretary, Mr Roy Hattersley, said the Government had 
handed the IRA a publicity coup which outweighed the advantage of keeping 
its representatives off the air. [...] Mr Hattersley said Labour shared the 
natural revulsion at the exhibition on television of support for terrorism, but 
did not believe the effect of the ban would be to help to defeat it. “Has the 
Home Secretary not considered the damaging way in which his proposals will 
be used, particularly in the US, to portray this Government as the enemy of 
free expression?” he asked. “Has he weighed that publicity coup for the IRA 
against the advantage of keeping its representatives off TV?” (The Guardian, 
HURD DEFENDS BAN ON TERROR BROADCASTS, 20.10.88)
In contrast, a Daily Telegraph journalist did not quote Roy Hattersley at length and 
excluded the American dimension from his expression of the discourse representing 
the ban as beneficial to the IRA: ‘Mr Hattersley said the ban would be used as a 
propaganda weapon to portray the Government as “the enemy of free expression”’ 
(The Daily Telegraph, TV AND RADIO BAN ON TERRORISTS HAS MIXED 
LABOUR RECEPTION, 20.10.88). As a result, readers of this Daily Telegraph 
article would be unaware as to who would ‘use’ the ban as a ‘propaganda weapon’.
Although these slight differences in representation are interesting, on a more 
general level, the discourse suggesting the ban is beneficial to the IRA and the above 
examples of newspaper representations of it can be considered more significant due 
its tactical nature. The social actors expressing the discourse and newspapers 
capturing it through reported speech largely continue the foregrounding and pejorative 
naming of the Republican Movement and its actions. They also suggest that the ban 
itself i5 not a legitimate grievance for those democratically elected people bound by it.
Lifting the ban (1994k
The discourse representing the ban as being beneficial to the IRA was 
expressed on 5 occasions (2.3%) in newspaper articles representing the British 
government lifting the broadcasting ban. Interestingly, the American dimension of 
IRA support is much more overtly discussed in these articles, whereas those 
representing the introduction of the ban largely excluded this despite Roy Hattersley 
and Ken Livingstone indirectly and directly expressing the American dimension in the
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House of Commons. A Daily Telegraph journalist writes the following in an article 
representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban: ‘Sinn Fein has also 
used the existence of the ban to damage Britain’s case abroad, particularly in the 
USA, claiming it is being denied free speech’ (The Daily Telegraph, SINN FEIN’S 
BROADCAST BAN TO END, 16.09.94). Similarly, an editorial in The Guardian 
wrote ‘American fundraisers for the IRA seized an issue which flouted all that the 
First Amendment held dear: a free helping of oxygen’ (The Guardian, THE VOICE 
RETURNS, THE VOTE AWAITS, 17.09.94).
There was another, more prevalent, discourse expressed in newspaper articles 
representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban that can be 
considered tactical in its opposition. This discourse, which was expressed 8 times 
(3.7%), argued the Irish actors who dubbed the voices of Sinn Fein actually improved 
the image of Sinn Fein and is also based on the premise that the ban was beneficial to 
the Republican Movement, rather than the British government. In the following 
extended example of this discourse expressed by a Daily Mail journalist it is 
suggested that the ban improved the image of Sinn Fein in several ways:
Interviews in which Adams was left floundering by questions about IRA 
violence [...] were transformed into a coherent response by the actor doing the 
voice-over. When former Sinn Fein publicity director Danny Morrison was 
interviewed recently at the Maze prison, where he is serving an eight-year 
sentence for imprisoning an alleged informer, he said afterwards: ‘I was rusty. 
But never mind -  the actor will clean it up.’ The small group of Northern 
Ireland actors who dub the interviews have also done Adams a valuable 
service, replacing his deep, dour West Belfast tones with softer, more 
appealing accents. {Daily Mail, ‘I WAS RUSTY. BUT NEVER MIND -  
THE ACTOR WILL CLEAN IT UP FOR ME’, 17.09.94)
This Daily Mail journalist suggests that the ban improved the image of Sinn Fein by 
allowing Gerry Adams to appear coherent when answering difficult questions about 
the legitimacy of IRA violence as well as making his accent more palatable for 
audiences. Danny Morrison is also directly quoted as expressing the discourse that 
Irish actors improved the image of Sinn Fein, which adds credibility to this discourse 
because apparently those most impacted by the ban admit it is beneficial to them. A 
Daily Express journalist chose to use this Danny Morrison statement too, albeit a 
slightly different version of it: ‘Sinn Fein publicity director Danny Morrison once 
pointed out the benefits of the ban. Asked how an interview had gone, he said:
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“I was rusty, but the actor will clean it up.’” {Daily Express, ACTORS LOSE THEIR 
ROLE, 17.09.94). A Gerry Adams statement was also used to reinforce the 
credibility of the discourse representing the ban as improving the image of Sinn Fein:
In the early days voiceovers were crude. Sinn Fein leaders sounded as though 
they had speech impediments. [...] Since then voices have grown more 
sophisticated. So much so that once when Mr Adams learned which actor was 
to speak his words, he said: “Dead on. He does it better than me.” {The 
Guardian, CURTAIN FALLS ON ACTORS WHO HAD WAY WITH 
WORDS, 17.09.94)
Again, it is suggested that those most impacted by the ban actually benefit from it and 
this is admitted by Sinn Fein members such as Gerry Adams. However, it is more 
likely that leading Sinn Fein repr esentatives such as Danny Morrison and Gerr y 
Adams were posturing if and when they made such statements in an attempt to put a 
positive spin on being targeted by the broadcasting ban. The discourse representing 
the ban as improving the image of Sinn Fein and therefore benefitting the Republican 
Movement can be considered tactical because it suggests the main targets and victims 
of the ban are the beneficiaries as opposed to the British government. One Daily 
Telegraph editorial overtly expressed this:
[T]he broadcasters soon took to showing Sinn Fein spokesmen with their lips 
moving while Ulster-accented actors simultaneously spoke their words. The 
indignity of this spectacle has rebounded more on the broadcasters and the 
Government than on the interviewee, whose views may even be enhanced by 
the actor’s professionally modulated tones {The Daily Telegraph, 
POINTLESS BAN, 02.09.94).
Such a discourse excludes the possibility that Sinn Fein representatives may have 
been dehumanised as well as ridiculed by, and alienated from, the audience after 
having their voices dubbed (whether out of sync or not). Instead, it is the British 
government itself that apparently loses out from its own media censorship, which is 
not very likely when it is considered how Sinn Fein media appearances dropped once 
the ban had been introduced (Henderson et al., 1990; Moloney, 1991; Rolston, 2002; 
McLaughlin and Baker, 2010).
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Principled opposition to the broadcasting ban
There were several discourses that opposed the broadcasting ban on a principled basis 
such as those recognising that Sinn Fein was a legal political party with 
democratically elected MPs and councillors, or that the broadcasting ban would make 
media coverage of the Northern Ireland conflict incomplete. However, the most 
prevalent discourse that can be considered principally opposed to the broadcasting ban 
rather than tactically opposed represented the ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil 
liberties. The tactical opposing discourse discussed in the previous section was 
mostly expressed by British politicians who shared the same belief that Northern 
Ireland should remain ‘British’, but differed on strategy as to how this would be 
achieved. In contrast, the most expressed principled opposing discourse mostly 
emanated from organised media workers and left-wing Labour MP, Tony Benn.
Although the original statements made by representatives of the NUJ and the 
Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom are not available, they were often 
cited in newspaper articles expressing the discourse that represented the ban as 
undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties. Tony Benn also expressed this discourse 
when he made the following statement in the House of Commons debate on 19th 
October 1988:
Is the Secretary of State aware that his statement will be seen as a massive 
extension of state control over the broadcasting authorities, and that it is 
precisely comparable to the ban on the Zircon film and the attempt to ban the 
Spycatcher book? Any attack on the rights of elected representatives has 
always historically been seen as an attack upon those who elect them, the 
people who have chosen to use the ballot to express their views. The powers 
that the right hon. Gentleman has used are so general that they could be 
extended to anybody. There is no limit to those powers. I once exercised them 
when I was Postmaster General. Is he also aware that, as Lord Scarman said 
on television, it is questionable whether broadcasters will be so timid as to 
obey the law? There is no moral obligation to obey an unjust law that attacks 
~ civil liberties and democracy. (Hansard, 1988; 899)
Tony Benn represents the broadcasting ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil 
liberties in several ways. Although suggesting it ‘will be seen as a massive extension 
of state control’ is less powerful than stating ‘it is a massive extension of state 
control’ as the former refers to an interpretation and the latter refers to a fact, this 
construction still functions to oppose the British government’s introduction of the ban.
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Whereas other social actors such as Douglas Hurd attempted to downplay the 
seriousness of the ban by representing it as ‘restrictions’ instead of censorship and by 
expressing discourses underlining that there’s a similar ban in the Irish Republic, 
Tony Benn attempts to underline the seriousness of it. This is achieved by using 
lexical choices that represent the magnitude (‘massive’) of this action (‘extension of 
state control’) and by contextualising the ban in terms of previous cases of the British 
government attempting to censor the Zircon documentary44 and Spycatcher book.45
The strongest manifestation of the discourse representing the ban as 
undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties, however, is expressed by Tony Benn at the 
end of his statement when he says: ‘There is no moral obligation to obey an unjust 
law that attacks civil liberties and democracy’ (Ibid.). Representing the broadcasting 
ban as ‘unjust’ and an ‘attack’ on civil liberties and democracy clearly functions to 
build opposition to it as well as building support for those who would try to resist it 
such as media workers committed to a free media. Manifestations of this discourse in 
broadcasting ban newspapers articles in both time periods will now be explored.
Introducing the ban (1988):
The discourse that represented the ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil 
liberties was expressed 17 times (4%) in newspaper articles representing the British 
government introducing the broadcasting ban. Nearly all manifestations of this 
discourse occurred in newspapers representative of the ‘quality’ press. This can be 
explained by the generic conventions of such newspapers, which assume their more 
educated and affluent readers are more interested in serious news stories that are 
discussed in more depth. The increased size of articles means that more voices will 
be expressed, increasing the probability of more discourses opposing the ban. Tony 
Benn was only called on to speak once in each of the ‘quality’ newspapers.
A Daily Telegraph journalist represented his Commons statement concisely, 
excluding the most powerful expression of the discourse representing the ban as 
undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties: ‘Mr TONY BENN (Lab, Chesterfield) 
said the announcement would be seen “as a massive extension of State control over 
the broadcasting authorities.’” (The Daily Telegraph, TV AND RADIO BAN ON 
TERRORISTS HAS MIXED LABOUR RECEPTION, 20.10.88). In contrast, a 
Guardian journalist represented Tony Benn’s Commons statement at length and 
included more (though not all) of his most overt articulation of the discourse:
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Mr Tony Benn (Lab, Chesterfield) said the ban would be seen as a massive 
extension of state control on a par with the ban on the Zircon film and the 
attempted ban on Spycatcher. But he suggested that the BBC and IBA might 
refuse to implement the ban. “As Lord Scarman said on television it is 
questionable whether the broadcasters will be so timid as to obey and there is 
no moral obligation to obey an unjust law that attacks civil liberties,” he said. 
{The Guardian, HURD DEFENDS BAN ON TERROR BROADCASTS, 
20.10.88)
Although, this Guardian journalist includes more of Tony Benn’s statement, it is 
interesting that he (or The Guardian editor) has chosen to exclude the last two words 
of it. Guardian readers would understand Tony Benn believes the ban is an attack on 
civil liberties, but not on democracy generally, which is a significant difference. 
Clearly, the journalist representing this discourse in The Guardian allows the British 
public reading this article to experience more of what was said in the House of 
Commons against the ban than the Daily Telegraph journalist does. However, it is 
interesting that the last two words of Tony Benn’s statement have been excluded 
because it is hard to believe that this would be a result of concision. The Guardian 
took an ambivalent editorial position on the ban, which did not overtly support or 
oppose the British government introducing the ban. This might explain why these 
two words were excluded, perhaps by the editor as opposed to the journalist, to soften 
the power of Tony Benn’s statement, but it is impossible to know conclusively.
Organised media workers were also called on to speak in newspaper articles 
representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. 
Representatives of the NUJ and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom 
expressed discourses that also represented the ban as undemocratic and a threat to 
civil liberties. It was a Daily Telegraph journalist, which represented the most 
powerful expressions of this discourse, allowing an unnamed representative of the 
BBC’s NUJ branch and Mike Jempson, a representative of the Campaign for Press 
and Broadcasting Freedom, to speak:
The BBC’s National Union of Journalists branch said: “In seeking to cut the 
oxygen of publicity from terrorists, the Government risks cutting off the 
oxygen o f democracy -  the normally free flow of information and views. [...] 
The Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom condemned the 
Government’s decision as a major attack on free speech, which set an alarming 
precedent. Mr Mike Jempson, Campaign spokesman, said: “Who will the next 
group of people the Government will seek to silence because it doesn’t like
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their opinions and cannot deal in an open and democratic way with the 
challenge they pose? It is a sad day for media freedom and democracy. (The 
Daily Telegraph, DAMAGING PRECEDENT SAYS BBC, 20.10.88)
Both these expressions of the discourse representing the ban as undemocratic and a 
threat to civil liberties clearly function to oppose the British government’s 
introduction of the broadcasting ban. The NUJ statement subverts the discourse that 
argued ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ into one that represents 
the ban as a risk to the ‘oxygen of democracy’, which it explains is ‘the normally free 
flow of information and views’. By shifting the order of discourse into another it 
suggests that the normally free flow of information and views are being stopped by 
the ban and this is therefore undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties. Organised 
media workers were rarely allowed to speak in newspaper articles representing the 
broadcasting ban, but this interesting challenge to the dominant discourse illustrates 
how the broadcasting ban could have been opposed if they were.
As texts reflect the balance of social forces at a given place and time, it is 
possible to see that members of the British elite (in this case, newspaper owners and 
British politicians) were hegemonic then as now. Although centrifugal pressures 
obviously existed in society as illustrated by the alternative discourses expressed by 
the representatives of the NUJ and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting 
Freedom, centripetal pressures overwhelmingly dominated in the battle over the 
meaning of the broadcasting ban. Social actors challenging dominant discourses (in 
this case, organised media workers) and the media workers actually producing the 
newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban, must re-constitute already 
existing discourses expressed by the British government in order to justify introducing 
such censorship. This can be explained using a CDA perspective:
-Text producers have nothing except given conventions of language and orders 
of discourse as resources for dealing with centrifugal pressures, but they are 
able to use these resources in news ways, generating, for instance, new 
configurations of genres and discourses. (Fairclough, 1995: 7-8)
Mike Jempson’s statement expressed in the Daily Telegraph newspaper article also 
represents the ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties by suggesting that the 
British government ‘cannot deal in an open and democratic way’ with the challenge 
posed by those it is banning from the broadcast media. By saying ‘it is a sad day for
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media freedom and democracy’, he also reaffirms such a principled opposing 
discourse by suggesting those who care about media freedom and democracy will be 
saddened by the British government’s broadcasting ban. Although such expressions 
of this discourse are challenging to the British government’s broadcasting ban, they 
were very rare and this was the only occasion journalists allowed Mike Jempson to 
express such a statement. This is significant because it illustrates that the organisation 
he represented was trying to resist the British government introducing the 
broadcasting ban, but that British newspapers mostly stifled this voice and therefore 
the breadth of opposition to the broadcasting ban. That said, other expressions of the 
discourse that represented the broadcasting ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil 
liberties were frequent when compared to the lack of principled discourses opposing 
the ban in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting it.
Lifting the ban (1994):
The discourse that argued the ban was undemocratic and a threat to civil 
liberties did not feature in any newspaper articles representing the British government 
lifting the broadcasting ban. Although opposition to the ban was unanimous by the 
time it was lifted, there were very few principled opposing discourses. There was 
one, however, which argued the ban made media reporting of Northern Ireland 
incomplete. This discourse was expressed on 8 occasions in newspaper articles from 
both sample periods and will now be explored in the latter sample period for two 
reasons. Firstly, it was the only principled discourse expressed in newspaper articles 
representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban. Secondly, the 
discourse arguing the ban made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete also 
constitutes a higher percentage of the total discourses expressed in newspaper articles 
in the sample period capturing newspaper articles representing the British government 
lifting.the broadcasting ban (3.7%) than those introducing the ban (1.9%).
The discourse arguing the ban made media reporting of Northern Ireland 
incomplete originated from managerial representatives of the broadcast media as well 
as organised media workers, namely the NUJ. It was Guardian journalists who 
allowed such social actors to speak most often. For example, two weeks before the 
British government lifted the broadcasting ban a Guardian journalist acknowledged 
that (the managers of) ITN and Channel 4 as well as the general secretary of the NUJ 
believed the ban had made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete:
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Independent Television News said: “We will not be able to do our job 
properly in the important months ahead unless this ban is lifted immediately.” 
Channel 4 also favoured a meeting with Mr Dorrell. John Foster, general 
secretary of the National Union of Journalists, said: “The ban stops our 
members from giving the public the full reports they deserve.” (The Guardian, 
GERRY ADAMS MAY SOON GET HIS VOICE BACK, 01.09.94)
Such principled opposition to the ban was not expressed in any other newspapers in 
this sample period until after the ban was lifted. In the same article quoted above, it is 
acknowledged that ‘[cjriticism of the ban reached fresh heights in February when Mr 
Adams was interviewed on American chat shows, while British broadcasters laboured 
under the restrictions’ (Ibid.). Similarly, it was only Guardian journalists who 
explained how the ban actually made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete:
In stark numeric terms the ban has had the effect Mrs Thatcher intended. In 
the first year, Sinn Fein’s appearances on British television plummeted by 63 
per cent. On the second anniversary of the notice the Government and the 
republican movement reached uncharacteristic agreement on its evident 
impact. Sinn Fein’s Richard McAuley said: “In terms of minimising interest 
in Britain and denying people access to information about Ireland I think it has 
been successful.” {The Guardian, CONTRADICTIONS DUMPED IN THE 
DUSTBIN OF HISTORY, 17.09.94)
This is the only newspaper article that details the extent to which Sinn Fein was 
censored in the broadcast media as a result of the ban. It is also the only newspaper 
article to represent the ban as an attempt by the British government to reduce Sinn 
Fein appearances on television for purely political purposes as opposed to those stated 
by the British government such as needing to starve ‘terrorists’ of the ‘oxygen of 
publicity’ and because of the offence caused to the ‘British public’.
Quoting a Sinn Fein representative helps to construct this alternative discourse 
because Richard McAuley suggests only one side of the Northern Ireland story has 
been told to those living in England, Scotland and Wales as a result of the ban. This 
was clearly the purpose of the broadcasting ban, yet such a discourse was only 
expressed on this one occasion because Sinn Fein representatives were rarely allowed 
to speak by journalists. The only other occasions on which Sinn Fein representatives 
were called on to speak in this time period was when journalists tried to persuade their 
readers that the broadcasting ban had actually benefitted the Republican Movement by 
improving their image with the voices of Irish actors.
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Other expressions of the discourse arguing the ban made media reporting of 
Northern Ireland incomplete directly quoted representatives of the BBC and Channel 
4. A Daily Express journalist acknowledged the unpopularity of the ban amongst 
broadcasters when writing: ‘Broadcasters welcomed the lifting of the TV ban. Tony 
Hall, head of BBC news and current affairs, said: “It means we are now able to do our 
job properly.’” {Daily Express, ULSTER MOVE AS US FREES IRA GUNMAN,
17.09.94). The social actor who is directly quoted expresses the discourse arguing the 
ban made media reporting on Northern Ireland complete by suggesting that only once 
the ban had been lifted could broadcasters report Northern Ireland properly. 
Journalists at The Daily Telegraph and Daily Mail both used the same reported speech 
of the chief executive of Channel 4 who expressed a statement very critical of the ban:
Mr Michael Grade, chief executive of Channel 4, who took a lead among 
broadcasters in calling for a revocation of the ban, said: “The lifting of the ban 
ends Britain’s most embarrassing attempt to censor coverage of the most 
important domestic political story of post-war years. Normal news reporting 
can now be resumed.” {The Daily Telegraph, BROADCASTERS RELIEVED 
BY LIFTING OF THE BAN, 17.09.94)
This social actor represents the broadcasting ban as Britain’s most embarrassing 
censorship attempt throughout the Northern Ireland conflict as well as expressing the 
discourse arguing the ban made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete by 
stating that only after the ban had been lifted could normal news reporting resume. 
Significantly, he also argues the Northern Ireland conflict was the most important 
domestic political story since World War II. Although credible, such a discourse was 
rarely expressed in newspaper articles representing the British government 
introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban.
More generally, it is interesting to discover that there was only one discourse 
that can be considered to principally oppose the broadcasting ban in newspaper 
articles representing the British government lifting it. Although the discourse arguing 
the ban made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete was expressed on 8 
occasions in this latter time period, it is clearly the case that most journalists did not 
‘remember’ it in this way as half of the expressions of this discourse appeared in just 
two Guardian articles. Moreover, the discourse representing the ban as undemocratic 
and a threat to civil liberties was totally absent from newspaper articles representing 
the British government lifting the ban.
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This is significant because such a principled discourse was expressed 
frequently in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the 
ban meaning there was some principled opposition to the ban in 1988. As will 
become clear in the next section, although opposition to the ban was unanimous by 
the time the ban was lifted, it was not rationalised by principled discourses such as the 
ban being undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties or because the ban made media 
reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete.
Ban was a farce because of dubbing
The discourse arguing that the ban was a farce because of Irish actors dubbing Sinn 
Fein representatives was most frequently expressed as to why the broadcasting ban 
should be lifted. This discourse featured 21 times (9.8%) in newspaper articles 
representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban. There was another 
discourse expressed less often that also fixated on the use of dubbing and argued Irish 
actors actually improved the image of Sinn Fein representatives. Earlier, it was 
argued that this discourse can be considered an example of tactical opposition because 
it suggests the main targets and victims of the ban are actually the beneficiaries of it 
as opposed to the British government. Although both discourses fixate on the 
dubbing by Irish actors, they were categorised separately because they are considered 
to oppose the ban in slightly different, yet ideologically significant ways.
Whereas the discourse arguing the ban was a farce because of dubbing 
opposes the ban as an absurdity, failing to prevent the voices of those it intends to 
deny access from the broadcast media, the discourse arguing Irish actors improved the 
image of Sinn Fein representatives opposes the ban by suggesting that the ban was 
actually beneficial to the Republican Movement. Both discourses oppose the 
broadcasting ban, but the former does so by focusing on the absurdity of the ban, 
which„although distracts attention from the seriousness of such censorship, it is at 
least a credible criticism of the ban and the British government for introducing it. The 
latter discourse, on the other hand, which argues the ban actually benefitted the 
Republican Movement by improving the image of Sinn Fein representatives, severely 
lacks credibility because it is more likely that such dubbing would hinder the image of 
Sinn Fein by identifying them as the enemy of, and distancing them from, the ‘British 
people’ as well as dehumanising and ridiculing them with altered, out-of-sync, voices.
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Although the discourse arguing that the ban was a farce because of Irish actors 
dubbing Sinn Fein representatives was expressed in slightly different ways such as 
being ‘ridiculous’, ‘a disaster’, or ‘a joke’, the opposition to the ban was always 
rationalised by identifying the use of Irish actors. This is significant because the ban 
is frequently represented in ways that make it appear to be a ‘silly mistake’ rather than 
a serious erosion of British democracy and media freedom. It is interesting that 
newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the ban frequently 
expressed a discourse arguing the ban was undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties, 
yet there was no such discourse in newspaper articles representing the British 
government lifting the ban. The broadcasting ban was the most serious attempt to 
control the British broadcast media since World War II, clearly undemocratic 
(especially considering several Sinn Fein representatives had been elected in council 
and general elections) and an attack on the freedom of the broadcast media. However, 
it is mostly ‘remembered’ as being an absurdity instead. Arguably, fixating on the use 
of actors directs blame for the failure of the ban towards the British broadcasters 
instead of towards the British government, which actually introduced the censorship.
The British government lifted the broadcasting ban during the summer recess 
of Parliament in 1994. This means there are no Hansard records of the debates that 
took place in the months leading up to John Major announcing the end of the ban in 
Belfast on 16th September. The origins of the discourse representing the ban as a 
farce because of dubbing are therefore difficult to pinpoint. However, there were two 
MPs who did briefly mention the use of Irish actors when debating the broadcasting 
ban. In a House of Commons debate about Northern Ireland on 21st January, 1994, 
Labour MP Tony Benn argued the ban infringed his own civil liberties and was an 
absurdity for several reasons:
The ban on the President of Sinn Fein is a great mistake from the 
Government's point of view. The ban on broadcasting is not only an outrage 
for my civil liberties but also an absurdity as one can sit in Belfast and listen to 
-  Gerry Adams broadcasting from Dublin now. [...] My solution, which I put to 
Sinn Fein the other day, would be that if Gerry Adams joined Equity he could 
broadcast and they could say "actor's voice" on the television screen. What 
nonsense it is to deny us the right to hear from one of the participants who are 
being pleaded to come to the table. (Hansard, 1994: 1192)
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Tony Benn is much more critical of the British government and although he mentions 
the use of actors in dubbing Sinn Fein representatives, he does not fixate on them as 
the reason for the ‘absurdity’ and ‘nonsense’ of the ban. Instead, he opposes the ban 
by underlining the contradictory behaviour of the British government maintaining a 
ban on Sinn Fein representatives whilst simultaneously trying to encourage them into 
talks. He also humorously opposes the ban by suggesting Gerry Adams should join 
Equity (the trade union representing workers from the arts and entertainment industry) 
so that Gerry Adams could speak on the broadcast media with his own voice. The 
other Member of Parliament that briefly mentioned the broadcasting ban and the use 
of Irish actors was Tory MP, Rupert Allason. In Prime Minister’s Question Time in 
the House of Commons on 24th May 1994, he asked the following:
Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is high time that the abuse of 
the broadcasting ban, which is so widely circumvented by all 
the broadcasting media, should be reviewed so as to prevent known terrorists 
from appearing on television and having their voices dubbed by out-of-work 
actors from Northern Ireland? (Hansard, 1994: 180)
In contrast to Tony Benn, Rupert Allason blames British broadcasters rather than the 
British government for the ‘abuse’ of the ban and calls for a review of it to prevent 
‘terrorists’ from having their voices dubbed by Irish actors. The suggestion then is 
that the ban itself is not problematic, but the broadcasters who circumvent it by using 
actors to dub Sinn Fein representatives. John Major’s reply was very brief and vague:
I understand the frustration that my hon. Friend feels about that matter. A 
number of complex matters are involved, but I will certainly discuss them with 
my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for National Heritage. (Hansard, 
1994: 180)
A possible explanation for the brevity and vagueness of John Major’s reply was that 
he had already decided to the lift the broadcasting ban, but was waiting for the most 
strategic moment to publicly announce it. Rather than speculate any further, 
expressions of the discourse arguing the ban was a farce because of Irish actors 
dubbing Sinn Fein representatives will now be explored in newspaper articles 
representing the British government lifting the ban. As before with other discourses 
deconstructed in this chapter, the extent to which the order of discourse is altered 
depends on the genre of newspaper articles and the political sympathies of individual
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newspapers, which refract the discourse in different ways. For example, the following 
excerpt from a Daily Mail editorial illustrates how editorials allow a newspaper to 
express views not necessarily emanating from the reported speech of particular social 
actors. It also shows how a ‘mid-market’, right-wing newspaper supportive of the 
British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban is more critical of the 
actors trying to make a living and broadcasters trying to defend media freedom than 
the British government for introducing the ban in the first place:
It cannot be said too often: the ban is a disaster. [...] It has never worked. In 
practice it has become no more than a job creation scheme for Irish actors. 
They must love it. They are regularly called in to repeat the words -  and how 
sympathetically they do it -  uttered by Adams and other apologists for murder. 
The fee can top £1,000. Nice work if you can get it. But it doesn’t stop 
Adams and his kind getting their views across. Broadcasters enjoy thumbing 
their noses at the Government by using lip synchronisation and dubbing. 
{Daily Mail, TRUST THE PEOPLE, 16.09.94)
This Daily Mail editorial not only fixates on the use of actors as the reason for the ban 
failing to work, but their nationality too. It suggests Irish actors employed to dub the 
voices of Sinn Fein representatives are sympathetic to the ‘apologists for murder’ and 
actually enjoy dubbing ‘Adams and his kind’. The editorial also argues that 
broadcasters enjoy ‘thumbing their noses at the Government by using lip 
synchronisation and dubbing’. Instead of representing Irish actors as simply doing 
their job and broadcasters as merely trying to air the opinions of all parties in 
Northern Ireland, the Daily Mail chooses to portray them as ‘enemy’ sympathisers.
The hysteria and racism the Daily Mail editor seemingly intends to whip up is 
wrong in both principle and fact. Assuming actors support a certain political tendency 
because of their nationality is a racist idea because it is based on stereotyping, which 
in this case appears to be as a strategy to ‘other’ people in Ireland from people in 
Britain. It is also simply wrong in fact because the actors were from Northern Ireland, 
which the Daily Mail itself staunchly defends as ‘British’. The actors the Daily Mail 
encourages its readers to hate are acknowledged as being from Northern Ireland in a 
Daily Mail news article printed the following day {Daily Mail, I WAS RUSTY. BUT 
NEVER MIND - THE ACTOR WILL CLEAN IT UP FOR ME, 17.09.94).
Clearly, the hate appeal for such actors would not work as well for the Daily 
Mail and its readers if the ‘enemy’ of the ‘British people’ was represented as ‘British 
actors’ because it goes against the long crafted nationalism that such a newspaper
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intends to inspire. The Daily Mail was the only newspaper to make such outlandish 
and racist claims, but the focus of the discourse arguing that the ban was a farce 
because of dubbing often meant broadcasters were blamed for the farce rather than the 
British government for introducing it in the first place, as this Daily Mail news article 
illustrates:
The restrictions backfired almost immediately. Broadcasters sidestepped it by 
using actors to dub the words of leading Sinn Fein members such as Adams 
and Martin McGuinness. {Daily Mail, I WAS RUSTY. BUT NEVER MIND - 
THE ACTOR WILL CLEAN IT UP FOR ME, 17.09.94)
The seriousness of the ban was also downplayed in expressions of the discourse 
arguing the ban was a farce because of dubbing. For example, a Daily Mail journalist 
quotes a Unionist politician fixating on the dubbing and then referring to it as ‘a joke’ 
and ‘comedy’:
Ulster Unionist general secretary Jim Wilson said there was no sense in 
continuing the use of voice-overs by actors. He said: ‘It is a joke, and most 
people will not be annoyed at the comedy being removed from the airwaves’. 
{Daily Mail, MCGUINNESS DODGES KEY QUESTION OVER THE 
CEASEFIRE, 17.09.94)
The theme of the ban as an absurdity rather than an attack on British democracy and 
civil liberties was continued in other expressions of the discourse arguing the ban was 
a farce because of dubbing. For example, a Daily Express editorial referred to the 
broadcasting ban as ‘nonsense’ whilst drawing attention to the use of ‘Irish’ actors 
who would apparently ‘mourn’ the ending of the ban: ‘With the peace process picking 
up speed this nonsense is now to end. It will not be mourned -  except by Irish actors’ 
{Daily Express, VOICE OF REASON, 17.09.94). Although, like the Daily Mail, the 
Daily Express encourages its readers to be hostile to the ‘Irish’ actors employed to 
dub Sinn F&n representatives by suggesting they will ‘mourn’ the lifting of the ban, it 
does riot overtly suggest they are sympathetic to the Republican Movement. Instead, 
the suggestion is that these actors will ‘mourn’ the loss of employment.
In The Daily Telegraph, John Major is also reported as referring to the ban as 
‘nonsense’ because of dubbing, but in a way that blames the broadcasters rather than 
his predecessor, Margaret Thatcher: ‘Mr John Major expressed dismay at the 
broadcasters use o f lip-synching, which he said was making a nonsense of the ban’
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{The Daily Telegraph, BROADCASTERS RELIEVED BY LIFTING OF THE BAN,
17.09.94). A few weeks before the British government lifted the broadcasting ban, 
the then head of Sky News, Ian Cooke, gave a concrete example of why the 
broadcasting ban was a farce, or ‘stupid’, as he describes it:
Mr Ian Cooke, head of Sky News, said: “Today Gerry Adams and Martin 
McGuinness made major speeches in Belfast and we carried them live. But 
we had to get a translator sitting in the studio to translate from English to 
English as it went out. That just illustrates how stupid the whole thing is.” 
{The Daily Telegraph, BIRT CALLS FOR BROADCAST BAN TO BE 
LIFTED, 01.09.94)
Of course, there is no denying that the broadcasting ban had all the attributes ascribed 
to it in newspaper articles representing the British government’s lifting of the 
broadcasting ban. It was a farce, it was ridiculous and a disaster. It was a joke, 
nonsense and stupid. However, the dominance of those expressions of the discourse 
arguing it was a farce because of dubbing, which ‘remember’ the ban as an absurdity, 
massively downplay the seriousness of it. This discourse also fixates on the effects of 
the ban, rather than the cause of it. In other words, broadcasters resisting censorship 
by using actors to dub Sinn Fein’s democratically elected representatives are 
foregrounded, whereas British government representatives who actually enacted the 
ban are backgrounded. Therefore, the social actors responsible for the broadcasting 
ban who acted undemocratically in the “mother of democracies” are overshadowed 
whereas those resisting it and defending basic freedoms in Britain are attacked by 
sections of the British newspaper industry. The consequence of this is that the British 
government largely evades criticism by journalists.
Although not one single newspaper article representing the British government 
introducing or lifting the broadcasting ban did, it is worth acknowledging the first 
principle of the National Union of Journalists’ Code of Conduct. Since 1936, all 
journalists joining the NUJ agree to follow a series of principles that all journalists 
should strive towards. The first one states a journalist: ‘At all times upholds and 
defends the principle of media freedom, the right of freedom of expression and 
the right of the public to be informed’ (cited in Adams and Hicks, 2009: 194).
Broadcasters resisting the British government’s broadcasting ban could have 
and should have been celebrated in British newspaper articles, but rarely were. At the 
beginning of this section, it was acknowledged that the order of discourse can be
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subverted depending on the genre of newspaper articles and the political sympathies 
of individual newspapers, which refract the same discourse in different ways. Most 
expressions of the discourse arguing the ban was a farce because of dubbing excluded 
the agency of the British government in that farce and suggested it was broadcasters 
who were to blame as well as Irish actors employed to assist in circumventing the ban 
and thus following a crucial principle of being a journalist: resisting censorship.
The Guardian was the only newspaper to contain an editorial remotely 
sympathetic to the broadcasters and acknowledging the agency of the British 
government in the farce of the broadcasting ban. In the opening sentences of this 
Guardian editorial it welcomes the lifting of the ban and represents the ban as ‘wholly 
absurd’, but crucially acknowledges the British government’s agency in all this, 
which other newspapers did not:
The part of Gerry Adams in future episodes will henceforth be played by 
himself. Good news. The Government’s radio and TV ban on the real voices 
of Sinn Fein has become wholly absurd. (The Guardian, THE VOICE 
RETURNS, THE VOTE AWAITS, 17.09.94)
One of the major reasons given for why the ban had become wholly absurd was the 
use of actors, but ‘spatchcock legislation’ is blamed for the farce instead of 
broadcasters:
As with all such spatchcock legislation, farce soon supervened. Out-of-work 
Irish actors grew rich, statesmanlike and perfect as broadcasters found a way 
through the prohibition. (The Guardian, THE VOICE RETURNS, THE 
VOTE AWAITS, 17.09.94)
Unlike the Daily Mail editorial discussed at the beginning of this section, this 
Guardian editorial does not attack the broadcasters for circumventing the ban. 
Similarly, a Guardian journalist writing in a news article comes close to actually 
celebrating broadcasters ‘flouting’ the spirit of the ban:
Though the broadcasters bowed to the censorship restrictions, in time they 
became more confident in flouting its spirit. Actors were brought in to speak 
the words of Sinn Fein leaders and their imitations grew more and more 
precise. By the end the ban had become all but superfluous. (The Guardian, 
CONTRADICTIONS DUMPED IN THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY,
17.09.94)
136
The discourse arguing that the ban was a farce because of actors dubbing Sinn Fein 
representatives was altered by this journalist working for The Guardian towards a 
more positive and professional position that was supportive of broadcast media 
workers resisting government censorship. However, this commendable refraction of 
the order of discourse i n The Guardian was an exception rather than the norm. 
Although most journalists acknowledged the ban was absurd and a farce because Sinn 
Fein representatives were dubbed by Northern Irish actors, instead of celebrating the 
refusal of British broadcasters to comply with British government censorship, there 
was a tendency to blame the effects rather than the cause of the absurdity.
Most newspapers in the sample were hostile to British broadcasters for 
circumventing the broadcasting ban rather than hostile to the British government for 
introducing it in the first place. Excluding the agency of the British government for 
introducing the ban is significant because when John Major lifted the ban he could be 
represented as responding to the ban having been made an absurdity because of the 
actions of British broadcasters rather than the design of the ban itself by his 
predecessors. Another interesting distraction chosen by some journalists and editors, 
particularly those at the Daily Mail, was the hostility directed towards the actors 
employed by British broadcasters to circumvent the censorship.
Critical Discourse Analysis - textual analysis II: summary
In this chapter, CDA has been used to analyse British newspaper representations of 
the broadcasting ban in the periods when the British government introduced and lifted 
the ban. The most significant discourses have been analysed to explain how they 
functioned to support or oppose the ban. During the period when the British 
government introduced the broadcasting ban, the most frequently expressed 
discourses in broadcasting ban newspaper articles foregrounded the Republican 
Movement as the main targets of the ban and represented them in pejorative ways.
It has been argued here that these interdiscursive constructions functioned to 
support the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban. 
Foregrounding the Republican Movement as the main targets of the ban whilst 
representing them as perpetrators of, and apologists for, ‘terrorism’ encourages 
newspaper readers to fixate on the actions of the Republican Movement instead of the 
reasons for the IRA and Sinn Fein’s existence in the first place.
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This is especially the case because newspaper journalists overwhelmingly 
chose to suppress the Republican Movement’s historical and political motivations. 
Only the Daily Mirror acknowledged that partition was a core grievance motivating 
the Republican Movement and that was on one occasion. This alternative discourse 
could have been expressed by all journalists and newspapers so that newspaper 
readers in England, Scotland and Wales could have understood why England was 
being targeted by the IRA other than their suggested ‘blood lust’, but doing so would 
not have served British nationalism, or the British elite that thrives on it.
Instead, Republican combatants were represented as ‘terrorists’, ‘extremists’ 
‘gangsters’, ‘godfathers’, ‘murderers’, ‘bombers’ and ‘killers’ (in other words, 
perpetrators of violent crime) and Sinn Fein was represented as a ‘front’, 
‘mouthpiece’ or ‘apologist’ for these crimes. Clearly then, Chomsky’s (2002) 
contention about the propagandists approach to terrorism being adopted by large 
sections of the mass media is correct when considering the naming of Republican 
Movement social actors by British journalists during the Northern Ireland conflict.
Van Dijk’s (1998, 2006) ideological square predicts that discourses referring 
to different racial or national groups (especially during conflicts) will involve 
contrasting positive aspects about an imagined ‘us’ with negative aspects about an 
imagined ‘them’. The referential and predicational strategies used by British 
journalists clearly functioned to construct a negative other-presentation for the 
Republican Movement. Interestingly though, there was a distinct absence of British 
combatants in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing and 
lifting the broadcasting ban, which meant a positive self-presentation of British 
combatants was achieved by representing them as the victims of IRA violence and 
never the perpetrators of violence against civilians.
Discourses emanating from the British government were frequently expressed 
in newspaper articles representing its introduction of the broadcasting ban. The 
discourse arguing that ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’, which 
considering the aforementioned discourses clearly referred to Republicans as being 
the ‘terrorists’ rather than Unionist combatants, suggested the British media had given 
the Republican Movement many opportunities to speak. However, as the review of 
literature in Chapter 2 made clear, this was not the case. This discourse and the 
discourse acknowledging there was already a similar ban in the Irish Republic 
suggested that introducing censorship was both necessary and acceptable in Britain.
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Therefore, it has been argued in this chapter that such discourses, which were 
the next two most frequently expressed, also largely functioned to build support for 
the broadcasting ban. Although this is overwhelmingly the case and such discourses 
were often amplified by newspaper journalists, the orders of discourse were 
occasionally subverted by journalists and social actors opposed to the ban. Such 
challenges to dominant discourses illustrated how the ban could have been resisted if 
the social forces opposed to the British government were stronger.
Newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the 
broadcasting ban also constructed the ban as mainly targeting the IRA and Sinn Fein. 
However, the discourse foregrounding the Republican Movement was not consistently 
interconnected with the discourse representing them in pejorative ways. Instead, 
discourses that functioned to oppose the broadcasting ban were frequently expressed 
during 1994, shifting the context of such foregrounding from that focusing on the 
actions of the Republican Movement to the farce of the broadcasting ban itself and 
other discourses, which welcomed the end of such censorship.
The most frequently expressed discourse opposing the ban appeared exactly 
the same amount of times in newspaper articles as the discourse foregrounding the 
Republican Movement as the main targets of the ban. It simply argued that the ban 
should be lifted (in newspaper articles before 16th September, 1994) or that the lifting 
of the ban is welcomed (in newspaper articles after 16th September, 1994) without 
explaining why. It has been argued here that this interdiscursive shift in 1994 altered 
the meaning of such foregrounding and functioned to oppose the broadcasting ban.
This chapter, following Miller’s (1990) analysis, has also argued that 
opposition to the British government’s broadcasting ban was expressed in discourses 
that can be considered either ‘tactical’ or ‘principled’. In essence, opposing 
discourses were motivated and refracted by the interests of particular social actors and 
groups. The most prevalent discourse tactically opposing the British government’s 
introduction of the ban represented it as being beneficial to the IRA. Analysing this 
discourse revealed not only the differing ways in which the same discourse was 
expressed by politicians to reinforce their own party political and ideological 
allegiances, but also how journalists represented this discourse to reinforce their own 
newspaper’s party political and ideological allegiances. Social actors who 
emphasised US support for the IRA were either completely excluded by journalists or 
the parts of their statement acknowledging this were excluded in newspaper articles.
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The discourse representing the ban as being beneficial to the IRA was 
expressed far less in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the 
broadcasting ban, although the American dimension of IRA support was much more 
overtly discussed in these articles. The most prevalent discourse expressed in 
newspaper articles during this time period that can be considered tactical in its 
opposition to the broadcasting ban argued the Northern Irish actors who dubbed the 
voices of Sinn Fein actually improved the image of Sinn Fein and is also based on the 
premise that the ban was beneficial to the Republican Movement, rather than the 
British government.
The most prevalent discourse that can be considered principally opposed to the 
broadcasting ban during its introduction in 1988 represented the ban as undemocratic 
and a threat to civil liberties. This discourse was mostly expressed by organised 
media workers, but left-wing Labour MP, Tony Benn, was a rare voice in the House 
of Commons articulating it too. These social actors were more concerned with 
democracy and media freedom in Britain than Britain’s “national interest” in Ireland 
meaning that their opposition to the broadcasting ban could be based on the principle 
of censorship being undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties rather than just a 
tactical mistake of the British government in fighting “the enemy”.
Again, the extent to which journalists expressed this discourse in newspaper 
articles representing the broadcasting ban seemed to depend on the party political and 
ideological allegiances of the newspaper owner for which they worked, but also on 
generic conventions of newspapers themselves. Some expressions of the discourse 
representing the broadcasting ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties in 
newspaper articles illustrated how it was possible to allow critical social actors to 
speak such as Mike Jempson of the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom. 
However, most newspaper articles did not feature such voices. Whether this was the 
decision of journalists, or their editors, is unknown.
The discourse that argued the ban was undemocratic and a threat to civil 
liberties did not feature in any newspaper articles representing the British government 
lifting the broadcasting ban. Although opposition to the ban was unanimous by the 
time it was lifted, there were very few opposing discourses, which can be considered 
principled in their opposition. There was one, however, which argued the ban made 
media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplet e. This discourse originated from 
managerial representatives of the broadcast media as well as organised media
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workers, namely the NUJ. It was Guardian journalists who allowed such social 
actors to speak most often and once detailed the extent to which Sinn Fein was 
censored as a result of the ban. Such exceptions to the general pattern of British 
newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban reveal that it was possible for other 
journalists to do the same if they chose to or were allowed to by their editor.
The final discourse explored in this chapter represented the ban as a farce 
because of Irish actors dubbing Sinn Fein representatives and was the most frequently 
expressed reason for the British government lifting the broadcasting ban in 1994. 
This discourse, which fixated on (Northern) Irish actors, was an interesting 
journalistic trend because it meant British newspapers ‘remembered’ the ban as an 
absurdity rather than the worst censorship in Britain since World War II. The ban was 
represented as a farce because it failed to prevent the voices it intended to deny access 
to the broadcast media due to actors being used to circumvent it. The dubbing was 
often out of sync. Although a credible criticism of the ban, such a memory of it 
avoids acknowledging the seriousness of such government censorship. It also meant 
that broadcasters were blamed for the failure of the ban instead of the British 
government for introducing it in the first place.
Although one of the two politicians expressing this discourse clearly intended 
to blame the British government for the farce of the ban, most newspaper expressions 
of this discourse did not. As before with other discourses explored in this chapter, the 
extent to which the order of discourse was altered depended on the genre of 
newspaper articles and the political sympathies of individual newspapers, which 
refracted the discourse in different ways. So, whereas Daily Mail and Daily Express 
journalists (incorrectly) fixated on the ‘Irish’ nationality of the actors and criticised 
the broadcasters for daring to circumvent the ban, journalists from The Guardian 
chose to criticise the government for introducing censorship in the first place rather 
than the broadcasters for resisting it. Either way, the result was that when the British 
government lifted the broadcasting ban in 1994, the newspaper industry’s ‘collective 
memory’ mostly remembered it for being a farcical mistake rather than a serious 
erosion of British democracy and media freedom.
141
Chapter 6 -  Critical Discourse Analysis: Textual Analysis III
In this chapter CDA is used to explore a selection of individual newspaper articles 
representative of the ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’ and ‘quality’ newspaper genres. The 
textual analysis in the previous chapter analysed the most significant discourses 
across all newspaper articles representing the British government introducing and 
lifting the broadcasting ban. In this chapter, the textual analysis focuses on the most 
significant newspaper articles during the sample period in which the British 
government introduced the broadcasting ban instead of the one covering its lifting. 
The main reason for this is because the way in which the ban’s introduction was 
represented would impact whether it would be supported or opposed from the 
beginning and therefore impact how long the censorship lasted.
Another reason for analysing British newspaper representations of the 
broadcasting ban during the period covering the British government’s introduction of 
it is because there was division amongst elite social actors as to whether the 
broadcasting ban was the best strategy for stopping the Republican Movement. By 
the time the British government lifted the ban elite opposition to it was universal. As 
a result, newspapers were divided on whether to support or oppose the British 
government’s broadcasting ban when it was first announced, which makes it more 
interesting to analyse newspaper articles during this period.
The textual analysis in this chapter shifts from the general thematic analysis 
in the previous chapter to a meticulous sentence by sentence analysis here. This 
entails deconstructing each newspaper article from the headline through to the 
narrative of the entire article. The naming and framing of social actors and their 
reported speech by journalists is examined as well as the representations of the 
discourses explored in the previous chapter to explain how they operated 
interdiscursively in building support or opposition to the British government’s 
introduction of the broadcasting ban. To reveal the choices made by journalists in 
creating these newspaper articles, alternative constructions will be considered 
throughout as well as the potential impact of the actual representations compared to 
the alternative representations.
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The Sun -  ‘Fury as BBC beat Hurd ban on IRA’s claptrap’ 
by Carson Black, news article, 20th October, 1988, page 2
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The Sun
The most significant Sun newspaper article representing the British government 
introducing the broadcasting ban (above) was a news article printed on 20th October 
1988. It was the most prominent, appearing on page 2, and was the largest being 
between an eighth and a quarter of a page in size. It was also the only Sun newspaper 
article representing the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban, 
which had corresponding imagery. There is one image of Gerry Adams above one of 
Douglas Hurd with the following captions written underneath the images: ‘Adams... 
‘We won’t go away” and ‘Hurd... interviews crackdown’. Both images are small 
and equal in size as well as being equally close-up, eye-level shots. Although both 
subjects are represented as speaking because their mouths are open, Gerry Adams is 
gazing into the camera whereas Douglas Hurd’s gaze is slightly to the left of the 
camera. This is significant because Gerry Adams is represented as addressing the 
newspaper reader, which arguably generalises the threat of the caption from being 
aimed at the British government to the British public.
The order in which the images appear counters the chronology of the British 
government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban, which is significant because it 
creates an ideological narrative. Positioning the image of Gerry Adams above that of 
Douglas Hurd with the respective captions creates a representation that suggests Gerry 
Adams has taunted the British government or British public more generally by saying 
‘We won’t go away’ and then Douglas Hurd has reacted by introducing an ‘interviews 
crackdown’. In reality, however, the British government had made clear its intention 
several days before to introduce a media ban as The Sun itself briefly recognised on 
171" October (The Sun, IRA FACES THE BOOT FROM TV, 17.10.88) and Gerry 
Adams was being defiant against this by saying ‘We won’t go away’.
This chronology would have been represented far more accurately if these 
images (and the article itself) had acknowledged this as opposed to representing the 
Gerry Adams statement being aired before the broadcast ban was officially introduced 
on 19th October. Whilst this representation decontextualises the British government’s 
introduction of the broadcasting ban by excluding this fact, it is perhaps more accurate 
to criticise the article itself because the images reflect the narrative of the article and 
would have been chosen to fit the article. The images have been explored first though 
because it is the imagery (and the headline) of a newspaper article that readers tend to
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consume first. That is why it is still worth considering how the meaning would shift 
if the images and respective captions appeared with Douglas Hurd above Gerry 
Adams because the narrative would represent Douglas Hurd introducing an 
‘interviews crackdown’ and Gerry Adams reacting by saying ‘We won’t go away’.
Choosing such images also individualises a complex conflict between many 
social actors and institutions including the British government, British media and 
eleven Republican and Loyalist organisations to just two social actors. This 
simplifies the narrative of the conflict and foregrounds Gerry Adams, therefore 
expressing the most prevalent discourse and most likely to be articulated first in 
newspaper articles, which represented the ban as mainly targeting the Republican 
Movement. This is further fixed by the headline and the article itself, which diverts 
attention from the seriousness of the British government introducing censorship to the 
alleged irresponsibility of the BBC instead. The headline of this Sun news article, 
‘Fury as BBC beat Hurd ban on IRA’s claptrap’, suggests that the discourses 
representing British broadcasters (especially the BBC) as irresponsible and the ban as 
mainly targeting the IRA and/or Sinn Fein will be prominent in the newspaper article. 
This is achieved by foregrounding the BBC and the IRA and by making significant 
lexical choices to fix these discourses.
The headline suggests the BBC created ‘fury’ by beating Hurd’s ban. The 
noun ‘fury’ denotes anger, but, like the noun ‘rage’, connotes higher levels of hostility 
and emotion. If the headline read ‘Anger as BBC beat Hurd ban on IRA’s claptrap’ or 
‘Criticism as BBC beat Hurd ban on IRA’s claptrap’ the signified meanings would be 
less dramatic. Using hyperbole to describe the BBC’s defiance against the ban 
arguably serves to attract the reader to the article and to exaggerate the seriousness of 
the BBC broadcasting a statement by Gerry Adams. The ‘fury’ is generalised because 
it is not attributed to a particular social group or social actor, which creates an enigma 
for the reader, but also suggests the ‘fury’ is more widespread than it actually is, 
perhaps inviting the reader to share the disdain for the BBC.
Using the verb ‘beat’ is another significant lexical choice as it also connotes 
the presence of a confrontation although the meaning of this signifier is more open to 
interpretation than ‘fury’. The context in which it is used suggests the verb ‘beat’ is 
used in the sense of defeating and overcoming something or surpassing or outdoing 
something, in this case the ban. There is also the possibility of this verb being chosen 
over others for the purpose of alliteration because ‘B-B-C beat Hurd ban’ certainly
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constitutes a form of alliteration. The most significant lexical choice in the headline, 
however, is ‘claptrap’. Constructing statements from representatives of the 
Republican Movement as ‘claptrap’ clearly functions to delegitimise their political 
motivations as it suggests whatever they say is at best, ‘insincere’ (in the formal sense 
of the noun), and at worst, ‘nonsense’ (in the informal sense of the noun). This is 
clearly ideological because it not only represents the ‘enemy’ unfavourably, but the 
corollary of casting doubt on the truthfulness of statements made by ‘them’ is that 
banning statements from the Republican Movement is more legitimate as a result.
It is important to recognise that the author of this Sun article has not only 
made a choice to begin with a particular discourse in its headline, but has also singled 
out a particular broadcaster: the BBC. The day before this news article was printed 
was the day the British government introduced the ban and the day in which both the 
BBC and ITN aired statements from Gerry Adams before the ban became law.46 
Whether this was illustrative of ‘irresponsible’ broadcasters or of principled 
broadcasters defying government censorship is debatable, but it is a fact that both the 
BBC and ITN aired statements from Gerry Adams. By excluding ITN from this 
social action and including the BBC, it is clear The Sun intended to embroil the BBC 
in a scandal or at least to persuade its readers to be hostile to the BBC. Of course, 
there is a profit motive behind this. Since The Sun owner, Rupert Murdoch, bought 
Satellite Television UK (SATV) and renamed it Sky Channel in 1984, the BBC has 
been the main competitor of Sky (Tuccille, 2003). It is in the interests of Rupert 
Murdoch to encourage tirades against the BBC from journalists in his employ so as to 
discredit the BBC in the minds of British television audiences and British politicians.
This discourse is continued in the opening sentence of the article where it is 
said ‘BBC bosses stuck two fingers up at the Government’. This use of a colloquial 
expression is a stylistic feature of The Sun and the ‘popular’ press generally, but 
representing the BBC resisting the British government’s broadcasting ban this way 
arguably reduces the seriousness of both the introduction of censorship and the 
resistance to it within the media. Such a metaphor conjures imagery of defiance, but 
as there is no explanation for such defiance, it suggests it is a rebellion without a 
cause as if the BBC likes to taunt the government for no reason. By referring to ‘BBC 
bosses’ as the agents in this social action it suggests it is BBC institutional practice to 
behave in such a way as opposed to just a few trade unionist militants or ‘bad apples’ 
of some other description.
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Such ‘irresponsibility’ is further pinned on the BBC when the Sun journalist 
‘informs’ the reader that the BBC did this ‘moments before Home Secretary Douglas 
Hurd banned them from interviewing people who back Irish terror groups’. This 
emphasises that the BBC was ‘irresponsible’ right until the end as ‘moments’ do not 
specify measurement of time like seconds, minutes or hours do. The BBC’s 
irresponsibility is further ‘proven’ by defying government action against those who 
support ‘Irish terror groups’. Prefixing Irish nationality to ‘terror groups’ is 
particularly interesting because although the ‘terror groups’ being referred to are from 
Northern Ireland, part of Britain, it connects ‘Irishness’ to ‘terrorism’. Arguably, this 
identifies social actors fighting for an Irish United Republic as ‘terrorists’, rather than 
those fighting for a British United Kingdom. Such collocation between Irish 
Republicans and terrorism is further strengthened by the focus on Gerry Adams in the 
next sentence as well as the IRA in the headline and Gerry Adams in the first image.
He is directly quoted in the next sentence in what is the first occurrence of 
reported speech in the article: ‘As Mr Hurd put the final touches to his Commons 
announcement, Mr Adams warned: “We’re not going to go away’” . Although lacking 
a full transcript of Gerry Adam’s statement, it could be argued his reported speech is 
selectively taken out of context to represent him in a purely threatening way. To 
support this argument, there are two newspaper articles that represent different parts 
of the same Gerry Adams statement, which change the context and therefore meaning 
of what he said. A Daily Express newspaper article adds that Gerry Adams called the 
ban a denial of democracy before quoting the same part of his statement {Daily 
Express, ROW AS BBC FLOUT HURD TERROR BAN, 20.10.88).
This context changes the meaning of Gerry Adams’s statement to an act of 
defiance against a denial of democracy, which is more legitimate. Similarly, another 
newspaper reported him saying: “We are not going to take this lying down. We don’t 
intend to go away and our support will not go away” {The Daily Telegraph, SINN 
FEIN MAY FIGHT UK POLLS, 20.10.88). Again, this changes the meaning because 
it recognises that Sinn Fein is defiant against the ban and that they have support. It’s 
also interesting that although these three newspaper articles represent Gerry Adams’s 
statement as verbatim reported speech, there are differences. Whereas The Sun and 
Daily Express quote him as saying “we’re/we are not going to go away”, The Daily 
Telegraph quotes him as saying “we don’t intend to go away”. This also changes the 
meaning of his statement as the former is more forceful and confident than the latter.
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There is also a continuing emphasis on the closeness between the ban 
becoming law and the broadcasting of Gerry Adams in this sentence, which arguably 
is a device to build a more dramatic and thus entertaining narrative. Although 
collocating Gerry Adams with ‘terrorism’ in the first two sentences, the naming of 
him is balanced here because both he and Douglas Hurd are referred to formally and 
respectfully; as Mr Adams and Mr Hurd. However, the quoting verb (warned) 
attributed to Gerry Adams combined with the decontextualised statement frames his 
six quoted words in a threatening manner. That said, this sentence was coded as the 
discourse arguing the ban will not stop the IRA or Sinn Fein as it suggests the ban is 
flawed despite the hostile construction of Gerry Adams.
The ‘fury’ expressed in the headline against the BBC for ‘beating’ the ban is 
attributed in the fourth sentence: ‘Tories were furious the interview went out, MP Ivor 
Stanbrook said: “It shows you can’t rely on the media to behave responsibly by self- 
discipline’” . This makes it clearer that the fury against the BBC was not as 
widespread as the headline suggested, rather it was the Tories who were furious, 
which is less shocking because they generally share the Sun's dislike of the BBC.47 
The headline would have been more accurate if it read ‘Tory fury as BBC beat Hurd 
ban on IRA’s claptrap’, however, such a headline might not have attracted so many 
readers to the actual article because it would be more obvious that such ‘fury’ was not 
widespread after all. In addition, although The Sun enjoys using alliteration and 
rhyming structures, perhaps it would not when referring to the political party it 
endorses as such rhetorical stylistic devices often denigrate those social actors or 
subjects to which it is applied.
Returning to the fourth sentence, Ivor Stanbrook is used as the representative 
for the Tory fury. He is named formally and respectfully and the quoting verb 
attributing his reported speech is neutral, however the discourse he expresses clearly 
functions to support the introduction of the ban. This was coded as another 
manifestation of the ‘broadcasters are irresponsible (especially the BBC)’ discourse 
because although the BBC is not identified individually or even broadcasters 
generally, the context of the article and the discourses expressed beforehand work 
interdiscursively to suggest it. Expressing this discourse arguably functions to 
support the ban because Ivor Stanbrook suggests this instance of the BBC 
broadcasting a statement by Gerry Adams ‘proves’ that the media needs to be 
disciplined because they are too ‘irresponsible’ to discipline themselves.
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This ‘problem’ leads perfectly to a ‘solution’ in the narrative structure of the 
newspaper article because dominant discourses supporting the introduction of the 
broadcasting ban are expressed in the next three sentences. The ‘terrorists must be 
starved of the oxygen of publicity’ discourse is expressed first: ‘Mrs Thatcher insisted 
on the ban to deprive the IRA of the “oxygen of publicity’” . The “oxygen of 
publicity” concept is not explained, but the targets of it are identified as the IRA, 
which has previously been collocated with ‘terrorism’ in this article and is again in the 
next sentence. The dominant discourse expressed in the next sentence is the ‘offence 
to public’ discourse: ‘Mr Hurd told MPs that TV appearances by terrorists justifying 
murder caused “grave offence’” . Considering the IRA was identified as being the 
target of the ban in the previous sentence, this sentence clearly suggests they are the 
‘terrorists’ who use TV to justify ‘murder’.
The power of dominant discourses are revealed here because in this article it is 
not the British government representatives who are constructing this discourse 
through verbatim reported speech, rather it is the journalist who, intentionally or not, 
has singled out the IRA as the ‘terrorists’ in the Northern Ireland conflict instead of 
any of the other combatants. Similarly, it is only the IRA that ‘murder’. Such lexical 
choices are ideological constructions, which refract reality in the interests of the 
British government and its supporters. Loyalist combatants are not implicated with 
‘terrorism’ or ‘murdering’ because they are backgrounded in this newspaper article 
despite loyalist organisations being covered by the ban too.
The dominant discourse expressed in the next sentence is the ‘terrorists must 
be starved of the oxygen of publicity’ discourse: ‘He [Hurd] added: “The Government 
has decided that the time has now come to deny this easy platform to those who use it 
to propagate terrorism’” . Douglas Hurd’s argument presupposes that there was 
actually an easy platform for (Republican) social actors to “propagate terrorism” 
whereas media scholarship on the subject of the Northern Ireland conflict (reviewed 
in Chapter 2) reveals such a platform was simply not provided. However, suggesting 
there was functions to support the introduction of a ban because such censorship 
would ensure that the phantom ‘easy platform’ is taken away from the ‘terrorists’. 
The narrative of this article is structured to suggest that the broadcasters do give those 
that “propagate terrorism” an easy platform because the ‘broadcasters are 
irresponsible (especially the BBC)’ discourse is the most prevalent discourse as well 
as being the first to be expressed in this article.
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The next sentence softens the seriousness of the ban by recognising ‘it will be 
lifted during elections’. For the first time in the article, it is acknowledged that the 
ban also covers Loyalist organisations, although interestingly the Sun journalist 
chooses to refer to them as ‘Protestant paramilitary groups’. This is particularly 
interesting when this referential strategy is contrasted with the earlier representation 
of Sinn Fein and the IRA as ‘Irish terror groups’. There are suggestions of religious 
motivation to the conflict here with the Irish (Catholics) against the Protestants 
(British). Those sympathetic to the former are considered ‘terrorist groups’ whereas 
those sympathetic to the latter are considered ‘paramilitary groups’.
Arguably, this sentence functions to normalise the ban by emphasising 
‘positive’ features of it, that is, it will be lifted during elections and it applies to 
loyalist and republican organisations, whilst suppressing negative features of it just 
before opposing discourses are expressed. An example of a negative feature of the 
ban that could have been expressed would be that direct media censorship of this 
nature had not been used by the British government since World War II. That is as 
much a fact as the ban being lifted during elections, but an ideological choice has 
been made about which fact reinforces the narrative in this Sun newspaper article. 
The meaning of this sentence would have been completely different, yet no more or 
less true, if it said: ‘The ban, which is the worst censorship since World War II, also 
covers Protestant paramilitary groups’. If single standards were applied to Republican 
and Protestant organisations, the journalist could have written: ‘The ban, which is the 
worst censorship since World War II, also covers Protestant terror groups’.
The next three sentences express two opposing discourses, namely the ‘ban 
makes Britain look repressive and ridiculous’ discourse and the ‘ban will make media 
reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete’ discourse. The next two sentences state: ‘It 
[the ban] was attacked last night by Labour deputy leader Roy Hattersley. He said: “It 
will make the Government look restrictive and ridiculous”. Although the social actor 
is named formally, an interesting lexical choice is made to describe his opposition to 
the ban. The verb ‘attack’ is chosen to represent his opposition, which continues the 
dramatic narrative and arguably overemphasises the strength of such a discourse 
opposing the ban. Whilst Hattersley’s opposition to the ban was more critical than his 
representation in this Sun article, a lot of his arguments were based on tactical 
questions, which can be observed in his House of Commons statement on the day the 
British government introduced the broadcasting ban:
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Why does the Home Secretary believe that the net effect of such a specific 
prohibition will be to damage terrorism and help in the defeat of terrorists? 
Has he considered the damaging way in which his proposal will be used at 
home and abroad, especially in the United States, to portray the Government 
as the enemy of free expression? Has he weighed that publicity coup for the 
IRA against the advantage of keeping its representatives off television? Does 
he not have enough faith in the British people to accept that such personal 
appearances only increase the revulsion and contempt felt by most British 
viewers for terrorism and terrorists? (Hansard, 1988: 894)
Returning to the representation of Roy Hattersley’s opposition in The Sun though, 
there is an interesting factual mistake. Although the statement used to illustrate Roy 
Hattersley’s opposition to the ban is reported as verbatim, manipulation is evident. Of 
the 443 words that he uttered in Parliament (Hansard, 1988: 893-895), the nine words 
chosen for the Sun newspaper article derive from the end of his first statement where 
he states the ban ‘will make the Government look simultaneously repressive and 
ridiculous’ (Ibid.). Not only does this mean his arguments against the ban outlined in 
his Commons statement are excluded, therefore changing the context of his statement, 
but one of the words has been changed. It is significant that the Sun journalist 
changes an adjective used by Roy Hattersley to describe the British government, 
‘repressive’, to one that is more euphemistic, ‘restrictive’.
This is because the co nnotations of the former evoke negative ima ges of 
authoritarian regimes crushing dissent, whereas the latter connotes a more civilised, 
legislated action. It cannot be proven whether this was a genuine mistake by the Sun 
journalist or not, but either way, it is a misrepresentation of what Roy Hattersley said. 
Furthermore, Roy Hattersley acknowledges who he thinks will be ‘using’ the 
broadcasting ban abroad to portray the British government as the enemy of free 
expression; sympathetic Americans. This is excluded by the Sun journalist, which is 
significant because acknowledging the US dimension to the Northern Ireland conflict 
means acknowledging that some American citizens and politicians considered the 
Republican Movement to have a legitimate cause.
The next sentence states: ‘BBC and ITN claimed the ban would make 
reporting of Northern Ireland affairs incomplete’. Metonymy is used to represent 
what the BBC Chairman, Marmaduke Hussey, said. Although BBC management was 
more critical of the ban than ITN management it still misrepresents opposition to the 
ban because even though the discourse expressed in this sentence is based on 
principles, rather than tactics, it excludes the opposition of organised BBC and ITN
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workers to the ban. This is a significant choice because the Sun journalist 
marginalises alternative discourses that opposed the ban such as those expressed by 
the BBC’s NUJ branch and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom.
As with the other discourses (supporting and opposing the ban) in this Sun 
article, the opposing discourse in this sentence is not explained. Nonetheless, it is the 
first expression of a potential explanation of why the BBC (and ITN) broadcast a 
statement by Gerry Adams before the British government banned them from doing so 
(to make reporting of Northern Ireland affairs complete). That said, the verb 
attributing the BBC and ITN’s argument against the ban undermines the credibility of 
it because ‘to claim’ implies the Sun journalist doubts the truth of such a statement. 
Consider how the meaning of the sentence changes if ‘said’ or ‘suggested’ had 
replaced ‘claimed’.
This Sun article finishes with the ‘similar ban in the Irish Republic’ discourse 
with the last sentence stating: ‘Terror groups have been barred from Irish TV for 17 
years’. Arguably, this discourse functions to normalise the introduction of the ban on 
broadcasters in Britain by suggesting that another society confronting ‘terrorism’, 
which is also geographically and politically close to Britain has not only introduced a 
similar ban, but it did so a long time ago. This discourse is not attributed to any social 
actor, which means it is represented as a statement of fact whereas it was actually a 
dominant discourse emanating from the British government.
The Sun editorial position:
In case any readers doubt the argument that the choices made in the 
construction of the above Sun news article function to support the British government 
introducing the broadcasting ban, it is worth briefly analysing a Sun editorial that 
mentions the ban. The brevity of this editorial analysis is due to the fact that only one 
of the sentences in the editorial addresses the ban, simply stating: ‘We support the ban 
on TV and radio interviews with terrorists’ {The Sun, WHAT’S A LIE, 21.10.88). No 
explanation is given for such support, but the sentence is underlined and written in 
bold font, which signifies the importance of this statement. The editorial’s focus is on 
the British government’s introduction of an oath renouncing violence for election 
candidates in Northern Ireland and the next sentence switches to questioning such an 
oath because, as The Sun says (again, in underlined, bold font): ‘If they are willing to 
murder, they would certainly be willing to lie’ (Ibid.).
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The other Sun editorial, printed a week later, focuses on journalists resisting 
the ban (The Sun, TELLY BERKS, 28.10.88). Interestingly, as with the Sun news 
article analysed above, the tirade against the ‘irresponsible’ BBC is present in this 
latter editorial, beginning with the following question underlined and written in bold 
font: ‘ARE there more twits at the BBC than in any other organisation?’ (Ibid.). The 
editorial continues by attacking the BBC journalists calling for strike action against 
the broadcasting ban and ends with the following statement underlined and written in 
bold font again: ‘BBC must stand for British Berks Combined’ (Ibid.).
THE SUN SAYS
W h n t 's a
we smuMit ttM mu on tv 
interview* wftti terroriiU.
nMSfe
s But what does Home Secretary: 
* Douglas Hurd believe it would 
1 achieve if election candidates in 
I  Ulster were made to swear an oath 
1 renouncing violence?
1 It tmy art wttmg to murder, they
I  weuM certainly he wUfclg to »*.§  — — -
rThe Sun. ‘What’s a lie?’.
21.10.88, editorial, page 6]
THE SUN SAYS
T e ih r  b e r k s
ARE there twit* at the BBC than hi
my etter organisation?
Their journalists are threatening 
a 24-hour news blackout next 
month,
I  The action is in protwt at the 
|  Government on Overviews
I with IRA  '
#  They say they are defending 
I  freedom of speech.
I  It is a strange way to do that by 
i  ensuring that no one speaks at all. 
And what about the victims of 
the IRA? They lost more than 
freedom of speech.
BBC must ttamt for British B*rks
m
I
rThe Sun. ‘What’s a lie?’.
28.10.88, editorial, page 61
Newspaper editorials should not be used to explain the position of news and op-ed 
articles because of the differing generic conventions and authors of such articles. 
However, newspaper editorials are still revealing of the party line of a newspaper 
owner and editor and will impact upon the ability of journalists to stray from such 
positions. For example, generic conventions dictate that news articles should not 
overtly contain the opinion of the journalists writing them, but choices have clearly 
been made by the Sun journalist. These choices include which social actors have been 
foregrounded, which social actors are called on to speak and in what order, resulting 
in which discourses are expressed and when, which words and sentences are used as 
reported speech and which social actors are named positively and negatively.
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The Sun -  summary:
Arguably, the Sun journalist has made particular choices in producing the Sun 
news article that function to support the British government’s introduction of the 
broadcasting ban such as foregrounding Sinn Fein and the IRA and the BBC whilst 
backgrounding loyalist organisations and ITV. The Sun journalist also 
overwhelmingly calls on social actors from the British elite to speak (the exception 
being Gerry Adams) resulting in dominant discourses being present and principled 
alternative discourses being absent. Explanations for this will be explored in the next 
chapter which analyses the discursive practices involved in British newspaper 
production, distribution and consumption as well as the social practices involved in 
British newspaper as one facet of the British social formation.
Daily Mail
The Daily Mail was another newspaper which had few articles representing the 
British government’s introduction of the ban; however, those that did were very 
supportive of it. There was one Daily Mail editorial about the ban before it was 
introduced (Daily Mail, DEPRIVE TERROR OF THIS MEGAPHONE, 17.10.88) 
and one after the ban was introduced (Daily Mail, MURDER’S VOICE TO BE 
MUZZLED, 20.10.88). These Daily Mail editorials, which can be seen on the next 
page, overtly supported the British government introducing the broadcasting ban.
The Daily Express also had few newspaper articles representing the 
introduction of the broadcasting ban and those that did were supportive of it. Daily 
Express editorials overtly supported the British government introducing the ban 
(Daily Express, CLOSING DOWN THE ENEMY MOUTHPIECE, 20.10.88; Daily 
Express, THE BEST MOVE, 29.10.88) and condemned BBC journalists resisting it 
(Daily Express, A SILLY STRIKE, 28.10.88). As the Daily Mail and Daily Express 
are both ‘mid-market’ newspapers and both overwhelmingly supported this 
censorship by the British government, it is only necessary to analyse one Daily Mail 
news article in this chapter.
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B aitji H lail 
COM M ENT
NEVER will the Fxfira Minister yield to 
terror. Never. Nor need it be doubted 
Hut tbe words of her imfi&tehtfir 
coolereaee speech wili harden into 
*etta&
Camft&toMfbr local office to Northern 
Irelaad wlU to the ftftufT have to ttisr 
—an oatfc of allegiance. The ‘Ftofifittoir, 
of Terrorina Act is to be strengthened^ 
And me CovemnMBJt fir considering 
pew laws which would ban. interviews 
Wfiil lRA ganert«i»-«n1^4evision. radio ;^Jo_the f^ nes*. • *•■
U  they can operate such % ban
nottothe Utoted Kingdom? ___
But the mA’s loudest and most Ire- 
auenUy used megaphone is Btoa Fein,7f p K r f i B r - ..——  -  ....
ts * prosMSued
organiaatkm.
■•So ttjmhu :^bt.h«rn...™... *.......~ ,
jW,as~1ong so tbe iaws of this land 
allow the Kkes of Gerry Adams a 
legtttamto Btetfgna. um  
i# gulp dowh-tbe oxygenw publicity 
and spew out I^ Mjm m ssS kS L iggor-.
rDaily Mail. ‘Deprive terror of this 
megaphone’. 17.10.88. editorial, page 61
B o l i n  m a ix  
Murder’s voice 
to be muzzled
FRONT men for the IRA are not 
allowed to promote their politics of 
terror on television or radio in the 
Irish Repub lie. So why should they 
still get away with It here?
The Home Secretary is abundantly 
Justified In banishing forthwith from-- 
British TV and radio any statement by 
Sinn Fein or by anyone else doing a 
public relations Job for tbe IRA. - 
Sensibly, Douglas Hurd Is also to deny ‘ 
screen space and air time to toe 
Protestant paro-mili tor y thugs and 
their mouthpiece*.
Most decent men and women have 
never understood why the soft-voiced 
apologists for murder should be invited 
by broadcasters to put terror's point of
 view as—if—fci~were Just' another, if  '
somewhat eccentric, part of our tradi­
tional political process.
Nevertheless, there are arguments 
against the ban. And they, merit 
analysis.,
It is said that, when Sinn Fein's Gerry 
Adams appears on television reeking of 
hypocrisy after the latest atrocity, his 
—performance only serves to ftenaify-the— 
contempt whkhthajm ^ view- -
..._ jto£J^ ..to r.J th fi..T R A ,._ ------------------   —
There is some truth ip that.. But it is by ,
no means the whole truth. 
HespectobilityU what the -cameras and 
the microphones afford Sinn Fein. All 
the more to in a perverse kind of wav, - 
fust because many broadcasters are to 
conscientious about balance and re- 
' sponrlbibtv in the making of their
.. .praptmusetT R v this ambiance of ,
worthy journalistic investigation is the 
very one* in which the execrable Adams 
luxuriates. He hr only too happy for 
some of that worthiness to rub off on 
himself.
..Tbe. Prime Minister .and. . the ... Home....."
Secretary are determined io  strip...
terror's gnptssacUdB of this spurious 
respectability by association. '
But this brings us to the most telling 
riposte . to .Mr Hurd’s announcement. 
Broadcasters can protest that, in 
allowing Sinn Fein to raakeits case on 
the television, they am doing no more 
than rotifecttog that organisation’s 
share of the popular vote In local and. 
to a leaser extent, nsttoal elections in 
Northern Ireland, .■ - 
Does it not mock logic to remove Sinn 
. FWn's TV. platform, yet leave it* 
electoral platform intact?
Indeed, it does.---------=- -
Ideally, there should not be one law for
the goggle box and another fee the 
ballot' box. Sinn is terror with a
polUtcal face. Its spokesmen should not 
appear on teletnjricm. ft* candidates 
should not be eligible for election.
The . Government's considered view is .
that it would be impracticable to ' 
~-mZBPtf ' Sifcn Fein as a party. Mr 
Hurd's preferred method of making life 
raore difficult for terror's PR men on
the hustings is to demand of all
candidates in Northern . Ireland that
-they—take-■■an outh - disavowing any -
Commitment to violence. That might 
thin out the contingent of Sinn Fein 
councillors. But Oath-taking could one 
day become.contagious ... a pledge to 
denounce Apartheid .. a  sworn alle- 
giaince tothis, that or the other ...
That'Is why the .DaUy~Xtail advocates, a 
dompiete tnin onStrrn Fein.
Hdanwlill*, we are ip no' d<n3t,3t that haif- 
a ban is better aan"no bah at all.
rDaily Mail. ‘Murder’s voice to be 
muzzled’. 20.10.88. editorial, page 61
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Daily Mail -  ‘Hurd to wipe Adams off TV screen’ 
by John Deans, news article, 19th October, 1988, page 1
Hurd to 
wipe
Adams
off TV
screen
SINN Fein spokes­
men are to be ban­
ned from TV. and 
radio from' today.
. One of the roost prominent 
causaittes Will be the oi^ ani- 
:s»fcksf* leader, W«*t Belfast 
U P Gerry Adams.
Home Secretary Douglas. 
Hurd will announce the era*- 
down, which also embnwaes the 
IRA/ifr a CoitiTnons statement,
• Ur flu ids move, pretoeia&rty. 
started a tow last night hut he 
is cietenained to starve the 
extreml&U of ‘the oxygen, of 
puMlrfty*.
atnn FMs *»d IRA. jroofce*- tom  are already banned from 
radio and TV tu the Irish 
Republic
Details m the workuigs ot the 
ban mm being kept secret until 
Mr Hurd’s statement 
; Mrs Thatcher has become 
tacreasm*iy irritated at the 
way the IRA and its political 
wing, particularly Mr Adams, t^ jx p fo itsd toe broadcast-
* But toe move was attacked 
_  Dykes, toe 'wet* Tory
for Harrow East. He said 
. „ into toe IRA’s 
oould increase su p­
port for them in Northern 
Ireland, ft would took as il toe :N3tovetro»tnt fear the IRA can 
persuade people of ‘their sick 
cause. .
Jity. the more they 
, alienate.
Northern Ireland
 _____ Mr Kevin McNa*i maia. said he did not tolnk a 
Ltmv -wouMhwHect opntoorto
• U k te r .  I f  th e  O e r a m m o i t  w as reven-hsnded, It Would todhufee s u m m  trnrn*^  l i l M l m* the Jfeubttcr^w*dc**ttog*
The most prominent Daily Mail news article (above), printed on 19th October 1988, 
has been chosen for analysis here. Although this article was not the largest Daily 
Mail article and there was no corresponding imagery, it was the only Daily Mail 
article to appear on the front page. A Princess Diana story led the front page, but the 
news article representing the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting 
ban appeared in its entirety next to it between an eighth and a quarter of a page in size. 
This news article was also chosen because it is important to illustrate how Daily Mail 
news articles also functioned to persuade readers to support the ban, like the two 
Daily Mail editorials on the previous page, albeit in less overt ways.
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The headline of the above Daily Mail news article foregrounds Gerry Adams 
and therefore the Republican Movement as the main targets of the ban: ‘Hurd to wipe 
Adams off TV screen’. An interesting lexical choice has been made to describe 
Douglas Hurd’s action against Gerry Adams. The finite verb ‘wipe’ fixes Hurd’s 
action to either mean ‘erasing’ or ‘cleaning’ Adams off the television screen. Either 
way, using such a metaphor creates imagery of Hurd physically removing Adams 
from the television screen. Although ‘wipe’ could just denote removing Adams from 
television generally, culturally ‘wipe’ connotes a process of cleaning because it is 
used in this context most often. By using the adverb ‘o ff instead of ‘from’ and the 
object ‘TV screen’ instead of ‘television’, it further fixes this cleaning connotation, 
perhaps suggesting Gerry Adams is a piece of dirt or a stain that Hurd is cleaning off.
Obviously, different readers may decode this headline in differing ways, but 
considering alternative ways in which the headline could have been constructed 
illustrates the choices made by the journalist to fix a particular meaning. For 
example, the connotations of cleaning would be absent by changing the finite verb 
‘wipe’ to ‘take’. Or, if the headline was more accurate, it could have simply read 
‘Hurd to ban Adams from broadcast media’, but it would be less dramatic and 
entertaining and therefore less attention-grabbing. The fact that this is a newspaper 
front page (although not the lead story) contributes to a slight generic difference in 
that it is, to use a fishing metaphor, bait for the reader, that is, a news hook.
Nevertheless, it is significant that Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, is singled 
out, rather than any of the Loyalist organisations, suggesting to the reader that he is 
the main threat and therefore the main target of the ban. In this instance, such 
foregrounding can be attributed to journalists wrongly assuming the broadcasting ban 
would only apply to the Republican Movement as this Daily Mail news article was 
printed on the day the British government was introducing the ban. However 
mistaken, foregrounding the Republican Movement would encourage newspaper 
readers to see the IRA and Sinn Fein as the only threat in the Northern Ireland 
conflict. Furthermore, as illustrated in the previous chapter, such foregrounding by 
journalists continued once it was clear the broadcasting ban applied to Republican and 
Loyalist organisations anyway.
The focus on Sinn Fein and Gerry Adams continues in the first two sentences: 
‘Sinn Fein spokesmen are to be banned from TV and radio from today. One of the 
most prominent casualties will be the organisation’s leader, West Belfast MP Gerry
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Adams’ (Ibid.). The lexical choices used to describe Sinn Fein and Gerry Adams are 
respectfully formal and neutral. Similarly, in the next sentence the IRA is 
foregrounded, but it is not labelled as a terrorist organisation: ‘Home Secretary 
Douglas Hurd will announce the crackdown, which also embraces the IRA, in a 
Commons statement’ (Ibid.). However, both Sinn Fein and the IRA are collocated 
with ‘extremism’ in the next sentence: ‘Mr Hurd’s move, predictably, started a row 
last night but he is determined to starve the extremists of ‘the oxygen of publicity’ 
(Ibid.). This sentence acknowledges there is opposition to the ban, but its seriousness 
and credibility is questioned by referring to it as a ‘row’ and by excluding the identity 
of important social actors concerned, how many of them there are, and the reasons for 
their opposition. Instead, there is a switch of focus to reasons for supporting the ban, 
that is, starving ‘the extremists’ of ‘the oxygen of publicity’.
As the narrative thus far has concerned the conflict between the British 
government and the Republican Movement, it is highly likely that ‘the extremists’ 
being starved of ‘the oxygen of publicity’ will be identified by the newspaper readers 
as either Sinn Fein or the IRA or both. Using such a pejorative label obviously 
connotes irrational, potentially violent, action and by collocating such action with 
particular organisations functions to delegitimise them and justify censoring them. 
The ‘terrorists must be starved of the oxygen of publicity’ discourse is clearly evoked 
here even though the label of ‘extremists’ is used instead of ‘terrorists’.
Another supporting discourse is circulated in the next sentence, the ‘similar 
ban in Irish Republic’ discourse: ‘Sinn Fein and IRA spokesmen are already banned 
from radio and TV in the Irish Republic’ (Ibid.). Again the emphasis is on the 
Republican Movement, which continues the collocation between Republicans and 
‘extremism’ from the sentence before. By acknowledging that they are banned in the 
Irish Republic already, this dominant discourse functions to normalise the 
broadcasting ban in Britain.
Although it is a statement of fact, choosing to express this discourse over all 
others is ideological because it excludes information that would question introducing 
a similar ban in Britain. For example, there was an alternative discourse about the ban 
in the Irish Republic, which was rarely expressed, but nonetheless functioned to 
oppose the ban because it suggested the ban in the Irish Republic was flawed. If the 
Daily Mail journalist had acknowledged that discourse in the same sentence or in a 
following sentence the meaning would have completely altered from a discourse that
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supported the ban to one that opposed it because if the ban in the Irish Republic is 
flawed and the British broadcasting ban is similar then the British one could be or 
would be flawed also.
Arguably, the next three sentences do not contain significant ideological 
features, nor do they express any supporting or opposing discourses. The first of 
these three sentences informs the reader that the full details of the ban are not 
available until Douglas Hurd officially introduces the ban: ‘Details of the workings of 
the ban are being kept secret until Mr Hurd’s statement’. The next sentence explains 
how the ban will be legislated: ‘However, new legislation has been ruled out and the 
Home Secretary, it is understood, will rely on his existing powers under the BBC 
charter and the law which set up the Independent Broadcasting Authority’. The last of 
these three sentences suggests why the ban will not apply to British newspapers: ‘The 
ban does not apply to newspapers because it would require a major change in the law 
and be extremely difficult to enforce’.
The remaining sentences do contain significant ideological features and 
express both supporting and opposing discourses. In the next sentence, the ‘terrorists 
must be starved of the oxygen of publicity’ discourse is circulated: ‘Mrs Thatcher has 
become increasingly irritated at the way the IRA and its political wing, particularly 
Mr Adams have exploited the broadcasting media’. This is considered a supporting 
discourse because by suggesting that Sinn Fein have exploited the broadcasting 
media, it functions to gain support for action to prevent it. The last six sentences in 
the Daily Mail news article feature opposing discourses, which are expressed through 
verbatim reported speech. A Tory MP’s opposition to the ban is represented in four 
of these sentences:
But the move was attacked by Hugh Dykes, the ‘wet’ Tory MP for Harrow 
_ East. He said: ‘It would play into the IRA’s hands and could increase support 
for them in Northern Ireland. It would look as if the Government fear the IRA 
can persuade people of their sick cause. In reality, the more they appear, the 
more they alienate the decent, moderate majority.’
The first interesting lexical choice in these sentences is the finite verb representing the 
social actor’s opposition to the ban. As with the representation of Roy Hattersley’s 
opposition in The Sun newspaper article, ‘attack’ is chosen to represent his opposition, 
which arguably exaggerates the depth of Hugh Dyke’s opposition in the following 
sentences. There is also another significant lexical choice in the naming of the social
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actor, which arguably attempts to discredit him and therefore his opposition to the ban 
before he is allowed to express it. Labelling Hugh Dykes as the ‘wet’ Tory MP for 
Harrow East represents him as a ‘weak’ and ‘pathetic’ politician who is not ‘strong’ 
or ‘brave’ enough to support the British government introducing censorship. Even so, 
like Roy Hattersley again, Hugh Dyke’s opposition represented in the Daily Mail 
newspaper article is based on tactics, not principles. The opposing discourse he 
expresses first, which argues that the ban is beneficial to the IRA does oppose the ban, 
but only because of how it could make the government appear.
This discourse leads into another opposing discourse, which argues IRA and 
Sinn Fein media appearances harm themselves. This opposing discourse is also 
considered tactical because although it did oppose the ban it does so whilst attempting 
to discredit the Republican Movement. This is clearly the case in this instance as the 
IRA’s cause is described as ‘sick’, which suppresses the political motivations of 
Republicans and suggests they are driven by some kind of psychopathic or evil 
tendency. In addition, Hugh Dykes suggests that those who are alienated by IRA 
statements are ‘decent’, ‘moderate’ and the ‘majority’, which implies those who are 
not alienated by IRA statements must be ‘immoral’, ‘extreme’ and the ‘minority’.
The final two sentences in this Daily Mail news article feature opposing 
discourses from the Labour Party’s Northern Ireland spokesman, which are expressed 
through non-verbatim reported speech:
Labour’s Northern Ireland spokesman Mr Kevin McNamara, said he did not 
think a ban would affect opinion in Ulster. If the Government was even- 
handed, it would include Loyalist terrorists, as did RTE, the Republic’s 
broadcasting authority.
The social actor Kevin McNamara is named formally and respectfully, but it is the 
first occasion any social actor outside of the Conservative Party has been called on to 
speak and he was last to be called to speak, suggesting a lack of importance. His non­
verbatim reported speech in the first sentence evokes the ‘public capable of making 
own judgement’ discourse.48 Arguably, this functions to suggest that the ban is not 
necessary because people have already chosen sides in the conflict, especially in 
Northern Ireland, and therefore banning particular organisations from the broadcast 
media will not change the outcome. The discourse present in the next sentence only 
appeared in newspaper articles before the broadcasting ban was officially introduced
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by Douglas Hurd in the House of Commons. This is because it was not clear whether 
the ban would only apply to Republican organisations or whether it would cover 
Loyalist organisations too. Kevin McNamara believed the ban would only apply to 
Republicans and so criticised the British government’s ban on these grounds.
Daily Mail -  summary:
The Daily Mail journalist has made similar choices to the journalist employed 
by The Sun. He too has foregrounded Sinn Fein and the IRA as the main target of the 
ban although for a different reason, that is, the article was written before the British 
government officially introduced the broadcasting ban. Predicting that the ban will 
only apply to Republican organisations is a testimony to the dominant discourse that 
the Republican Movement is the ‘enemy’ and as such is a threat to ‘us’ that needs to 
be silenced rather than spoken with. The Daily Mail journalist only calls on elite 
social actors to speak resulting in dominant discourses being present and principled 
alternative discourses being absent.
The Guardian
Both newspapers representative of the ‘quality’ press featured considerably more 
articles than newspapers representative of the ‘popular’ press and the ‘mid-market’ 
press, but it was The Guardian that had the most. Although The Guardian did not 
support the ban, it certainly did not oppose it either. Its first editorial concerning the 
ban was, at best, ambivalent {The Guardian, MR HURD’S BLANKET OF IRA 
SILENCE, 20.10.88). That said, its editorial representing the BBC strike against the 
ban was supportive of their resistance {The Guardian, THIS STRIKE IS RIGHT, 
AND DEADLY SERIOUS, 04.11.88). These editorials can be seen on the next page.
A Guardian newspaper article has been chosen for analysis here rather than a 
Telegraph newspaper article for two reasons. Firstly, Guardian articles constituted 
more than a third of the total newspaper articles representing the British government 
introducing the broadcasting ban. Secondly, The Guardian is less conservative than 
The Daily Telegraphy which provides a break from the The Sun and Daily Mail textual 
analyses in terms of their overt support for the ban and an opportunity to explore how 
a liberal ‘quality’ newspaper represented the broadcasting ban.
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Mr Hurd’s 
blanket 
of IRA
silence
I r-StaTri State should think w«m toe* I 
i pablt of scenting r.tdk duplicities 
I Even to, it is possible that such ln- 
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support among young people. and ; 
! the Government would he tight to:
i  ial» that very seriously; —  1
s Bat on the basis of yesterday’s 
statement there is much to fee 
weighed on the other side. So much 
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tensions deserve to be judged first of j  the eavirptament. roads and the rest.
sOPBlte blanked out ? How do you 
cope with Sitto Fein’s presence, up- 
parallelled in the Republic, to local 
government’ Whatever its owr>~ 
riding purpose, it is deeply em- 
broifei to arguments over ’
an on that test. The Horn* Secretary 
gave two main grounds for his ac-
Can Sts views be reported ? If toey 
can't. won’t shat greatly boost its 
chances ef representing these mea­ner!. Jlrst, the broadcasting of such , ,„,.w
mterviews after epitpdos of woience I sure*, however dishonestly, as tito- 
offend many who see tad hear them, I crimination 'age!art the wider !
republican ccnmutalty ? And how I 
■ will the exemption for election cov­
erage work ? Couldn’t it. as Mr Hat- 
rerttey suggested in the Commons 
yesfKday.''*ef"o<r* Whole now pro- 
peeanda campaign with Stoa Fein 
oandktate* naming *s Gounn, Rich­
mond and Replug *
Thee* and other probteta* and 
ancmahts threaten the whole de­
sign. Bur Mr Sard's fciaaave needs 
also to be considered in the light of the baleful othtudf of this Gifvsm-
ment to the broadcast media (in 
sharp and etajuem contrast to its 
in the face of news-
Hurd's concern about the ’’wide- 
spread offence” given to viewers fey 
toleration and radio coverage as it doceto«h«p»p?fpihduitopEaabfts.
There is much else to routine news 
coverage which dtotucj&toany view- 
ea andwhtcbwUl SfeWibtTw tTnv- 
tng them before long to write totters 
of complaint to tord Ren-Mogg. 
Gould Mr Hurd's now principle be 
widened acru-ss the free of TV news 
reporting ? Tbe Governs]tint's own 
backbenchers some of them bruised 
in past battles over official secrew. 
ought to be as vigilant in these mat­
ters as the opposition parties given 
this Government's recant for men­
acing those — and especially broad- 
caster* — whg get to its way or seek 
to impede its- will.
Thai to true, bat it would surely 
slieneto such people rather than 
building support f*r terrorism. ;
Second, th*.trrroriito,draw awart i 
and susterssnce from getting direct 1 
access to an audience rather than : 
operating shrcugfe SnteracdSartes as : 
they do when they talk to the Frees, i
Wnar MrtturH rc itnMii has in mind I
to ttot Image of gentto reason which :
Sian Fern spokesmen attempt to ex­
ude, to contrast to tbe bloody death- 
dwthng methods they slsswhsre tup 
port, the epitome of this approach 
being Mr Gary Adams, who with 
his cosy sweaserj auti pigae-iBigfti aiv
most be mistaken by the unwary for 1 paper excesses.) The iatreduetion of i 
an advertisement for S! Bruno. But * this new prohibition thrsngh the i 
where tbe Home Secretary errs is in i medium of existing kgtototkm cov- 
his apparest asuniptiar, that view- i erirtg foe BSC and 23A would be 
ere are fcoied It seems odd that a I worrying at any time; with Spy- 
-Wrerotneekwhieh to-to-«aBy»&es |  oateher-mid -GGHO-ae-foesb-m -the i 
spheres trass people to judge for | mind it becomes positively atom- J 
themselves and condemns the ; tog. That applies as much to Mr s
TThe Guardian. ‘Mr Hurd’s blanket of IRA silence’.
20.10.88. editorial, page 221
This strike 
is right, 
and deadly 
serious :
ON the one hand as Mr J!u$o Young was musing this week) leader columns don’t often say (hat a Strike — any strike, 
anywhere in Britain — is sensible.
por£'Cbrthe ottSfcr hand, next Thors 
day’s strike by BBCioamalists.it all 
of those things. It to a strike of des ­
peration and of principle: and it de­
serves xympathy and apptouse.
One thing, as ever in political Hfe. 
ims gone with another to produce 
the qpprcssed isobuiott that broad­
casting jounigltots fee). 11 isn’t )ust 
the ban os Ston Fein interviews, tbe 
final match that ignited this particu­
lar bonfire — though that is bad 
enough, .4 0 4  *ot ac better in Wedhe|day’s iConrtpons debate as 
Mr Daagm Vina vamped ltto way 
through a hundred more flimsy 
reasons for the gag. Tltp whedd pic- 
sure is more threatening than that 
fey a ton* ehafk. The'journalists 
have voted strike because they feel 
lhay must do sonunhing, tbat none- 
000  has to protest. They do«ot—by 
inference - - tbeLihot their leaders, 
their Chtrirmath-fheir Kircetpr-Gen-
,»rr>i > h e  H a v e  h ixh*  B te
job for- them- Such-foelims, though, 
contain no acrimony; only retognad 
understanding. For. next, week the 
same Douglas Hurd unveils his 
White Taper on the future of broad- 
t-ast.lng. Whilst that meldng pm of 
notion* is stirred, the future of 
cvorythtog that moves Ha screen, 
and of thejob* behisvd it. hmtg in the 
balance. The future of the BBC, the 
license foe, and” of -public sendee 
braatktosttog itselTTcmaita, politi­
cally, to be seen. The future of lode-
j seKdvnt Television News 4snto» by* thread. Tito Frattohtses of existing 
' commercial TV companies are in the 
pot. as w«8. The Independent Broad­
casting Authority to headed for tbs 
knackers' yard removed for quan- 
pocs that hare irked Mrs Thatttoer. 
Who can wonder, then, foot tbe 
grcat-end the-swxt of Bri1ish-br<witt 
castting bite thirir Up* a totlt when 
Her Majesty’s Govennaea! pifes to 
extra (tea bs restrtottotu ?  And no 
one need wonder why the journal- 
ins oa tlw groandfee) thal-ft to upto 
thetn to be counted.
By happeastaoce, 
aftemooB, the very
tirt Jitoyal Tetovtoian Sociaty to Sis 
cuss his ammment nlbm d  the Of­
ficial Secret* Act- With iso evident
term  of irony, he ttod his audience 
that the proposal* were * a charter 
for libarty." Had he arrived" a few
minutes earlier, however, he would 
have *at through * Granada presen­
tation of dtps from programme* 
trow the past decade, all of them 
raising gaeetioas bf matpnicttoe or 
deception in public life, and all of 
them, with legal certainty, doomed 
not merely to fee banned, hot never
ip fee made when Mr Hurd’s Hberty 
.charter to in operation. Contract fid­
dling at the Mtofstry of Defence. 
Sorry, (rid boy, no can show. Soppy 
'security at GCHQ Off Hows. Illegal 
telephone tapping of innocent cifi- 
xan*. Absolutely out of the euestion. 
‘(lie sense oftmpendtog losstedear 
- No big coi
Hpse. Thy growing tmpto|cnco of a 
rblnl-term Prim* Mrowtef ter any 
thiret that cause* her discomfort It 
to one thing and ait«h«r thing, and 
ancthar ajKi another. Not* ptnt-nec- 
esserily, _But a  malevolent coniunc- 
ttou of hooks and lejaas 
The ban on Sinn i ’eto Interviews, 
Bwst', b  only onepart’of the story. It 
ha* grown. If anything, worse since 
jl* rickety promuigHtKBi, vrorse a* 
. Mr Hurd has chopped and changed 
reasonlEg and cancelled bis last 
ice to btomr adcasters It* direst ef­
fect a* the BBC journalists know, is 
hot that it removes a plpe-stiRridng 
Corry Adams from screens in-fey- -BottroeBWMith-feot-thot-otr'tlre 
ground, to Botfast M-dl-ondundrrry, 
where Sum Fein MPs and loctri 
councillors, for good or ill, are pari 
of the co»motUty scene, legal, 
elected, commanding votes, tlteir 
ability to cover that ecmmanity is 
mnbned. Tbey cannot try t« reflect 
the troth. They canned serve tbe 
people who watch and listen to 
them, 80  they cannot command 
trust. They cannot do a proper job, 
That to worth a day of protest, it to 
the oatward and visible symbol of 
too much that to seedy and careless 
of cor freedoms.
and absolute. mpany, nor 
.small company, in thto clii’J climate,«i taplbKtrbieiworWtrit^  ^
of pre-production cost* into pro­
grammes that the lawyer*, and the 
politicians, rale out of court.
Many other ingredients, to fee : 
sore, can be stirred into this egre- i 
gtous uorndge of seeping repression i 
Lord Racs-Mogg, hi* public opinion i 
polls and codes of TV sex and vlo- i 
l«tce. Ttie cheerdeadhtg against the 
established order fey newspaper* -- 
which, in another part of their cor- : 
porate forest, jast bapipen to m : 
commercial opportunity in Us col- 1
rThe Guardian. ‘This strike is right and deadly serious’.
itoriaL page 221 
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The Guardian -  ‘Broadcast ban leads terror fight’, 20th October, 1988 
by John Carvel, David Hearst and David Sharrock, news article, page 1
Television curbs 'irst of series of Ulster initiatives
Broadcast 
ban leads 
terror fight
The largest and most prominent Guardian news article (above) will now be explored. 
It was the only Guardian article that led the front page with a corresponding image 
and it was the largest of all Guardian articles; between a quarter of a page and half a 
page in size. Due to the size of this news article, each sentence will not be analysed 
as this would be too protracted, but the article will be studied in depth nonetheless.
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The headline of this Guardian newspaper article is a three-deck headline with 
the largest font on the page, which signifies where the reader should enter the page 
but also that this particular news article covers the most important story of the day: 
‘Broadcast ban leads terror fight’. Arguably, it begins with a series of 
presuppositions. Firstly, it suggests that a ‘terror fight’ is actually possible and that 
there is one taking place. This presupposes that readers will ‘know’ what a ‘terror 
fight’ is, which social actors are involved and whether this means all social actors 
involved in the conflict are using ‘terror’ to fight one another or that there is a fight 
against ‘terror’ being waged by some social actors who do not use ‘terror’ against 
other social actors that do use ‘terror’.
Secondly, it suggests that media control can not only be used in the ‘terror 
fight’, but that it can lead it. The corresponding image is of Douglas Hurd and 
appears with the following caption underneath it: ‘Mr Hurd addressing the Police 
Federation yesterday’. The image identifies Douglas Hurd as the social actor who has 
introduced the broadcasting ban because his gaze is directed towards the headline and 
article. The image also represents him speaking because his mouth is open and his 
left hand is gesticulating, which suggests it is an image of him introducing the 
broadcasting ban although the caption informs otherwise. The size of the image -  
which is the same size as the entire article -  the headline, and the low angle shot 
arguably connote importance and authority, which leads to a strong and positive 
representation of Douglas Hurd.
Unlike the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ newspaper articles analysed above, 
there is also a sub-head in the Guardian article. It is written in a much smaller font 
situated above the entry point of the headline making it less significant than the 
headline, but there are still interesting lexical choices: ‘Television curbs first of series 
of Ulster initiatives’. The ban along with other policies are represented as 
‘initiatives’, which is a euphemistic label connoting a less serious meaning than, for 
example, ‘restrictions’ or ‘government restrictions’.
Similarly, the meaning of the sub-head would have been more critical if the 
ban was referred to as ‘television censorship’ instead of ‘television curbs’. In 
addition, these ‘initiatives’ are represented as ones applying to Ulster whereas the 
broadcasting ban applies to England, Scotland and Wales as well. This also 
downplays the seriousness of the ban and the other policies. The sub-head expresses 
the ‘ban just one of several anti-terrorism policies’ discourse, suggesting it will
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ffeature in the introductory section of the newspaper article. Arguably, this discourse 
functions to support the introduction of the ban because it positions the ban as just one 
of several anti-terrorism policies, reducing its significance by cushioning its 
introduction. This is especially the case when the ban and the other policies are 
represented as being justified by the summer upsurge in IRA attacks because it 
suggests IRA violence is the reason for the ban as opposed to Sinn Fein electoral 
breakthroughs, for example.
The ‘ban just one of several anti-terrorism policies’ discourse is continued in 
the first sentence of the article meaning that whether the reader skips the sub-head or 
not, this discourse is the first to be expressed in this Guardian article:
Broadcast interviews with supporters of terrorists in Northern Ireland were 
banned yesterday by the Home Secretary, Mr Douglas Hurd, in what 
government sources confirmed was the start of a series of initiatives to be 
announced ‘over the next few days and weeks’.
Whereas The Sun and Daily Mail began by identifying Republican organisations as 
the main targets of the ban and collocating them with ‘terrorism’, this Guardian 
article does not. However, there is a presupposition that ‘terrorists’ do exist, that 
some of the social actors involved in the Northern Ireland are ‘terrorists’ and that 
some are not ‘terrorists’ themselves, but are supporters of ‘terrorists’. Interestingly, 
the ‘ban just one of several anti-terrorism policies’ discourse em anates from the 
government, but the reported speech is not attributed to an individual, just to 
‘government sources’, which suggests an off-record conversation between one of the 
journalists and an official source has taken place. In the next sentence, another 
government source is called on to speak and is quoted at length expressing the 
‘offence to public’ discourse to justify the introduction of the ban:
The Northern Ireland Secretary, Mr Tom King, welcomed the ban. ‘Anyone 
who knows Northern Ireland will know how deeply offensive it is to see the 
terrorists, the paramilitaries and their allies on both sides of the community 
appearing on radio and television,’ he said.
The social actor is named formally and respectfully and uses some interesting 
rhetorical devices to fix the discourse he is expressing. He uses the pronoun ‘anyone’ 
as a rhetorical trope to suggest all who are familiar with Northern Ireland know how 
offensive the ‘terrorists’, paramilitaries and their allies on both sides of the
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community appearing on radio and TV. Therefore, the suggestion is that if you fail to 
recognize that you must be ignorant about Northern Ireland. Tom King also 
demarcates ‘the terrorists’ and ‘the paramilitaries’, which suggests he believes the 
combatants on one side of the conflict are ‘terrorists’ and the others are not. Although 
he does not say which organisations he deems to be ‘terrorists’, it is most likely the 
case that he means Republican combatants are ‘the terrorists’ and Loyalist combatants 
are ‘the paramilitaries’ because the dominant discourse of that decade was that the 
IRA are the main enemy of ‘Britain’ and are therefore a ‘terrorist’ organisation.
In the next four sentences the Guardian journalists speculate about other 
policies alluded to in the ‘ban just one of several anti-terrorism policies’ discourse 
before expressing the frequently used justification for them: ‘Mr King has been 
discussing new security measures with the rest of the Cabinet since the bus bomb 
attack in August in Ballygawley that killed eight soldiers’. Interestingly, the IRA’s 
agency in this action is excluded, although the IRA and Sinn Fein are foregrounded in 
the next sentence: ‘Mr Hurd’s ban on IRA, Sinn Fein and other paramilitary 
supporters was implemented immediately by directions to the broadcasting 
authorities’. This focus evokes the ‘IRA and Sinn Fein are the main targets of the 
ban’ discourse and contributes to the collocation between them and terrorism in the 
first sentence of the next paragraph, which introduces another dominant discourse, the 
‘terrorists must be starved of the oxygen of publicity’ discourse:
He said it was time to deny ‘this easy platform for those who use it to 
propagate terrorism’. He denied that it amounted to censorship and claimed he 
was merely putting the broadcasters on the same footing as print journalists. A 
similar ban already applies in the Irish Republic.
The presupposition that there was actually an easy platform for (Republican) social 
actors to “propagate terrorism” helps to build support for the ban because it suggests 
the Republican Movement were given the ‘oxygen of publicity’. As already noted 
above and in previous chapters, media scholarship on the Northern Ireland conflict 
reveals this ‘easy platform’ never existed for the Republican Movement. Suggesting 
there was, however, functions to support the introduction of the ban because such 
censorship would ensure the ‘easy platform’ is taken away from the ‘terrorists’. This 
advantage for the British government in the propaganda war seems to have been the 
motivation behind the orthodox academics and British politicians making such claims.
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The following two sentences by the Guardian journalists contain three more 
discourses that arguably function to support the introduction of the ban: the ‘ban is not 
censorship’ discourse, the ‘ban puts broadcasters on same footing as print journalists’ 
discourse and the ‘similar ban in Irish Republic’ discourse. Although these three 
discourses emanate from Douglas Hurd, none of them are verbatim reported speech. 
This allows the Guardian journalists to subtly imply some doubt in the credibility of 
Douglas Hurd’s remarks by using particular quoting verbs. For example, writing that 
Douglas Hurd ‘denied that it amounted to censorship’, suggests that there has been or 
will be an accusation that the broadcasting ban is censorship. It could also suggest 
that the ban is, in fact, censorship. Similarly, the quoting verb ‘claimed’ casts some 
doubt on the ‘ban puts broadcasters on same footing as print journalists’ discourse. 
The last sentence in this paragraph is interesting because the discourse underlining 
‘there’s a similar ban in Irish Republic’ is not attributed to Douglas Hurd or other 
social actors from the British government. This is significant because constructing 
this discourse without agency of its origin naturalises such a supporting discourse.
It is important to note that all those called on to speak thus far have been 
members of the British cabinet, which has meant all the discourses have supported the 
introduction of the broadcasting ban. However, the Guardian journalists then 
introduce many more social actors that express opposing discourses as well as some 
more supporting discourses. Two social actors from the broadcast media provide 
reported speech in the next six sentences although the Guardian journalists give the 
impression that there are more by using metonymy.
In reality, the BBC and ITN cannot literally speak because they are 
institutions. Representatives of such institutions can speak, but representing the 
institutions as speaking suggests the discourses expressed by them are representative 
of all that work there, whereas it actually refers to the opinions of management. It is 
clear~from a news article in another newspaper (.Daily Telegraph, DAMAGING 
PRECEDENT SAYS BBC, 20.10.88) printed on the same day as the one written by the 
Guardian journalists that it was the BBC Chairman, Mr Marmaduke Hussey that 
expresses the two opposing discourses to the ban. These opposing discourses are: the 
‘ban sets a damaging precedent’ discourse and the ‘ban will make media reporting of 
Northern Ireland incomplete’ in the first sentence of the Guardian news article being 
analysed in this chapter and it was ITN’s editor, Mr David Nicholas, that continued 
the latter discourse:
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The BBC described the ban as a ‘dangerous precedent’ that would make 
Northern Ireland coverage incomplete, and Independent Television News said 
the public was determined to defeat terrorism precisely because broadcasting 
had been so full and free to date.
Although the two opposing discourses are legitimate and based on principles as 
opposed to tactics, there are several questionable presuppositions expressed by ‘ITN’, 
which arguably serve an ideological function. For example, to suggest the ‘public’ 
was determined to defeat ‘terrorism’ presupposes that ‘terrorism’ does exist and that 
the public are unanimously determined to defeat it. To suggest that this is precisely 
because broadcasting had been so full and free to date presupposes that the broadcast 
media had represented the Northern Ireland conflict in a full and free way until the 
broadcasting ban whereas the evidence cited in the review of literature in chapter 2 
suggests this is a fallacy. Although the Guardian journalists do not acknowledge that 
the above ‘ITN’ statement is actually by David Nicholas, they do name him in the 
next sentence where he is quoted verbatim at length:
ITN’s editor, Mr David Nicholas, said: ‘I hope it won’t lead to further 
curtailment. The Government still accords legal status to the UDA and Sinn 
Fein. These restrictions would have been easier to understand if they had made 
those bodies illegal’.
David Nicholas states his hope that there will be no further curtailment of the media in 
the first sentence, but suggests the government should have banned the UDA and Sinn 
Fein to reduce the confusion when broadcasters interpret the censorship in the second 
and third sentences. His three sentence statement is somewhat contradictory as it 
expresses both libertarian and authoritarian positions. In other words, opposing 
discourses that recognise the ban is censorship and that direct government control of 
the media is a damaging precedent are evoked, but so are supporting discourses. 
Calling for the banning of Sinn Fein usually followed the discourse that argued the 
broadcasting ban did not go far enough, but David Nicholas does not make this 
argument yet implicitly calls for both the UDA and Sinn Fein to be banned.
Much clearer opposing discourses are represented in the next five sentences 
because non-elite social actors are called on to speak allowing alternative discourses 
to be expressed. This is a major difference between this Guardian article representing 
the ‘quality’ press and those representing the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ press,
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allowing many more critical voices to be heard. For example, the ‘ban makes Britain 
comparable to South Africa’ discourse is expressed by organised media workers: ‘The 
National Union of Journalists accused the Government of putting British broadcasters 
under much the same restrictions that applied in South Africa’. In addition, Gerry 
Adams is quoted verbatim at length, expressing opposing discourses such as the ‘ban 
is censorship’ and ‘Gerry Adams is an elected MP/SF is a political party’:
Mr Gerry Adams, the president of Sinn Fein, said: ‘Eight years ago Mrs 
Thatcher claimed that the Republican movement had no support. Now they are 
directly censoring a legal political party which has an electoral mandate. If 
they had an argument to counter the Sinn Fein view then they should be 
putting it instead of censoring us.’
Clearly, there is a significant difference between the Guardian and Sun articles in the 
choice of verbatim reported speech, which completely alters the representation of 
Gerry Adams. He is represented as a threat that is “not going to go away” in The Sun 
because of the few words chosen by the Sun journalist to express his opposition to the 
ban, whereas here he is allowed to justify his opposition to the ban with political 
arguments in the Guardian news article. This allows him to represent himself as a 
legitimate politician who is being censored by the British government.
Although this is a positive feature of the article because it allows both sides of 
the story to be expressed, the next sentence representing Gerry Adams discredits his 
previous statement somewhat: ‘Mr Adams, who is MP for West Belfast, said he 
would still not take his Westminster seat even though it would allow him a public 
voice through the Commons’. There is a major exclusion here as to why he refuses to 
take his seat, which is significant as it excludes a legitimate explanation for such an 
action. Irish Republicans pursued a policy of abstentionism because they refused to 
recognize the right of Westminster to govern Ireland (North or South). In addition, 
MPs have to swear an oath of allegiance to the Queen; Republicans could not do this.
The next social actors called on to speak represent other political parties in 
Britain and Northern Ireland, most of which express opposing discourses. The next 
sentence represents Roy Hattersley’s opposition through non-verbatim reported 
speech: ‘Mr Roy Hattersley, the shadow home secretary, condemned the move, telling 
Mr Hurd it would be used to portray the Government as the enemy of free 
expression’. This is taken from Roy Hattersley’s statement in the House of
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Commons. The Guardian journalists exclude a few significant details such as the 
identity of social actors that would use the ban to portray the Government as the 
enemy of free expression. In his statement, Roy Hattersley referred to social actors 
‘at home and abroad, especially in the United States’ (Hansard, 1988: 894). The focus 
on the US alludes to the funding of the Republican Movement by sympathetic 
Americans and is a point that Ken Livingstone overtly made in the same debate, but 
which is excluded too:
Before taking this decision, did the Home Secretary receive any briefing from 
the intelligence services on the likely impact of this decision on the flow of 
funding from Canada and North America for the IRA? If he did not, why not? 
How was it that the IRA managed to sustain itself, decade after decade, from 
the 1922 bombing campaign through into the 1930s and 1950s, without access 
to television? Is this not simply a diversion in response to the increased level 
of violence in Northern Ireland during the summer? Has the Home Secretary 
not thrown this bauble into the House of Commons, where it will be debated at 
great length, and with which the media will be obsessed because it affects 
them, rather than deal with the reeil problem, which is to find the answer to the 
violence, either by defeating terrorism, or by negotiating a peace settlement? 
(Hansard, 1988: 901)
It is worth noting that in all the newspaper articles representing the introduction of the 
broadcasting ban, there is no mention of the fact that some Americans politically and 
financially supported the Republican Movement. Likewise, Ken Livingstone is never 
called on to speak, which reduces the parameters of debate in British newspapers and 
therefore amongst its readers. For example, there is no discourse in any newspaper 
article based on the last question he asks, which opens the possibility of a negotiated 
peace settlement being a much better solution to the Northern Ireland conflict than 
media censorship. Similarly, the discourse representing the ban as a diversion from 
increased levels of violence in Northern Ireland expressed by Ken Livingstone is 
completely absent from newspaper representations of the ban. Although such a 
discourse was expressed in the House of Commons, all journalists chose to exclude it 
from their own reportage of the debates for and against the broadcasting ban.
Another reason for the Guardian journalists excluding the US dimension from 
Roy Hattersley’s statement could be that recognizing American support for the IRA 
would also evoke the corollary discourse that the ‘ban is beneficial to the IRA’. This 
is clearly what Roy Hattersley was expressing in his original statement when the 
sentence following the one partially quoted by the Guardian journalists is examined:
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Has he considered the damaging way in which his proposal will be used at 
home and abroad, especially in the United States, to portray the Government 
as the enemy of free expression? Has he weighed that publicity coup for the 
IRA against the advantage of keeping its representatives off television? 
(Hansard, 1988: 894)
Interestingly, a similar exclusion from the next social actor in the Guardian article 
excludes the ‘ban is beneficial to the IRA’ discourse too: ‘The Democrat leader, Mr 
Paddy Ashdown, said the Government’s own standing advisory committee on human 
rights had advised against the ban and the Government had taken the worst of all 
measures’. Again, when Paddy Ashdown’s full statement in the House of Common is 
examined, it is evident that he also opposed the ban on the same tactical grounds as 
Roy Hattersley:
Have not the Government’s own standing advisory committee on human rights 
and Lord Colville advised against such bans? The Government seem to have 
taken the worst of all possible measures. They have given the IRA a 
propaganda coup. They have left it open to it to put its view through the 
newspapers; they have left Sinn Fein still a legal organisation which is denied 
the right of access to a free press; and they have established a dangerous 
precedent by using the Broadcasting Act in this manner. (Hansard, 1988: 895)
It appears these exclusions are related to the narrative of this Guardian article because 
it would be tedious to represent several social actors expressing the same opposing 
discourse. However, it could be argued that there is an ideological motive too 
because the social actor chosen to more overtly express the ‘ban is beneficial to the 
IRA’ discourse does so by naming the IRA (and the UDA) pejoratively unlike the 
other two social actors quoted above. A few sentences below those representing Roy 
Hattersley and Paddy Ashdown’s opposition, another social actor expresses the ‘ban 
is beneficial to the IRA’ discourse, but this time it is included in reported speech:
The deputy leader o f the Social Democratic Labour Party, Mr Seamus Mallon, 
warned: “You are doing exactly what the gangsters in the IRA and UDA want. 
They are now laughing all the way to the European and district council 
elections.”
Representing IRA and UDA members as ‘gangsters’ is significant because it 
discredits their political motivations. ‘Gangsterism’ denotes a particular kind of crime 
that is driven solely by making money and connotes a lifestyle of violent mob wars
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motivated by securing monopolies on drug dealing and loan sharking as opposed to 
more principled historical and political motivations for violence. Interestingly, 
although Seamus Mallon’s statement is represented as verbatim, it actually differs to 
what he said and how he said it in Parliament. He asked Hurd a series of questions, 
one of which is represented in this Guardian article, but as a statement rather than a 
question and several words are changed, which have been underlined below:
Will the Secretary of State accept that the real damage will be done, not to the 
UDA or the Provisional IRA, but to the highest standards of judicial and legal 
practice in this country? Does he accept that he is doing exactly what the 
gangsters in the Provisional IRA and the UDA want him to do? Those 
organisations will be laughing all the way to the European election and the 
district council elections because they now have the street issue that they did 
not previously have. (Hansard, 1988: 897)
Also of interest in Seamus Mallon’s statement in the House of Commons is the 
question he asks, which the Guardian journalists chose to exclude from the reported 
speech they attribute to him. Arguably, this is also an ideological choice because if 
the Guardian journalists did want to turn that question into a statement they could 
have just as easily written:
The deputy leader of the Social Democratic Labour Party, Mr Seamus Mallon, 
warned: “The real damage will be done, not to the UDA or the Provisional 
IRA, but to the highest standards of judicial and legal practice in this country.”
This would have expressed a more critical discourse, opposing the ban on a principled 
basis by arguing it would damage British legal standards. That would have also 
avoided having to exclude crucial aspects from what Roy Hattersley and Paddy 
Ashdown said a few sentences above. One possible explanation for all these choices 
is that the Guardian journalists wanted to represent the IRA and UDA in a hostile 
way, but wanted to use a social actor to do this because The Guardian is supposed to 
be a ‘quality’ newspaper and generic conventions prohibit use of such propagandists 
terms in news articles where only the opinions of social actors can be conveyed.
The next social actors called on to speak in the Guardian news article are both 
Unionists who express discourses supporting the ban, which were coded as the ‘ban is 
justified/right/sensible’ discourse (for Ken Maginnis) and the ‘ban is not enough, Sinn 
Fein should be proscribed’ discourse (for Ian Paisley):
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Unionist reaction was muted. Mr Ken Maginnis, the Official Unionist security 
spokesman, welcomed the ban, but the Reverend Ian Paisley, leader of the 
Democratic Unionists, said that nothing short of a total ban on Sinn Fein 
would satisfy them.
Although it is excluded in this Guardian article, Ken Maginnis did give a reason as to 
why he welcomed the ban, evoking the ‘ban will prevent Sinn Fein influencing young 
people’ discourse49 in his House of Commons statement (Hansard, 1988: 896). The 
remaining eleven sentences of the Guardian news article provide specific details 
about the broadcasting ban such as which Northern Irish organizations it applies to, 
what is and what is not allowed under the ban, how satellite television will be 
impacted by it and which aspect of laws are being used to allow the ban. Such 
information would help the reader understand the ban and allow better informed 
opinions. This is a major difference between this Guardian article and those 
newspaper articles representing the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ press because such 
information is simply not available. Whilst there is little ideological significance in 
the remaining sentences, Douglas Hurd and a Home Office representative are used as 
sources. Clare Dyer, the legal editor of The Guardian, is also quoted.
The Guardian -  summary:
This Guardian article clearly provides more information than the above 
articles representative of the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ press and allows alternative 
discourses that are excluded by The Sun and Daily Mail to be expressed by calling on 
the NUJ and Gerry Adams to speak. It is the first time that the NUJ is allowed to 
speak, which means the alternative discourse that compares the British government to 
the South African government is expressed for the first time. Gerry Adams is called 
on to speak in The Sun article, but his reported speech is taken out of context to 
represent him in a threatening manner. In this Guardian article, however, his reported 
speech is far more extensive, which means he is represented in a much more positive 
way as it actually contains the legitimate political arguments he expressed.
Having said that, the Guardian journalists make several presuppositions about 
‘terrorism’, foreground the IRA and Sinn Fein as the main targets of the ban and 
exclude particular social actors that express alternative discourses. For example, Ken 
Livingstone also participated in the House of Commons debate from which many of 
the social actors represented in this Guardian article are quoted, yet the discourses he
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expressed are absent. Ken Livingstone expressed the fact that much of the 
Republican Movement’s funding was donated by sympathetic American citizens. He 
also suggested one possible solution to the Northern Ireland conflict was a negotiated 
peace settlement. Excluding such alternative discourses from this Guardian article is 
a significant and ideological choice.
Many more social actors and discourses are absent in these news articles and 
editorials representative of the ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’ and ‘quality’ press. If the 
journalists and editors responsible for the above articles had included more critical 
voices, it would have given newspaper readers access to principled opposition to the 
broadcasting ban. The exception to this general pattern of excluding critical social 
actors and thereby their principled opposing discourses can be seen in the next 
newspaper, which was the only newspaper to take an editorial line that overtly 
opposed the British government introducing the broadcasting ban.
Daily Mirror
The Daily Mirror was the only newspaper with an editorial line that was overtly 
critical of the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Although taking 
a brave and praiseworthy editorial position defending media freedom in Britain, Daily 
Mirror news articles representing the introduction of the broadcasting ban were 
similar to those of its ‘popular’ press rival, The Sun. There were few Daily Mirror 
articles representing the introduction of the ban and those that did were small and 
overwhelmingly featured elite social actors as sources. Another similarity between 
Daily Mirror articles and those of all the other newspapers sampled was that IRA 
members were represented as ‘terrorists’ and the Republican Movement, particularly 
Gerry Adams, was identified as the main target of the broadcasting ban.
„  That said, Daily Mirror j oumalists did try to persuade their readers to question 
the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban by expressing 
discourses challenging the ban much earlier in the news articles and by giving such 
discourses and the social actors expressing them more copy space than newspapers 
supporting the broadcasting ban (see the Daily Mirror news articles below). As there 
were more similarities than differences between Daily Mirror news articles and those 
of other newspapers in the sample, especially The Sun, the Daily Mirror editorial that 
did differ from the editorials o f the other newspapers will be explored here.
174
IBA tBPPOP flag
Is on the way
CURBS an Press and TV interviews with eawi Feta and
uy nome secretary Douglas Huru 
But the news wtll enrage MPs who believe any 
ban could play into the hands of the terrorists.
Premier Margaret Thatcher and Ulster Secretary 
Tata King believe the n»c—"■"n ♦*—
But rebel. Tory HP 
Hugh Dykes has de­
clared: ''Banning IBA 
sympathisers from i*»ing 
broadcast would play into the IRA's hands.
"It would look as If the 
Government (cars the
o f l h ^ ^ S S L ^ 1*
1 ByMMMOH REPORIUI |
they alienate the decent 
moderate majority.
■ 1  think authoritarian 
trends today are disturb 
ing MPs tnaol parts of the 
House.”
"More
[Daily Mirror -  ‘IRA terror gag is on the way’, 
By Anon., 19.10.88 , news article, page 2]
OCFIANT
derated U ni U* tone ha* 
or to dm? thU 
tty  o la tfsra  to tn'ite 
«te tue II to propagate 
terrontzr.” Mr n ld
mtrrv i n
H H  | tor Sa y.
The O t t r r a a x s l  t  d c t v u i  iS M fd ltM y
I to  U t o V  devoir k-wJrrltor Hmmnimj aa 
a l t e M l  d |k t ccBtiwt »m « to > ______
^ S S S A n r'S t ^ !riErac»ta uu wrtWiM oan i _
p l l o l  wtnc. ftrm  JTktn 
Me dertwre Wc nr
iyScZSr
saarmnditm 
• . . . oatanttMarr
I V j  ra-eat not fee »
by tor Mb ewrnunrnt.
SM SMtr Hmmt Jac- 
rmn Mr HMtante?
Ht Mk Mt « m m 
mme* tttotoN  
yW  M MMiof lW
Mr lofct tor f m i w  
to  aayonr M p p o ^ S t
The CM: tod Mjb ex­
clude l a r t t r n  la  U>* cim» i^ are wawn
Mr H-jrd o l d  tntor 
rid** *iU> nrprrarata 
l l a a a  o f  t e r r o r l e l  
N C U lu U tM  after u
mum* kt< rtiHtd 
"csdeapread ofter.ee 
(OiouaMotl
'The Otmnmuol to*
S«?SSE^S
ucuve t i  tod m l  Ufht 
•Camel, w rm tai*.
n  wuuM oak* tor Oo» 
r m a n t  look boU. re 
K to h r  end rtdkakhn 
Many MPa oWactow to 
toe ban auto a  * o J d  ac­
tually bead U* lerruneta 
•  pro*>**a«da weapon
rS D tP M T  Eddie
Proceataet firebrand 
laa  Paul«> eald Uvara 
‘ add have baea a total 
l aaSkmlf t to
[Daily Mirror -  ‘IRA’s front-men gagged by Hurd’, 
By Julia Langdon, 20.10.88 , news article, page 2]
175
Daily Mirror -  ‘Bankrupt, base, bad’, 21st October, 1988, editorial, page 2
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The above Daily Mirror editorial was between a quarter of a page and half a page in 
size and was prominent because it appeared at the top of page 2. The headline 
immediately indicates the Daily Mirror's overt opposition to the ban by using a pun 
combined with alliteration of negative adjectives to describe the ban: ‘Bankrupt, base, 
bad’. The pun is present in the first adjective ‘bankrupt’ as the first syllable is ‘ban’, 
which suggests the ban is bankrupt. This lexical choice clearly functions to oppose 
the introduction of the ban because bankrupt, although literally means financial ruin, 
can also be used to refer to ethical impoverishment as represented in the phrase 
‘morally bankrupt’. Arguably, it is in this latter sense that the Daily Mirror editorial 
intends its use as the remainder of the headline and the content of the editorial attests.
The next lexical choice in the headline, ‘base’, continues this opposition 
because when this word is used as an adjective instead of a noun or verb, it suggests 
the ban is ‘dishonourable’, ‘corrupt’, ‘immoral’, etc. The last lexical choice, ‘bad’, is 
the most obvious and literal criticism of the ban and completes the alliteration of the 
three adjectives, which all begin with the same two letters: ‘Bankrupt, base, bad’. As 
with The Sun, the Daily Mirror uses linguistic devices that characterise the ‘popular’ 
press, but in this case they are used to criticise the government and its introduction of 
the broadcasting ban. Interestingly though, both The Sun and the Daily Mirror have 
chosen to use a very similar form of alliteration that stems from ‘ban’ with the former 
using ‘b’ sounds and the latter using ‘ba’ sounds.
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The courage of the Daily Mirror editorial is further displayed by criticising all 
the newspapers it (correctly) perceives to have supported the British government’s 
introduction of the broadcasting ban. Although it begins by foregrounding Sinn Fein 
and the IRA as the main targets of the ban, it is one of the few occasions where they 
are not collocated with terrorism: ‘The British papers are in two minds about the ban 
on the BBC and ITV talking to Sinn Fein and the IRA’. The focus is mainly on how 
British newspapers responded to the ban rather than representing the Republican 
Movement in a hostile way.
This focus is continued in the next sentence and is a crucial part of the critical 
narrative in the editorial: ‘Some of them will swallow anything Mrs Thatcher says. 
They are not newspapers. They are Tory Party house newspapers’. This constructs 
particular British newspapers as little more than Tory propaganda platforms or 
‘mouthpieces’ (to borrow a phrase from these newspapers themselves). Considering 
how Sun, Mail, Express and Telegraph editorials represented the British government’s 
introduction of the broadcasting ban, it is certainly a fair criticism.
That said, it could be argued there is a significant exclusion in this first 
sentence of this Daily Mirror editorial, which generalises the editorial positions of 
British newspapers to the actual news and op-ed articles of them. By not overtly 
recognising that this Daily Mirror editorial is referring to British newspaper editorials 
being divided on whether to support or oppose the British government’s introduction 
of the broadcasting ban, it misrepresents this crucial generic difference. As stated 
earlier, while there was a clear difference in British newspaper editorials on the ban, 
the majority of news articles had more features in common across all the British 
newspapers sampled, including the Daily Mirror itself.
In the next four sentences the Daily Mirror editorial singles out the Daily 
Express, Daily Mail, The Times and The Daily Telegraph as British newspapers that 
welcomed the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban. Although 
the Daily Mirror editorial suggests such newspapers discredit themselves for 
supporting government censorship over the broadcast media by quoting sections from 
their own editorials, it does this further by reminding its readers about historical 
examples of shameful editorial positions taken by these newspapers.
For example, the Daily Mirror editorial reminds its readers that the Daily Mail 
supported Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists before quoting its support for 
the broadcasting ban: ‘The Daily Mail, with the enthusiasm which once led it to
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embrace British Fascism, declared: “The Home Secretary is abundantly justified’” . 
Although the verbatim quote is obviously a small section from the Mail editorial, it is 
representative of its overt support, which advocates a complete ban on Sinn Fein and 
argues ‘half a ban is better than no ban at all’ {Daily Mail, MURDER’S VOICE TO 
BE MUZZLED, 20.10.88).
The following four sentences in the Daily Mirror editorial identify the 
Financial Times, Guardian, Independent and Today as British newspapers that 
opposed the ban or were ambivalent towards it in the case of The Guardian. As these 
newspapers did not support the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting 
ban, they are represented much more positively, especially those which the Daily 
Mirror editorial suggests overtly opposed the ban. This is illustrated in the different 
ways in which Guardian and Independent editorials are represented: ‘The Guardian, 
as ever, wobbled but confessed it was all “alarming.” The Independent said stoutly: 
“Democracies do not best confound their enemies by silencing them.’”
By representing The Guardian as wobbling on whether to support or oppose 
the ban, the Daily Mirror editorial suggests its editorial position was irresolute, 
vacillating between supporting and opposing it. However, by adding ‘as ever’ before 
‘wobbled’ it fixes the meaning more towards representing The Guardian as 
‘cowardly’ and ‘weak’ because it suggests this newspaper is always indecisive. Using 
the quoting verb ‘confessed’ further fixes this meaning because it suggests that in 
spite of its indecisiveness, it was still forced to concede or admit that the introduction 
of the ban was worrying or ‘alarming’. In contrast, the representation of The 
Independent editorial is much more positive using the adjective ‘stoutly’ to modify 
the quoting verb ‘said’. ‘Stoutly’ suggests resoluteness and represents The 
Independent as defiant and firmly opposed to the ban unlike The Guardian.
Although The Guardian editorial is ambivalent towards the ban, 
simultaneously expressing discourses that support and oppose the ban and only 
opposing the ban on tactical grounds, it is somewhat misrepresented by the Daily 
Mirror editorial. The only Guardian direct quote used in the Daily Mirror editorial, 
‘alarming’, is taken out of context more than any other newspaper because it is the 
least quoted editorial of all with just one word whereas all the others are given a 
sentence or a meaningful part of a sentence at least. This oversimplifies the already 
complicated deliberation in the Guardian editorial, but it does still accurately 
represent the liberal cowardice of this particular Guardian editorial.
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It is in the remaining five sentences in the Daily Mirror editorial where it 
expresses its own opposition to the British government’s introduction of the 
broadcasting ban. The opposing discourses represented are mostly principled and the 
most critical alternative discourse is not expressed in any other news article, editorial 
or op-ed analysed in the sample of this research. The first of the remaining four 
sentences evokes the ‘ban illustrates failure of British government policy in Northern 
Ireland’ discourse50 and links back to the headline of the editorial by fixing how it 
intends the adjective ‘bankrupt’ to be understood by the reader: ‘The Daily Mirror 
says that to end the freedom of reporting after 20 years of troubles in Ireland shows 
the bankruptcy of the Government’s policy for the province’.
Although this sentence expresses an alternative discourse that opposes the ban 
on principles, this construction is based on a significant presupposition that reporting 
the Northern Ireland conflict had been free until the British government introduced 
the broadcasting ban. It is true the ban was the first time direct censorship was used 
over the British media in the Northern Ireland conflict, but indirect government 
pressure which led to self-censorship was practiced since partition, increasing from 
the beginning of the conflict and continuing throughout. That said, this sentence 
clearly criticises the ban and the British government’s entire Northern Ireland policy 
as the former is represented as ending freedom of reporting and the latter as bankrupt.
Also of significance is the representation of the Northern Ireland conflict as 
‘troubles in Ireland’. This construction simultaneously draws from dominant and 
alternative discourses. Referring to the conflict as ‘troubles’ rather than ‘insurgency’ 
or ‘war’ derives from the dominant representation of the Northern Ireland conflict, 
which functions to minimise the seriousness of it. Referring to the conflict as taking 
place in Ireland as opposed to ‘Northern Ireland’ or ‘Ulster’, however, originates from 
the alternative representation of the Northern Ireland conflict. Such a representation 
functions to oppose the British presence in Ireland by representing the island of 
Ireland in its totality, drawing attention to the partition of it that created the Irish 
Republic and Northern Ireland.
The discourse expressed by the Daily Mirror in the next sentence is also an 
alternative discourse that radically opposes the ban on principled grounds by 
representing such censorship as making the British government comparable to the 
South African government: ‘When we copy the behaviour of the South African 
Government then we should stop and think’. It is important to remember that the
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South African government was internationally boycotted because of its racist 
Apartheid system. Although the British government opposed this boycott until 
Margaret Thatcher could no longer maintain her position that Nelson Mandela and the 
African National Congress (ANC) were ‘terrorists’, advocates of human and civil 
rights in Britain and across the world had always viewed the Apartheid regime as an 
authoritarian state built on racism.
To compare the British government to this for censoring its own opponents 
was therefore very radical with no other newspaper editorial making this comparison. 
In fact, the only newspaper editorial to mention Apartheid was the Daily Mail, but it 
did so in a very different, traditionally Daily Mail way. When arguing that the 
broadcasting ban was not enough and advocating a total ban on Sinn Fein, it criticised 
the British government’s policy of making Northern Ireland electoral candidates take 
an oath disavowing any commitment to violence:
That might thin out the contingent of Sinn Fein councillors. But oath-taking 
could one day become contagious...a pledge to denounce Apartheid...a sworn 
allegiance to this, that or the other. (Daily Mail, MURDER’S VOICE TO BE 
MUZZLED, 20.10.88)
Representing a pledge to denounce Apartheid as a negative action clearly illustrates 
the Daily Mail's support for Apartheid in 1988 and is more evidence of that 
newspapers support for racism and fascism which the Daily Mirror editorial draws 
attention to earlier on. The ‘ban makes Britain comparable to South Africa’ discourse 
emanated from the NUJ, which illustrates how important media workers’ 
organisations were to opposing the broadcasting ban on principled grounds. No other 
organisation or social actors made this comparison and the NUJ were not called on to 
speak very often so it is a testimony to the Daily Mirror's brave editorial position that 
it chose to express this discourse.
The next sentence of the Daily Mirror editorial also functions to oppose the 
British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban by expressing the most 
frequently occurring opposing discourse: ‘When we hand propaganda gifts to the IRA 
we should wonder what we are doing’. As stated earlier, the ‘ban is beneficial to the 
IRA’ discourse clearly opposes the ban but on tactical, rather than principled, 
grounds. Nevertheless, this discourse still continues the critical position of the Daily 
Mirror editorial that challenges British government censorship.
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In the next sentence the Daily Mirror editorial actually represents the 
broadcasting ban as a piece of censorship, which is significant because most 
newspapers chose to represent the ban as a British government ‘restriction’ or 
‘initiative’. It also suggests such censorship should be seen as a warning for the kind 
of society Britain is becoming: ‘When the government reaches, yet again, for the 
censor, then we should fear for the society we are becoming’.
This clearly represents Britain as becoming a more authoritarian society 
especially because the editorial compared the British government to the South African 
government two sentences before. In addition, there is a presupposition that the 
British government has reached for the censor before by adding ‘yet again’ to the 
action of the British government. Arguably, this contradicts the earlier presupposition 
that there has been freedom of reporting for the 20 years of the Northern Ireland 
conflict, but it could also refer to something that Tony Benn said in the House of 
Commons two days before where he connects the broadcasting ban to other recent 
examples of censorship:
Is the Secretary of State aware that his statement will be seen as a massive 
extension of state control over the broadcasting authorities, and that it is 
precisely comparable to the ban on the Zircon film and the attempt to ban the 
Spycatcher book? (Hansard, 1988: 899)
Either way the Daily Mirror editorial representation of the British government 
reaching for the censor ‘yet again’ clearly functions to fix a discourse that opposes the 
ban. The fifth and final sentence of the Daily Mirror editorial, however, expressed 
the most critical alternative discourse of all the newspaper articles representing the 
introduction of the broadcasting ban. It wa s the only time such an alternative 
discourse was expressed in the whole sample of this research:
And when we deal with the symptoms of the problems of Northern Ireland 
instead of the causes -  which lie in the bizarre decision of nearly 60 years ago 
to divide the island artificially -  then we demonstrate that we would best serve 
the future of Ireland by departing from it forever.
This discourse expressed in the Daily Mirror editorial identifies partition as the cause 
of the ‘problems of Northern Ireland’ and functions to oppose the ban by representing 
it as a policy that only deals with the symptoms. The seriousness of the Northern
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Ireland conflict is downplayed again by representing it as the ‘problems of Northern 
Ireland’ although the Daily Mirror editorial does recognise partition as the cause of 
such ‘problems’. It also criticises partition itself by representing it as a ‘bizarre 
decision’. Such a representation suggests partition was a mistake because adding the 
adjective ‘bizarre’ to the noun ‘decision’ suggests it was a strange or peculiar idea. 
Adding ‘artificially’ further fixes this representation, because it suggests partitioning 
Ireland was unnatural. That said, the agency of who partitioned the island of Ireland 
is excluded, resulting in ambiguity as to whether it was Irish or British people that 
divided Ireland. To include British agency in partitioning Ireland the Daily Mirror 
editorial could have replaced ‘the bizarre decision’ with ‘our bizarre decision’, 
‘Britain’s bizarre decision’, or ‘the British government’s bizarre decision’.
The Daily Mirror editorial suggests a solution to end the Northern Ireland 
conflict, which matches the exceptionality of its criticism of the ban, by arguing that 
Britain should end its presence in Ireland to best serve Ireland’s future. The argument 
that Britain should depart from Ireland forever was so marginalised that this was the 
only time it was expressed in newspaper articles representing the introduction of the 
broadcasting ban. This discourse was expressed by the Troops Out Movement51 in 
Britain and the Republican Movement across Ireland, but the former were never 
called on to speak by journalists and the latter were very rarely called on to speak in 
newspaper articles during the sample of this research.
Inevitably, by excluding these social actors, alternative discourses were 
excluded from newspaper representations of the British government introducing and 
lifting the broadcasting ban too. Although the Daily Mirror editorial does not 
acknowledge the origins of the discourse expressing the centrality of partition to the 
Northern Ireland conflict, it illustrates such a discourse was circulating and therefore 
could have featured more in newspaper articles representing the ban.
-  Journalists in other newspapers, especially the ‘quality’ press, could have 
explained this crucial grievance to explain why the Republican Movement existed and 
why its members were willing to take up arms against the British presence in Ireland, 
but this would not serve the interests of British nationalism, the bastion of the British 
elite. ‘Quality’ newspapers feature more articles representing serious news such as 
the British government introducing and lifting censorship and such articles are much 
larger in size and longer in length compared to those of the ‘popular’ and ‘mid­
market’ press. This allows journalists to include more social actors as sources and
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therefore a broader range of discourses, but no journalists working for The Guardian 
or The Daily Telegraph expressed the critical alternative discourse underlining 
partition as a major cause of the Northern Ireland conflict. This suggests a more 
ideological reason is motivating such a significant exclusion in all newspaper articles 
except the above Daily Mirror editorial.
Acknowledging Britain’s occupation of the entire island of Ireland and the 
British government’s role in the partition of it after the Irish Republican Army had 
fought the British Army out of most of Ireland would foreground the shameful 
practice of colonialism under the British Empire. Therefore, journalists excluded the 
centrality of partition to the Northern Ireland conflict and backgrounded the causes of 
the Northern Ireland conflict just as elite social actors did.
Another significant aspect of the Daily Mirror editorial is the frequent use of 
the personal pronoun ‘we’. Arguably, this is an important strategy of this editorial to 
persuade Daily Mirror readers to oppose the introduction of the broadcasting ban 
because ‘we’ unites and generalises British government action and Daily Mirror 
opposition to that action to include the ‘British’ people or at least the Daily Mirror 
readers. Representing such collectivity is often used as a rhetorical device to persuade 
people to believe something is beneficial to a majority when in reality it only is to a 
minority, but it is used in a positive way in this editorial because it is attempting to 
persuade its readers to oppose the British government’s introduction of direct 
censorship over the British broadcast media. By underlining every instance of ‘we’ in 
the last four sentences, it is possible to see how often this strategy is used to express 
the Daily Mirror's opposition to the broadcasting ban:
When we copy the behaviour of the South African Government then we 
should stop and think. When we hand propaganda gifts to the IRA we should 
wonder what we are doing. When the government reaches, yet again, for the 
-  censor, then we should fear for the society we are becoming. And when we 
deal with the symptoms of the problems of Northern Ireland instead of the 
causes -  which lie in the bizarre decision of nearly 60 years ago to divide the 
island artificially -  then we demonstrate that we would best serve the future of 
Ireland by departing from it forever.
Also of significance is the lift-out quote at the bottom of the page written in type size 
half the size of the headline type size, but double that of the body type: “ Time to stop 
and think about Ulster policy” . Arguably, this serves two functions. Firstly, it
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informs the reader what the headline is referring to by connecting the adjectives 
‘bankrupt’, ‘base’, ‘bad’ of the headline to ‘Ulster policy’. Secondly, it summarises 
the Daily Mirror editorial position that not only is the broadcasting ban wrong, but so 
is the British government’s entire Northern Ireland policy. As such, the lift-out quote 
could be read twice. Once at the beginning to unravel the enigma in the headline as to 
what is bankrupt, base and bad and once after the last sentence of the actual editorial 
is read to reaffirm the editorial position that it’s time for ‘Britain’ to think about 
leaving Ireland.
Daily Mirror -  summary:
Although this editorial is an anomaly in terms of other Daily Mirror articles 
and the other five sampled newspaper editorial positions and their articles more 
generally, it illustrates that newspapers could have represented the British 
government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban far more critically. More 
generally, it illustrates that it was possible for the Northern Ireland conflict to be 
explained by acknowledging major historical grievances. Considering the Daily 
Mirror editorial was the only article where the partition of Ireland is even mentioned, 
let alone suggested as being one of the root causes of the Northern Ireland conflict, it 
could be argued the British newspaper industry severely reduced its readers’ ability to 
understand the historical and political reasons motivating the Republican Movement.
The fact that this Daily Mirror editorial was an article from the ‘popular’ press 
illustrates that all newspapers could have expressed this discourse and that it is not a 
question of copy space that permits or inhibits a journalist or editor from discussing 
historical and political dimensions to a conflict. Newspapers representative of the 
‘quality’ press had many more articles representing the British government’s 
introduction of the broadcasting ban than the Daily Mirror and dedicated far more 
copy-space to discussing the ban yet at no point was the question of partition raised. 
Likewise, no other Daily Mirror article mentioned partition and that the British 
presence in Ireland may be the problem, not the solution.
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Critical Discourse Analysis -  textual analysis III: summary
CDA has been used in this chapter to explore a selection of individual newspaper 
articles representative of the ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’ and ‘quality’ newspaper genres. 
Some of the most significant newspaper articles representing the British government 
introducing the broadcasting ban have been analysed to reveal in detail the choices 
made by journalists to include and exclude particular social actors, name and frame 
them and their expressions of discourses supporting and opposing the broadcasting 
ban. The textual analyses here have illustrated how journalistic choices can 
dramatically shift representations of events, in this case the British government 
introducing the broadcasting ban.
The news article and both editorials printed in The Sun explored in this chapter 
illustrate how choices were made to simultaneously build support for British 
government censorship and embroil the BBC in a scandal. The editorials illustrate 
this without question with the first declaring its support for the British government 
ban on TV and radio interviews with ‘terrorists’ and the second attacking the BBC for 
resisting such censorship. The journalist writing the news article for The Sun fixates 
on the BBC resisting the broadcasting ban ev en though the BBC and ITN both 
allowed Gerry Adams to speak before the censorship became law. Indeed, those 
working for The Sun seem to find BBC ‘irresponsibility’ more shameful than the 
British government introducing censorship in the first place.
Although generic conventions of news articles dictate that the author cannot 
put their own opinions on the subject they are covering, there are a number o f 
strategies used to persuade the readers to hold a particular position. In the Sun news 
article, there are many ideological devices used to single out the BBC and divert 
attention away from the British government introducing direct censorship and towards 
the -irresponsibility’ of the BBC. This includes reversing the chronology of the 
British government introducing the ban and Gerry Adams’ statement on television, 
generalising the ‘fury’ at the broadcasters for airing the statement, singling out the 
BBC as the only broadcaster airing the statement, and garbling Gerry Adams’s 
statement to represent his reported speech as a threat to the British public rather than a 
defence of Sinn Fein’s right to free speech. The social actors and discourses chosen 
by Black (1988) and the way they are framed also largely function to build support for 
the British government introducing the broadcasting ban.
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After Gerry Adams’ statement, the next three social actors chosen to provide 
reported speech are representatives of the British government and therefore express 
discourses supporting their decision to introduce the broadcasting ban. When Roy 
Hattersley, the Labour deputy leader, is called on to speak his statement is 
misrepresented in an ideological way, which reduces the seriousness of his tactical 
opposition to the ban. His statement acknowledging support for the Republican 
Movement from US citizens is excluded also. BBC and ITN managers are allowed to 
speak, but BBC and ITN workers are not, which means although some principled 
opposition to the ban is expressed, more critical alternative discourses are excluded.
The naming and foregrounding of Republican combatants and the naming and 
backgrounding of Loyalist combatants also reveal ideological choices made by the 
Sun journalist. Republican organisations and representatives are foregrounded from 
the beginning of the Sun news article and Irishness is connected with ‘terror groups’ 
whereas Protestantism is connected with ‘paramilitary groups’ suggesting it is only 
those combatants fighting for an Irish United Republic who are ‘terrorists’. This 
ideological representation was expressed consistently across the sample of 
newspapers in this research as acknowledged in the previous and present chapter. The 
only aspect that shifted was the level of hostility, which depended on how much each 
newspaper supported or opposed the British government introducing the broadcasting 
ban. Obviously, the more a newspaper owner supported the ban the more venomous 
its journalists and editors were towards members of the Republican Movement.
As with The Sun (and the Daily Express), the Daily Mail editorials overtly 
supported the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. It has been 
argued in this chapter that whereas Daily Mail editorials unquestionably supported 
British government censorship, Daily Mail news articles functioned to build support 
in a far more subtle way. Indeed, there was a marked difference between the Sun 
news, article and that of the Daily Mail most likely due to the varying generic 
expectations of the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ newspaper genres. Therefore, whilst 
foregrounding of the Republican Movement continued, naming them was less 
sensational and direct than The Sun.
That said, the social actors called on to speak by the Daily Mail journalist 
were all members of the Conservative Party except for the last social actor who was 
the Northern Ireland spokesperson for the Labour Party. As there were no 
representatives of the Republican Movement or the broadcast media (whether
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managers or media workers), no principled discourses opposing the broadcasting ban 
were expressed in the Daily Mail news article. Instead, discourses emanating from 
the British government, which supported the ban dominated the Daily Mail news 
article until the last three paragraphs where a ‘wet’ Tory MP and the Labour 
representative expressed opposing discourses, which suggested the ban was wrong 
tactically rather than principally. Unsurprisingly, the dominance of elite sources 
meant dominant discourses proliferated, thus building support for the ban.
The two newspapers representative of the ‘quality’ genre printed more articles 
about the broadcasting ban than the other four newspapers in the sample combined. It 
was The Guardian that printed the most broadcasting ban articles and to which this 
summary now turns. Although the editorial position of The Guardian was ambivalent 
towards the British government introducing the broadcasting ban, it did defend 
journalists resisting such censorship, which was a stark difference from The Sun, the 
Daily Mail, Daily Express and The Daily Telegraph. The lead front-page news article 
in The Guardian, which has been analysed in this chapter, differed from news articles 
already summarised here, but there were more similarities than differences.
The major break from the composition of ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ 
newspapers was the size of The Guardian article, which meant a more diverse range 
of social actors were allowed to speak by the authors of the news article. Although 
the Guardian journalists chose to select British government representatives for the 
first seven paragraphs of the news article there was a much broader selection of social 
actors throughout the rest of the article. This included an NUJ representative, Gerry 
Adams as well as representatives of other Northern Irish and British political parties.
As a result there was a broader range of discourses opposing the broadcasting 
ban such as the NUJ comparing the British government to the South African 
government. Gerry Adams was also allowed to express principled discourses against 
the broadcasting ban. The reasons for these differences in ‘quality’ newspapers will 
be explored in depth in the following chapter, which explains the discursive and social 
practices involved in the production and consumption of British journalism.
Although there were differences between the Sun and Daily Mail news articles 
and that of The Guardian, many similarities remained. Presuppositions about 
‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ continued as if there really is an objective definition for 
certain acts of violence committed by particular individuals and organisations. In 
reality, of course, these labels are merely ideological refractions, which attempted to
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delegitimise one side of the Northern Ireland conflict. The headline of the Guardian 
news article illustrates this by presupposing newspaper readers knew who was using 
‘terror’ in this so-called ‘terror fight’. This reveals how some dominant discourses 
could not be escaped by journalists no matter the ‘quality’ of newspapers they were 
writing for because British nationalism cannot be challenged in the British media.
The Guardian journalists also made significant choices to exclude vital 
aspects of discourses opposing the British government introducing the broadcasting 
ban. As with the Sun news article explored in this chapter, it is interesting to note 
how Roy Hattersley’s opposition to the ban is represented. Again, the 
acknowledgment of US supporters of the Republican Movement in his House of 
Commons statement is excluded from the news article. This point was made by Ken 
Livingstone in the same debate too, but this social actor and his opposition is 
excluded the Guardian journalists, which suggests they have decided that allowing 
Guardian newspaper readers to know there were Americans sympathetic to the 
Republican Movement is beyond the pale. The vastly increased size of this news 
article in a ‘quality’ newspaper means this ideological choice cannot be excused as a 
result of concision as it could be in a ‘popular’ newspaper like The Sun.
However, it is not to say that The Guardian news article attempted to persuade 
its readers to support the ban as much as The Sun news article did. The difference of 
treatment of Gerry Adams by the Guardian journalists attests to this as they attribute 
reported speech that represents him in a rational, non-threatening manner and frame 
him respectfully and formally. He is allowed to express an alternative discourse that 
only manifested once in the entire sample, which represents the British government’s 
introduction of the broadcasting ban as a planned and tactical method of reversing 
Sinn Fein electoral breakthroughs, suggesting Margaret Thatcher’s contention that the 
‘terrorists’ had no support in Northern Ireland had been proven wrong.
_ The last newspaper analysed in this chapter was the Daily Mirror. Although 
this newspaper printed similar news articles representing the British government 
introducing the ban, it took an editorial position that overtly opposed such censorship. 
The Daily Mirror, like its ‘popular’ newspaper genre rival, The Sun, printed few 
newspaper articles about the ban, which were small in size, colloquial and dramatic in 
style as well as overwhelmingly relying on elite social actors for sources. It also 
perpetuated the foregrounding and pejorative naming of the Republican Movement in 
its news articles like all the other newspapers in the sample of this research.
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However, the Daily Mirror editorial on the British government introducing the 
broadcasting ban was scathing of all the newspapers that supported this censorship 
and the British government for introducing it in the first place, making it a very 
interesting anomaly. The choices made by the editor of the Daily Mirror all 
functioned to persuade the readers to oppose the broadcasting ban from the alliteration 
and pun of the headline to the lift-out quote at the end of the editorial. The candour of 
the Daily Mirror editor when representing the British newspapers that shamefully 
supported British government censorship was remarkable.
The alternative discourses that were expressed to oppose the British 
government’s broadcasting ban were more critical than all editorials, news articles 
and op-eds printed in every other newspaper in the sample of this research. Not only 
did the Daily Mirror editorial compare the British government to the Apartheid 
regime in South Africa, it acknowledged that the partition of Ireland was one of the 
main causes of the Northern Ireland conflict and argued that the British presence in 
Ireland was the problem, not the solution.
Alternative discourses that questioned the historical record of the British 
government and military in Ireland were completely absent from British newspaper 
representations of the broadcasting ban, despite circulating in the Republican 
Movement and Irish solidarity grass roots organisations such as the Troops Out 
Movement in Britain. It is therefore very interesting that one British newspaper on 
one occasion chose to express such discourses.
It has been argued in this chapter that a ‘popular’ newspaper like the Daily 
Mirror choosing to express these alternative discourses reveals how all newspapers 
could have chosen to challenge the dominant discourses emanating from elite social 
actors. However, they chose not to. These choices need to be explained to 
understand why this occurred. In the next chapter, the discursive and social practices 
involved in the production and consumption of British journalism are explored in 
order to explain and understand British newspaper representations of the broadcasting 
ban (1988-1994).
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Chapter 7 -  Critical Discourse Analysis: Discursive and Social Practices
In this final chapter, the second and third dimensions of CDA are used to analyse and 
explain the discursive and social practices impacting British newspaper 
representations of the broadcasting ban. Although these dimensions have been 
alluded to in previous CDA chapters exploring newspaper articles representing the 
British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban, they are analysed in 
more depth here. Beginning with the discursive practices involved in the production 
and consumption of newspaper journalism, this chapter explains the processes in 
which the authors and audience of texts draw on already existing discourses for 
certain situations, which change through time and across societies and shape how 
texts are encoded and decoded. This chapter ends by expanding the analysis in terms 
of social practices and the role of journalism in relation to wider society.
The structuring influences within British journalism are analysed, including 
the generic conventions between and within newspapers as well as the political 
allegiances of newspapers. The impact of these structural influences on newspaper 
content is explained in terms of newspaper reader considerations, news values, source 
values and intertextuality. These aspects are then explored in terms of other 
significant factors existing outside the newsroom, which also impacted newspaper 
representations of the broadcasting ban. Social practices such as the British 
government use of indirect pressure and ‘anti-terrorism legislation’ throughout the 
Northern Ireland conflict and the introduction of direct censorship during the latter 
years of it are analysed to explain how these, in turn, shaped discursive practices. 
Industrial disputes within the newspaper industry in the lead up to the broadcasting 
ban are also explored to explain the weakness of print media workers compared to 
broadcast media workers during that period. These government controls, industrial 
disputes, and the resistance of media workers are analysed in terms of struggles within 
the media and in society at large.
There are many factors that impact the way in which journalists construct 
newspaper articles. Like all workers, journalists sell their labour to live and have to 
work in a way that satisfies the manager (newspaper editor) and proprietor 
(newspaper owner) of their workplace. As workers, journalists produce a commodity 
(whether that be considered the actual newspaper, the audience of the newspaper, or 
both), which can be sold to make profit. They also share similar interests to other
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journalists and media workers, meaning they are often unionised in order to safeguard 
their conditions and rights against the profit interests of their employers. There are 
many structuring influences impacting journalists before they even begin to work. 
Each newspaper owner has decided which section of the political system the 
newspaper supports and which section of the newspaper industry market it competes 
in, whether that be the ‘popular’ newspaper genre, ‘mid-market’ or ‘quality’. An 
editor is employed by the owner to ensure journalists remain within these boundaries.
Generic conventions of newspapers
A major structuring influence impacting journalists then are the political allegiances 
and generic conventions of the newspaper they are working for, neither of which can 
be separated from the economics of the newspaper. The different parts of the market 
to which newspapers cater are reflected in the different newspaper genres (Williams, 
2010). As Tunstall (1996: 8) points out, newspapers in Britain are ‘split very much 
along social class lines’ and use different business models; ‘broadsheets rely primarily 
on advertising revenue, while tabloids rely primarily on sales or circulation revenue’ 
(Tunstall, 1996: 11). In the 1980s and 1990s, the audience of ‘popular’ newspapers 
like The Sun and the Daily Mirror was and is today mostly made up of skilled and 
unskilled manual workers and the unemployed (Richardson, 2007).
Whereas the Daily Mirror has traditionally targeted the left-leaning and 
Labour voting members of these social classes, The Sun has traditionally catered for 
those with more right-wing and conservative views. These realities make a big 
difference in what stories are ‘newsworthy’ in the first place and how they are 
reported as the ‘popular’ press needs to maintain large audiences. This is because 
these newspapers rely on sales revenue with The Sun selling over four million and the 
Daily Mirror selling over three million during the late 1980s and just below these 
figures during the early 1990s (Willings Press Guide, 1989-1995). ‘Popular’ 
newspapers assume readers are more interested in light, entertaining news, sport and 
gossip than more serious, in depth, news (Tunstall, 1996).
This helps to explain why journalists working for The Sun and Daily Mirror 
gave such limited coverage to the British government introducing and lifting the 
broadcasting ban. It also helps to explain why those articles that did focus on the ban 
were so short in length. Smaller news articles inevitably mean fewer social actors are
191
called on to speak by journalists, thus limiting the range of discourses expressed. It 
could be argued that these discursive practices restrict discourses opposing the 
broadcasting ban because the reliance on British government social actors as sources 
(discussed below) will result in a dominance of them with little copy space left for 
those social actors expressing alternative discourses.
Returning to the Sun news article analysed in the previous chapter (see page 
143), it is possible to see this occurring. As the Sun journalist overwhelming relies on 
elite sources, discourses supporting the ban dominate the article. All the social actors, 
except Gerry Adams, who have been indirectly or directly quoted can be considered 
to represent the interests of the British elite because they all share a stake in 
maintaining the status quo in Britain. Sinn Fein President and MP, Gerry Adams, 
three Tory MPs (Ivor Stanbrook, Margaret Thatcher and Douglas Hurd), one Labour 
MP (Roy Hattersley) as well as BBC and ITN managers are used as sources.
Several social actors have been excluded who could have been included, such 
as Liberal Democrat MPs or other Labour MPs as well as, more importantly, 
organisations that represent media workers impacted by the ban such as the NUJ or 
the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom. In addition, representatives of the 
Troops Out Movement could have been called on to speak. If the Sun journalist had 
included these social actors in the article, more discourses opposing the British 
government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban would have been expressed.
Although considerations regarding newsworthiness are certainly impacted by 
the generic conventions of newspapers, newspaper content is also influenced by the 
political allegiances o f the newspaper owner. The Sun journalist as a worker 
employed by Rupert Murdoch would be aware that the editor expects the Sun news 
article to be as short, simplistic, entertaining and dramatic as possible, but it must also 
reinforce the political allegiances of the newspaper. This means excluding social 
actors considered too radical such as unionised media workers because trade unions 
interfere with the profit margins of the journalist’s employer.
Other excluded social actors would include socialist Labour MPs such as Tony 
Benn and Ken Livingstone as well as Irish solidarity activists from the Troops Out 
Movement because they questioned the entire presence of Britain in Ireland. Aside 
from Rupert Murdoch’s personal hatred of trade unions and his economic interests 
being served by the stability and maintenance of the British elite, his economic 
interests are also served by his employees undermining his media competition.
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Some may argue that the Sun journalist has constructed the news article in a 
way that will be appreciated by the intended audience because Sun readers are 
assumed to be right-wing and supportive of tough ‘law and order’ policies. However, 
there is a discourse dominating the article, which suggests it is not the audience that is 
determining the representation of the British government introducing the broadcasting 
ban in The Sun: the ‘broadcasters are irresponsible (especially the BBC)’ discourse. 
Sun readers do not have an economic interest in attacking the BBC, but Rupert 
Murdoch does. Arguably, the Sun news article, which distracts the reader from the 
significance of the fact that the British government has just introduced a piece of 
censorship to the ‘irresponsibility’ of the BBC, is constructed with the political and 
economic interests of the journalist’s employer in mind. Instead of directing criticism 
towards the British government for introducing the broadcasting ban, the Sun 
journalist encourages his readers to criticise the BBC and support the government, 
which perfectly suits Rupert Murdoch’s economic interests and his political alliance 
with Margaret Thatcher during that period.
The Daily Mail and Daily Express, which are considered to be ‘mid-market’ 
newspapers, target an audience comprised of both working class and middle class 
readers (Tunstall, 1996; Richardson, 2007). As a result, the method of profit 
accumulation of these newspapers is also comprised of both sales and advertisement 
revenue. The circulation of these newspapers also hints at this because they stand 
somewhere in the middle of the ‘popular’ and ‘quality’ newspaper circulations with 
both the Daily Mail and Daily Express averaging between 1.5 and 2 million copies 
sold per day during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Willings Press Guide, 1989- 
1995). The political allegiances of these ‘mid-market’ newspapers were both 
conservative during the sample period of this research as they were before and 
afterwards (Williams, 2010).
_ This clearly manifested in the editorial position of both newspapers supporting 
the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Needless to say journalists 
employed by the Daily Mail (Daily Mail and General Trust) and the Daily Express 
(United News and Media) were aware of this and constructed their news articles and 
op-eds accordingly. For example, the Daily Mail news article explored in the 
previous chapter (see page 156) overwhelmingly featured representatives of the 
Conservative Party. This meant that British government sources dominated 
discursively in this representation of the broadcasting ban.
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Newspapers representative of the ‘quality’ press target an audience with a high 
disposable income such as those in managerial, administrative and professional 
positions (Tunstall, 1996; Richardson, 2007). This means these newspapers can 
afford to have far smaller circulations than the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ press 
because the value of each reader of the ‘quality’ press is far higher in terms of 
advertising revenue. Therefore, throughout the sample period of this research, The 
Guardian never exceeded a circulation figure of 500,000 and The Daily Telegraph 
sold just over one million per day (Willings Press Guide, 1989-1995). Newspapers 
representative of the ‘quality’ press assume their readers are more interested in serious 
news stories and analysis (Tunstall, 1996).
This helps to explain why The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph featured so 
many more articles representing the British government’s introduction of the 
broadcasting ban, which were of increased size and length, compared with those 
newspapers from the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ press. The increased number of 
larger newspaper articles due to the generic conventions of ‘quality’ newspapers 
allows the journalist to include many more social actors in the articles, meaning a 
wider range of discourses can be expressed. This results in the readers of these 
newspapers being subject to the discourses that were being expressed in Britain to 
support and oppose the broadcasting ban.
This is illustrated in the Guardian news article analysed in the previous 
chapter (see page 163). The Guardian journalists feature numerous social actors, 
including all those chosen by the Sun journalist, plus an NUJ representative, Liberal 
Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown, Social Democratic and Labour Party deputy leader 
Seamus Mallon, Ulster Unionist Party MP Ken Maginnis and Democratic Unionist 
Party MP Ian Paisley. Including a bigger selection of social actors results in a broader 
selection of discourses opposing and supporting the introduction of the ban.
-  That said, the Guardian journalists like the Sun journalist also overwhelming 
called on elite sources to speak in the Guardian news article. The only added source 
that is not part of the British elite is the NUJ, meaning that while Guardian readers 
are presented with more discourses supporting and opposing the broadcasting ban, the 
diversity of opposition is still restricted by the exclusion of more critical social actors 
(other than the NUJ). This can be explained by the ‘liberal bias’ of The Guardian as a 
newspaper that is not right-wing in the way that The Sun, Daily Mail and Daily 
Express clearly are, but, nonetheless, is in the business of conserving the status quo
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and therefore conservative in that sense. During the 1980s as now, the political 
allegiances of the Guardian under ownership of the Scott Trust fluctuated between the 
Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats as “a paper that will remain bourgeois to the 
last” (Ted Scott, cited in Ayerst, 1971: 471).
Therefore, whereas the Guardian journalists knew that their editor would 
allow social actors critical of the Conservative Party and those defending the British 
media from the censorship introduced by the Conservative government, they also 
knew that the interests of the elite could not be challenged in general. This means 
Guardian journalists could be critical of some of the tactics used by elite social actors 
in the Northern Ireland conflict, but not the overall presence of Britain in Ireland. 
Therefore, those social actors that were critical of this such as socialist Labour MPs 
and representatives of the Troops Out Movement were excluded by the Guardian 
journalists. Such discursive practices clearly limit other critical discourses that 
opposed the British government’s broadcasting ban. However, the way in which 
journalists constructed newspaper articles went beyond the generic conventions and 
political allegiances of the newspapers they were working for.
Generic conventions of news articles, editorials and op-eds
Another structuring influence impacting journalists are the generic conventions of the 
actual newspaper articles. As acknowledged in previous chapters, the generic 
conventions of news articles, editorials and op-eds differ from each other and dictate 
the form and style of them, which the authors must follow. Returning to examples 
from the Daily Mirror and Daily Mail, it is possible to illustrate how the different 
political allegiances and text-genres of newspapers impact discursive practices of 
journalists, structuring what can and cannot be said as well as how. Whereas news 
articles in these two newspapers largely amplified dominant discourses expressed by 
elite social actors, op-eds and editorials altered the order of discourse.
As the Daily Mirror was a left-leaning newspaper supporting the Labour Party 
in the 1980s, its staff employed Paul Foot, a revolutionary socialist journalist, who 
could be critical of the Conservative Party, its introduction of censorship, and British 
government support for the Contras in his op-ed piece {Daily Mirror, CONTRA­
DICTORY, 27.10.88). He subverted the order of discourse by highlighting the 
contradiction in the British government introducing censorship to starve the
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‘terrorists’ of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ whilst meeting the leader of the Contras, a 
violent, right-wing, organisation which was trying to overthrow the democratically 
elected Nicaraguan government. It was during this war on democracy, that the US 
government was condemned by the World Court in the Hague for sponsoring 
international terrorism (Chomsky, 2002).
In contrast, the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ 
discourse was reinforced and embellished by a Daily Mail editorial to persuade its 
readers that the broadcasting ban did not go far enough and that Sinn Fein should be 
banned altogether because ‘they will gratefully gulp down the oxygen of publicity and 
spew out the propaganda of terror’ {Daily Mail, DEPRIVE TERROR OF THIS 
MEGAPHONE, 17.10.88). During the 1980s, as now, the Daily Mail was a right- 
wing newspaper supporting the Conservative Party, which meant its editor was 
employed to build support for Tory policies, in this case, introducing censorship.
The text-genres of these newspaper articles were equally important, if not 
more so, to the structuring of what Paul Foot and the Daily Mail editor could say. 
Both op-eds and editorials are very different in form and style compared to news 
articles. The generic conventions of op-eds dictate that journalists express personal 
views on a subject, which may differ from the editorial line of the newspaper one way 
or another. Similarly, the generic conventions of editorials dictate that the author 
writes the personal views of the newspaper proprietor and editor on a subject.
In contrast, the generic conventions of news articles dictate that the journalist 
must remain ‘objective’ and not express personal opinions on the subject they are 
writing about. Instead they must use the opinions of relevant social actors to inform 
and persuade their readers. It is the generic conventions of news articles, which give 
the impression that journalists are merely reporting the news whereas they are 
representing subjects like the broadcasting ban in ways that function to influence 
newspaper readers’ understanding and opinions of them.
Arguably, it is op-eds that allow journalists the most freedom in constructing 
articles because, to some extent, they can veer away from the editorial position as well 
as provide their own views on subjects. A day after the British government 
introduced the broadcasting ban, a cluster of notable articles in the Comment and 
Analysis section of The Guardian were printed. Three Guardian journalists gave 
more information about the roots of the ban in the four op-eds printed on the next 
page than all the articles from the entire sample of newspapers in this research.
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One Guardian journalist illustrated the problems of the Irish broadcasting ban 
and predicted how the British broadcasting ban would impact the British broadcast 
media {The Guardian, JOURNALISTS WALK TIGHTROPE ON COVERAGE OF 
SINN FEIN, 20.10.88). Another contextualised the ban by listing previous examples 
of censorship in the British media during the Northern Ireland conflict {The Guardian, 
POLITICS CONFRONT PROGRAMME CHIEFS, 20.10.88). The article begins by 
acknowledging that for many years, ‘television executives and editors have censored 
programmes about the IRA and Sinn Fein [who] have been supported by large 
sections of the British press’ (Ibid.).
The support for the Republican Movement in Northern Ireland was also 
acknowledged by a Guardian journalist {The Guardian, HOW THE MEDIA 
CREATES REPUBLICAN MYTHS, 20.10.88). Discussing the election of Bobby 
Sands to Westminster in 1981, he recalls that it was a shock to those working in the 
British media because they believed their own myths about Republicans. One of 
these myths being that the IRA had minimal support in Northern Ireland. The 
Guardian journalist argues the British media was largely responsible for such myths, 
conceding that ‘newspaper reporting of the IRA and its sympathisers has either been 
highly circumspect or outright hostile’ (Ibid.). This is attributed to journalists failing 
to investigate the feelings of the Irish nationalist community and not speaking to 
representatives of the Republican Movement. He explains:
This is not because militants are inaccessible. Editors are simply not 
interested in purveying the views of those they see as common criminals. 
Self-censorship, and the inevitable ignorance that it engenders, has worked as 
effectively as any government ban. (Ibid.)
These excerpts from op-eds in The Guardian and Daily Mirror illustrate how 
journalists were more than willing to inform their readers about British media 
censorship throughout the Northern Ireland conflict when they were allowed to by 
their editors and by the generic conventions of particular newspaper articles. This 
illustrates the structurin g influence of generic, political and, ultimately economic 
factors on the discursive practices of journalists. Unfortunately, the above excerpts 
that informed British newspaper readers about the roots of the broadcasting ban were 
exceptions to the general rule of news article representations of the ban, which occur 
more frequently and have much more restricting generic conventions than op-eds.
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Elite public spheres
A crucial aspect of the discursive practices involved in the production of news articles 
in particular is the selection of social actors called on to speak by journalists. The 
textual analyses of newspaper articles representing the British government introducing 
and lifting the broadcasting ban illustrate the journalistic reliance on powerful social 
agents (Chomsky and Herman, 2002); what Hall et al. (1978) term primary definers. 
This is true of all the newspapers in the sample of this research although newspapers 
representative of the ‘quality’ press allowed a slightly more diverse range of social 
actors to speak. Where possible it has been illustrated in the two previous chapters 
how journalists representing the British government introducing and lifting largely 
relied on the statements of politicians in the House of Commons.
Despite its name, the House of Commons is an elite sphere, which is 
structured to allow very few genuinely representative ‘commoners’ to participate 
although a small number do occasionally get elected. In contrast non-elite social 
actors such as organised media workers from the NUJ or the Campaign for Press and 
Broadcasting Freedom were very rarely called on to speak by journalists and 
organised Irish solidarity activists from the Troops Out Movement were never called 
on to speak. The impact of these discursive practices on British journalism has been 
briefly explored above and revealed in more detail during previous CDA chapters, but 
now the reasons for such exclusions can be explained.
Understandably, journalists are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with 
government and other powerful sources by the demand for a steady flow of news 
material that can be provided at little cost and in schedule with daily news demands 
(Herman and Chomsky, 2002; Davis, 2002; Franklin, 2004; Louw, 2005; Moloney, 
2006; Lewis et al., 2008). As it was the British government that introduced the 
broadcasting ban, clearly journalists were expected to inform their readers of this 
newsworthy event by reporting British government justifications. One way to achieve 
this was by spending time in the press gallery at Westminster, which is where the 
accredited journalists of the British Lobby System are allowed to observe and report 
on the public debates and proceedings of Parliament as well as receive private 
unattributable briefings from senior politicians and press officers (Tunstall, 1970; 
Riddell, 1999; Franklin, 2004).52
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Although visiting such centres of power was essential for journalists 
representing the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban, 
basing themselves there was problematic. Relying on the Opposition to provide 
arguments against the ban was not sufficient to provide the full spectrum of resistance 
to such censorship. Although some journalists did speak to representatives of Sinn 
Fein, the NUJ and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom thus allowing 
their voices to be heard, the majority did not. This can be explained by the British 
media being an elite public sphere in itself, meaning the plurality of views, values 
and, therefore, debate are bound by the need to maintain the status quo.
This necessitates the exclusion of those who could challenge the stability of 
British capitalism, whether that be representatives of the Republican Movement 
explaining why they used violence to end the British occupation of Ireland or socialist 
Labour MPs and Irish solidarity activists pointing out that the British elite were united 
on keeping British troops in Ireland when the majority of British citizens wanted them 
out (Guelke and Wright, 1990; Miller, 1993a). It is true that powerful social agents 
have more resources for PR and can thus bombard journalists with propaganda, but it 
appears the ‘source values’ of journalists is more determined by the elite values of the 
businesses for which they work. Journalists could always pick up a phone if they 
wanted to contact the organisations that were mostly or totally excluded, but ‘source 
values’ dictate that certain people are important and, therefore, worthy of being 
sources in news articles and others are not.
This discursive practice of ‘sourceworthiness’ obviously equates to enormous 
discursive power for elite social actors over the news media, shaping the parameters 
of what is included and excluded in texts. This can explain why particular discourses 
dominated newspaper representations of the British government introducing and 
lifting the broadcasting ban. In 1988, during the period the British government 
introduced the ban, discourses foregrounding and naming the Republican Movement 
pejoratively dominated newspaper articles alongside two of the three discourses 
expressed by the British government to justify the ban. The most prominent of these 
discourses argued the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’. The 
other discourse underlined there was a similar ban in the Irish Republic.
The most frequently expressed discourse opposing the broadcasting ban (as a 
tactical mistake) also originated from elite social actors, that is, Tory back-benchers 
and politicians from the Opposition. However, principled opposition to the
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broadcasting ban was represented in British newspapers too, which emanated from 
organised media workers and a socialist Labour MP. This illustrates that some 
journalists did speak and listen to non-elite sources on occasion. In 1994, during the 
period the British government lifted the ban, journalists also overwhelmingly 
expressed discourses emanating from elite social actors. The only difference was that 
in this period the British elite were united in its conclusion that the broadcasting ban 
should be lifted whereas they were split when the censorship was first introduced.
Reporting speech ideologically
It is not the ‘sourceworthiness’ alone that is significant to the way in which the 
broadcasting ban and those social actors for and against it were represented. Rather, it 
was the reported speech that journalists chose to attribute to particular social actors 
that is of crucial importance. Taking the news articles from The Sun (see page 143) 
and The Guardian (see page 163) explored in the previous chapter as examples again, 
it is possible to illustrate how the political allegiances and generic conventions of 
newspapers as well as the generic conventions of news articles in particular structure 
the way in which journalists use reported speech when constructing them.
Whilst the Sun journalist chose to include and exclude particular social actors 
thus limiting what discourses can and cannot be expressed, he has also chosen to 
include and exclude particular sections of what these social actors said in the reported 
speech attributed to them. For example, the Sun journalist misrepresents a statement 
by Gerry Adams to construct him in a threatening manner, taunting both the British 
government and Sun readers. Journalists in other newspapers expressed more of 
Gerry Adams’ statement through direct and indirect reported speech, revealing the 
context of what the Sinn Fein MP said. Although the choices made by the Sun 
journalist may be explained by the generic conventions of The Sun as a newspaper 
representative of the ‘popular’ press, there is another aspect of his article, which 
suggests they are more ideological.
Misrepresenting Gerry Adams’ statement through the use of supposedly 
verbatim reported speech was not the only example of the Sun journalist being 
selective with the reported speech of social actors. As acknowledged in the previous 
chapter, he not only reduced Roy Hattersley’s House of Commons statement to 
reported speech which fails to explain why this social actor believed the broadcasting
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ban would make the government look repressive and ridiculous, he misquoted Roy 
Hattersley too. The few words that the Sun journalist does use for reported speech 
attributed to Roy Hattersley, which are represented as verbatim speech, are actually 
altered; significantly ‘repressive’ is changed to the more euphemistic adjective 
‘restrictive’. This illustrates that journalists working for The Sun, and the editor who 
could have corrected it, are either careless or manipulative. It also reinforces the 
assertion that there is more to the discursive practices of journalists than who they 
quote. What they quote from these social actors’ statements are of vital importance to 
newspaper representations and therefore the audience’s understanding of important 
events such as the British government introducing the broadcasting ban.
The liberal political allegiance of The Guardian and the generic conventions 
of a ‘quality’ newspaper enable the journalist to include more social actors opposing 
the British government introducing the broadcasting ban and more extensive reported 
speech. However, there is a notable exclusion from the statement of one of the social 
actors chosen for reported speech by the Guardian journalists, which happens to be 
the same social actor who was misquoted in the above Sun news article. Roy 
Hattersley’s opposition to the broadcasting ban is represented through non-verbatim 
reported speech arguing the ban would be used to portray the Government as the 
enemy of free expression. By not directly quoting him, the journalists can exclude a 
few significant details such as the identity of social actors who would portray the 
British government in this way. In his House of Commons statement, Roy Hattersley 
referred to social actors ‘at home and abroad, especially in the United States’ 
(Hansard, 1988: 894).
The focus on the US alludes to the funding of the Republican Movement by 
sympathetic Americans, but this reality seems to be too uncomfortable for The 
Guardian to acknowledge. Arguably, this can be explained by the political 
allegiances of this newspaper allowing its employees to be critical of the Conservative 
Party, which The Sun, Daily Mail, Daily Express and The Daily Telegraph do not 
allow, but not of the British elite in general who were all committed to keeping 
Northern Ireland as part of ‘Britain’. This included the Labour and Liberal Democrat 
leaderships. Americans sympathetic to the Irish Republican Movement were against 
the entire presence of Britain in Ireland and so acknowledging this in British 
newspaper articles was beyond the pale as it would allow British newspaper readers to 
know this, which would undermine the power of the British elite.
202
Winning and losing newspaper readers9 hearts and minds
Thus far, all the considerations of discursive practices have concerned the structuring 
influences on the production of newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban, 
but the circuit of communication inevitably needs to consider the consumption of 
them too. Without audience research such as focus groups conducted during the time 
that these newspaper articles were printed and consumed, it cannot be discovered 
exactly how newspaper readers in Britain would have interpreted the newspaper 
articles explored in this research. However, some general inferences can be made 
from the content of these textual analyses, what is known about the differing ways in 
which media consumers deconstruct or decode texts as well as British public opinion 
polls relating to the Northern Ireland conflict.
The first inference that can be made from the newspaper articles analysed in 
this research is that the knowledge of newspaper readers concerning the broadcasting 
ban would have depended on which newspaper individuals read. The frequency and 
size of newspaper articles representing the British government introducing and lifting 
the broadcasting ban varied depending on whether newspapers were representative of 
the ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’, or ‘quality’ newspaper markets. As acknowledged 
above, ‘popular’ newspapers had fewer and smaller newspaper articles than ‘mid- 
market’ newspapers, which in turn, had fewer and small newspaper articles than 
‘quality’ newspapers. Such differences would clearly impact how much newspaper 
readers would know about the broadcasting ban and how important (‘newsworthy’) 
they considered such censorship to be.
Whether or not newspaper readers were persuaded to support or oppose the 
broadcasting ban is another issue and is impossible to know without audience 
research. Clearly, the political allegiances of the newspapers explored in this research 
impacted what journalists could say about the broadcasting ban. However, whether or 
not they were successful in persuading individual newspaper readers to hold such 
opinions is dependent on several factors outside the control of the journalists. As Hall 
(1980) acknowledges, decoding media texts such as newspaper articles is an active 
discursive practice in which newspaper readers interpret newspaper articles in 
different ways, sometimes accepting the dominant meaning encoded by the producer, 
sometimes concluding a negotiated meaning and sometimes an alternative one where 
the meaning is rejected and resisted.
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The ability of journalists to persuade newspaper readers to support the 
broadcasting ban would have depended on what newspaper readers already thought 
about the Northern Ireland conflict. It is important to remember that despite all the 
attempts by the British government to control the media during the Northern Ireland 
conflict, British public opinion polls conducted during the conflict revealed that the 
public increasingly wanted British troops out of Ireland:
Gallup first put the option that “we should begin to withdraw our troops” to 
respondents in November 1971. It attracted the support of 37% of those 
polled. This figure rose to 64% in December 1975. Support for troop 
withdrawal has stayed at roughly this level ever since, with occasional dips in 
response to particularly outrageous atrocities by the Provisional IRA. But it 
climbed to a new high at the time of the 20th anniversary of the dispatch of the 
troops to [...] Northern Ireland. In a telephone poll of over 5,000 people, 77% 
of callers answered yes to the question: “After 20 years, is it time to pull the 
troops out of Northern Ireland?” (Guelke and Wright, 1990: 55)
Then, as now with Afghanistan,54 the majority of English, Scottish and Welsh people 
were opposed to the conflict and again such ‘consistency of public support for 
withdrawal is remarkable in the light of the limited editorial backing the option of 
withdrawal has received in the national press’ (Ibid.). Therefore, despite all the media 
interference by the British government, which limited what could be said in British 
media representations of the broadcasting ban specifically and the Northern Ireland 
conflict generally, the majority of ordinary people were consistently anti-war. Of 
course, what people thought about Northern Ireland as with Afghanistan today is 
different to what people actually do to stop these conflicts. Indeed, maintaining 
hegemony is a constant battle and just because it is slipping on one front, it may be 
continually upheld on many others. To explore this it is important to look at the wider 
social relations in Britain and how the elite persuade o rdinary people to accept, 
begrudgingly or wilfully, the status quo.
Restricting British journalism during the Northern Ireland conflict
Another crucial aspect impacting the production of British journalism was the social 
environment in which media workers had to operate during the Northern Ireland 
conflict. In Chapter 2, the review of research on media representations of the 
Northern Ireland conflict suggested the British news media mostly ignored the
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discrimination and tensions in Northern Ireland until the civil rights movement 
culminated in the RUC attack on demonstrators in Derry on 5th October 1968. The 
contentious issue of partition was also excluded from British media representations 
before (and after) the Northern Ireland conflict began, which meant discourses 
expressing the political motivations of the Republican Movement were mostly 
unknown to the populations of England, Scotland and Wales.
As in all wars, the media was a crucial battleground and pressure from the 
British government increased over the British media once the Northern Ireland 
conflict started in 1968. This began with the ‘reference upwards’ system in 1971 and 
ended with the broadcasting ban from 1988 through to 1994. Although it was the 
broadcasters, especially the BBC, that experienced most British government pressure 
(Miller, 1994), newspaper journalists would have been well aware of the conflicts 
between the British government and the broadcast media. Although the ‘reference 
upwards’ system existed in the broadcast media it did not in the print media, which 
meant there was no formalised self-censorship for newspaper journalists. Similarly, 
the direct censorship of the broadcasting ban did not apply to the print media, which 
meant newspaper journalists could express statements from the banned organisations.
However, the print media was impacted by anti-terrorism legislation. As 
acknowledged in Chapter 2, the Official Secrets Act, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
and the Emergency Provisions Act were used to limit the ability of British media 
workers to report on the Northern Ireland conflict (Miller, 1994; Hussain, 2000). For 
example, by making the IRA illegal in Britain under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
in 1974, it made it very difficult for journalists to interview IRA members, especially 
after the Act was amended in 1976 making it ‘an offence under Section 11 not to pass 
information to the police about any future act of terrorism or about people involved in 
terrorism without ‘reasonable excuse” (Miller, 1994: 31-2).
— Clearly, such controls over the British media during the Northern Ireland 
conflict would have severely limited the capacity of journalists to report the conflict 
freely and encouraged self-censorship. Just as the British government intended, it 
also meant that access to representatives of the Republican Movement was very 
difficult, yet access to representatives of the British government was very easy. As 
Richardson (2007: 127) points out: ‘social and political actors outside the newsroom 
(social practices) can shape the content of reporting (text) via controlling the manner 
in which journalists produce the news (discursive practices)’. Of course, newspaper
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journalists cannot be blamed for the authoritarian actions of the British government 
and British state, but it does explain how these controls impacted their ability to 
represent the broadcasting ban.
Media workers’ resistance
Broadcast media workers represented by the NUJ did try to resist British government 
control of the British broadcast media by going on strike in 1985 following the 
censorship of the Real Lives programme and threatening to strike when the 
broadcasting ban was introduced in 1988. As a result of the latter, ITV and BBC 
executives were pressurised to broadcast ‘health warnings’ to indicate when reports 
on the Northern Ireland conflict were affected by the ban (Henderson et al., 1990). 
Sympathetic print media workers were unable to show support in news articles for the 
broadcast media workers resisting British government censorship of television and 
radio in 1988. This can be explained by their position as workers with managements 
and owners unsympathetic to workers’ power, but also because of the structuring 
influence of the generic conventions of news articles, which do not allow the personal 
opinions of journalists to be expressed.
Unsurprisingly, when the British government introduced the broadcasting ban, 
newspaper editorial positions on the strikes were dependent on whether individual 
newspapers supported the ban or not. If the editorial staff supported the ban, they 
obviously opposed media workers resisting it and vice versa. The only newspaper 
with an editorial supporting the NUJ call for strike action against the broadcasting ban 
was The Guardian (The Guardian, THIS STRIKE IS RIGHT, AND DEADLY 
SERIOUS, 04.11.88).
The editorial staff of the other five newspapers either condemned it or did not 
mention this honourable attempt to resist direct censorship over the British broadcast 
media. That said, the Daily Mirror editorial staff, while not commenting on the NUJ 
strike, took the only editorial position that overtly opposed the broadcasting ban and 
even suggested that the British presence was the problem, not the solution in the 
Northern Ireland conflict. This exceptional editorial position and the fact that the 
Daily Mirror had taken this view since 1978 (Miller, 1993b) can be explained by it 
catering to its target audience of left-leaning working class readers and its support for 
the Labour Party; the only British newspaper to do so since 1945 (Humphreys, 1996).
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Editorial staff aside, it was one Daily Mirror journalist and a sprinkling of 
Guardian journalists who most lived up to the first principle of the NUJ Code of 
Conduct, upholding and defending the principle of media freedom, the right of 
freedom of expression and the right of the public to be informed. As stated above, it 
was in op-eds that these journalists upheld their professional commitments, 
illustrating the structuring influence of generic conventions between and within 
newspapers. It is no coincidence either that these journalists worked for the two 
newspapers unsupportive of the Conservative Party and government, illustrating the 
structuring influence of the political allegiances of newspaper owners and managers.
Of course the way in which journalists represented the British government 
introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban cannot be separated from the way in 
which they represented the Northern Ireland conflict and the United Kingdom more 
generally. The social actors involved in the conflict were represented in different 
ways depending on whether they used violence to maintain Northern Ireland as part of 
Britain or whether they used violence to re-unite it as part of Ireland. Members of the 
Irish Republican Army were most often referred to as ‘terrorists’ in the British media 
whereas members of the British Army never were.
Although these discourses were dominant in British society, it is important to 
recognise how subjective and ideological they are, especially when it is recognised 
that the majority of those killed by the IRA were British combatants, not British 
civilians (Sutton, 1994). It is also important to recognise that these ruling ideas 
originated from British elite social actors in an attempt to legitimise and normalise the 
British presence in Ireland. The success in fixing a particular ‘order of discourse’ 
(Fairclough, 2002; 2003) where a particular way of making meaning became 
dominant and alternative ways of making meaning are marginalised obviously 
impacted the British media narrative of the Northern Ireland conflict generally and the 
introduction of the broadcasting ban specifically.
Although these discursive practices have been discussed at length in this 
research, it is important to explain the social practices of journalism more generally to 
situate it in the social structure of the British capitalist system. It has been argued 
here that the British newspaper industry on the whole represented the broadcasting 
ban in a way that largely served the British elite, reflecting and refracting orders of 
discourse emanating from them. Sometimes journalists did this creatively to 
challenge the broadcasting ban and by extension, the British government, but mostly,
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they re-presented them in conventional ways amplifying the British government 
justifications and sometimes embellishing them in an attempt to build support for the 
broadcasting ban and the British government amongst British newspaper readers 
(Fairclough, 1994; 2003). Sometimes journalists allowed non-elite social actors to 
speak in newspaper articles, which allowed alternative discourses to be expressed 
against the broadcasting ban, but most excluded them and therefore their opposition.
Arguably, this is illustrative of conflict at two interconnected sites in the 
British social formation. The first is within the British media itself to which the 
British newspaper industry is an important part although not as important as the 
British broadcast media. This conflict is simultaneously between the British 
government and British media management as well as between British media 
management and British media workers. The second is between the British elite and 
the British public at large. The mass media is the most important battleground for 
ideological warfare and is essential for the maintenance of the status quo. The 
broadcast media is clearly seen to be the most influential part of the mass media as 
evidenced by it consistently being targeted by British government indirect and direct 
censorship during the Northern Ireland conflict.
Orthodox academics were central to normalising the suffocation of censorship 
in Britain. By focusing on the so-called symbiotic relationship between the mass 
media (meaning the British broadcast media, particularly television) and ‘terrorism’ 
(not that of British or Loyalist combatants, just that of Republican combatants), the 
orthodoxy prepared the ground for British government interference with the broadcast 
media. As a result, the British government was able to dominate media coverage of 
the Northern Ireland conflict by banning representatives of the Republican Movement 
from expressing themselves whilst representatives of the British government, who 
actually did have a symbiotic relationship with the British mass media could easily 
access the ‘oxygen of publicity’ on which they depended to promote their own 
perspective on the Northern Ireland conflict.
The pressure brought to bear on broadcast media executives and managers by 
the British government can be seen as a conflict waged over decades, which 
culminated in the broadcasting ban. This top-down pressure was met with bottom-up 
resistance from British broadcast media workers unwilling to have their working 
conditions and autonomy restricted by broadcast media executives and managers 
appeasing the British government. Sometimes this manifested in strike action as in
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the case of the banning of the Real Lives -  At the Edge o f the Union documentary and 
other times in critical investigative journalism that exposed British government 
duplicity as in the case of This Week -  Death on the Rock. Of course, while there was 
resistance from broadcast media workers, there were also many casualties in these 
battles with more than 70 programmes known to have been cut or delayed before the 
broadcasting ban was introduced in 1988 (Rolston, 2002).
The British newspaper industry had a very different relationship with the 
British government and as this research has illustrated, most newspapers supported 
the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Some were even willing to 
support censorship of their own profession when it was believed the British 
government ban would apply to the entire British media. There were a few important 
industrial disputes in the years leading up to 1988, which can help to explain the 
relative weakness of British print media workers by the time the British government 
introduced the broadcasting ban. Ten years before, there was a major industrial 
dispute between workers and management at The Times and The Sunday Times.
As Greenslade (2004: 329) writes, ‘the unions rightly pointed out that they 
were being paid less than their Fleet Street colleagues’. However, the owners of these 
newspapers, the Thomson dynasty, were happy to follow the example of James 
Callaghan’s Labour Government, which had introduced public sector pay freezes. 
Following disruptions to production by the newspaper workers at The Times and The 
Sunday Times, which included wild-cat strikes (MacBride, 2003), management ‘set 
the unions an ultimatum: they must agree a productivity deal by November or the 
papers would be shut down’ (Greenslade, 2004: 329).
Both sides stood firm and the newspapers we re closed for nearly a year, 
becoming part of the Winter of Discontent (1978-9), which contributed to the 
reactionary process of the British elite headed by Margaret Thatcher after she was 
elected to power in 1979. Two years later in 1981, contrary to anti-monopoly 
provisions and, therefore, presumably adding to Rupert Murdoch’s amazement of how 
easy it was for him to enter British newspapers, Margaret Thatcher allowed Rupert 
Murdoch to purchase The Times and The Sunday Times from the Thomson Company 
(Tunstall, 2004).55
Another important newspaper struggle between media workers and 
management occurred in 1984 when print workers refused to print attempts at 
smearing Arthur Scargill, the leader of the National Union of Miners (NUM), by the
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Sun editor, Kelvin MacKenzie. Although several attempts by MacKenzie to attack 
Arthur Scargill and, by extension, all the miners on strike, were resisted by print 
workers the most desperate and famous propaganda attempt was to represent Scargill 
as Hitler. As Greenslade (2004) recalls:
[Wjhile he was addressing a rally of strikers, a news agency photographer 
pictured him with his hand raised above his head. By deleting the 
background, and thereby removing the context, it could have been 
misconstrued as a fascist salute. Sun editor Kelvin MacKenzie schemed a 
front page around it with the headline ‘Mine Fuhrer’. Printers refused to work 
on the page, set the headline or make the block for the picture and, after 
another bitter row [...], the front page was published with a large typeface 
statement which said: ‘Members of all the Sun production chapels refused to 
handle the Arthur Scargill picture and our major headline on our lead story. 
The Sun decided reluctantly, to print the paper without either’. (Greenslade, 
2004: 455)
Rupert Murdoch’s move to Wapping in 1986 was also critical because it shifted the 
‘power and money away from the trade unionised labour force [to] owners, managers, 
and editors’ (Tunstall, 1996: 18). Just two years before the British government 
introduced the broadcasting ban, the print unions went on strike in Wapping. The 
subsequent defeat of the strikers broke the strength of the print workers, which 
increased Margaret Thatcher’s admiration for Rupert Murdoch (Tunstall, 2004).56 It 
also weakened the power of journalists because the impact of any future strike action 
they wished to take could be deflected by using news wire copy printed by the 
weakened print workers (Davies, 2008).
With all this in mind, it is apparent that British print media workers were in a 
weak position when the British government introduced the broadcasting ban in 1988. 
Although the majority of British newspaper owners and managers were supportive of 
the Conservative Party because of shared class interests, British journalists did not 
necessarily share this loyalty, but they had little power in their capacity as workers to 
challenge the ban. As texts reflect the balance of social forces at a given place and 
time, it is possible to see that the British elite (in this case, owners of newspapers and 
representatives of the British government) were clearly hegemonic then as now.
Centrifugal pressures obviously existed in society as illustrated by the 
alternative discourses expressed by representatives of the NUJ and the Campaign for 
Press and Broadcasting Freedom, Sinn Fein, the Troops Out Movement as well as
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individual socialist Labour MPs. However, centripetal pressures overwhelmingly 
dominated in the battle over the meaning of the broadcasting ban. Social actors 
challenging dominant discourses and the journalists actually producing the newspaper 
articles representing the ban, had to re-constitute already existing discourses 
expressed by the British government to justify the broadcasting ban, and did so 
against a backdrop of major attacks against trade unions by Margaret Thatcher.
Although there were some exceptions, journalists writing the newspaper 
articles representing the broadcasting ban mostly amplified dominant discourses 
supporting the British government introducing such censorship. Some journalists and 
one editor bravely challenged the worst form of censorship in Britain since World 
War II by subverting the order of discourses dominating British newspapers. Whilst it 
is important to highlight and celebrate these media workers defending media freedom, 
it is more important to recognise that these were exceptions to the rule.
Critical Discourse Analysis — discursive and social practices: summary
This chapter has explored the discursive and social practices impacting British 
newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. There were many structuring 
influences upon journalists during the period that the British government introduced 
and lifted the broadcasting ban. It has been argued here that before journalists even 
begin to compose their articles there is a nexus of interconnecting pressures impacting 
them. These originate from the generic conventions between and within newspapers 
for which they work as well as the political allegiances of newspapers owners and 
managers from which journalists cannot stray too far if they wish to keep their job.
The generic conventions of ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’ and ‘quality’ and political 
allegiances of newspapers reflect the attempts to appeal to different sections of the 
newspaper audience, which are divided along class lines. These structure important 
considerations for newspaper editors, which in turn impact journalistic choices such 
as what is newsworthy in the first place. This determines how much copy space is 
given to particular news stories and therefore impacts who is called on to speak in the 
newspaper articles. Generic conventions of newspaper articles also structure the 
discursive practices of journalism depending on whether it is news articles, editorials 
or op-eds that are being written. In this chapter, it has been argued that different 
political allegiances and text-genres of newspapers impact the discursive practices of
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journalists, structuring what can and cannot be said as well as how social events and 
social actors are framed and represented. Such discursive practices clearly impacted 
the way in which journalists represented the broadcasting ban.
This chapter also explored another crucial aspect of the discursive practices 
impacting journalists when writing news articles: the reliance on elite social actors as 
sources. The generic conventions of news articles dictate that journalist must remain 
‘objective’ and not express personal opinions on the subject they are writing about. 
As such, journalists inform their readers of new events by quoting a range of social 
actors who are relevant to the news story being reported. There are several 
explanations for journalists overwhelmingly relying on British elite sources for news 
articles representing the broadcasting ban.
One reason is because journalists are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with 
government and other powerful sources by the demand for a steady flow of news 
material that can be provided at little cost and in schedule with daily news demands. 
Another is relying on the House of Commons for a diversity of views, which will 
rarely provide critical opposition, but the main reason is because the British media is 
itself, like the House of Commons, an elite public sphere. This means journalists 
could only call on social actors who opposed the broadcasting ban within the 
parameters needed to maintain the status quo. This is illustrated by the social actors 
included and excluded in newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban, but 
also in the selective reported speech of those social actors included.
This chapter has acknowledged that without conducting audience research, it 
is impossible to know exactly how newspaper readers would have interpreted the 
newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban. However, it has been argued 
that some inferences can be made. Firstly, the knowledge of newspaper readers 
concerning the broadcasting ban would have depended on which newspaper 
individuals read because the frequency and size of broadcasting ban newspaper 
articles varied depending on whether newspapers were representative of the ‘popular’, 
‘mid-market’, or ‘quality’ newspaper markets.
Secondly, consuming newspaper articles is an active discursive practice in 
which newspaper readers interpret newspaper articles in different ways, sometimes 
accepting the dominant meaning encoded by the producer, sometimes concluding a 
negotiated meaning and sometimes an alternative one where the meaning is rejected 
and resisted. Thirdly, British public opinion polls conducted during the Northern
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Ireland conflict consistently revealed the majority of people were anti-war. This 
suggests that despite all the attempts by the British government to control the British 
media during the Northern Ireland conflict, the people of England, Scotland and 
Wales were not persuaded to support the Northern Ireland conflict. It is therefore 
possible that there was little support for the broadcasting ban amongst ordinary people 
despite overt support for it in many of the newspapers read by them.
Another crucial aspect impacting the production of British journalism was the 
social environment in which media workers had to operate during the Northern 
Ireland conflict. There were a number of controls over the British media ranging from 
the indirect pressure of the British government to the direct censorship of the British 
government’s broadcasting ban. Most of this pressure and censorship targeted the 
broadcast media, but print media workers were impacted by anti-terrorism legislation. 
That said, it appears British print media workers were more restricted by their 
working conditions rather than British government interference. When British 
broadcast media workers resisted the British government introducing the broadcasting 
ban, sympathetic print media workers were unable to show support in news articles. 
This is because the management of newspapers mostly supported the British 
government and therefore its censorship, but also because the generic conventions of 
news articles do not allow the personal opinions of journalists to be expressed. It was 
in op-eds that journalists upheld their professional commitments.
This chapter has also argued that the way in which journalists represented the 
British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban cannot be separated 
from the way in which they represented the Northern Ireland conflict more generally. 
This, in turn, cannot be separated from struggles within the British social formation. 
The mass media is the most important battleground for ideological warfare and is 
essential for the maintenance of the status quo. The broadcast media was clearly seen 
to be the most influential part of the mass media as evidenced by it consistently being 
fixated on by orthodox academics and, therefore, targeted by the British government 
during the Northern Ireland conflict. The pressure brought to bear on broadcast media 
executives and managers by the British government can be seen as a conflict waged 
over decades, culminating in the broadcasting ban. This top-down pressure was met 
with bottom-up resistance from British broadcast media workers unwilling to have 
their working conditions and autonomy restricted by broadcast media executives and 
managers appeasing the British government.
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In contrast, the British newspaper industry had a very different relationship 
with the British government with most newspapers supporting the British government 
introducing the broadcasting ban. Several important industrial disputes in the years 
leading up to 1988 can explain why British print media workers were in a weak 
position when the British government introduced the broadcasting ban in 1988. 
Although the majority of British newspaper owners and managers were supportive of 
the Conservative Party and therefore its censorship, British print media workers did 
not necessarily support the British government and its censorship, but they had little 
power to challenge it in their capacity as workers.
As texts reflect the balance of social forces at a given place and time, it is 
possible to see that the British elite were clearly hegemonic then as now. Although 
there were some exceptions, journalists mostly amplified dominant discourses 
supporting the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Whilst it is 
important to highlight and celebrate these media workers defending media freedom, it 
is more important to recognise that these were exceptions to the rule.
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Conclusion
The analysis of British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban in this 
research has led to three interrelated general conclusions about the British newspaper 
industry during the latter stages of the Northern Ireland conflict. Firstly, the British 
newspaper industry did not consider the broadcasting ban particularly newsworthy. 
Secondly, elite social actors and discourses dominated newspaper articles representing 
the broadcasting ban. Thirdly, the majority of British newspapers overtly supported 
the British government when it introduced and lifted the broadcasting ban.
More than double the number of newspaper articles representing the 
broadcasting ban were printed when the British government introduced the 
broadcasting ban in 1988 than when it lifted the ban in 1994. In addition, more than 
double of these broadcasting ban articles featured in newspapers representative of the 
‘quality’ press. This reveals the introduction of the broadcasting ban was considered 
more newsworthy than the lifting of it and more newsworthy in ‘quality’ newspapers 
than those representative of the ‘mid-market’ and ‘popular’ press. However, when the 
frequency of broadcasting ban newspaper articles are compared to other subjects 
related to the Northern Ireland conflict, it is possible to see how little coverage of the 
broadcasting ban there actually was in all British newspapers during both periods.
Understandably, the introduction of direct censorship was considered more 
newsworthy because it was a new policy pursued by the British government. It was 
also the first time since World War II that the British government had directly 
controlled the broadcast media although no journalists acknowledged that. However, 
another reason for this increased number of broadcasting ban articles during 1988 was 
that the British elite was divided on whether direct censorship was the best tactic for 
fighting the Republican Movement at the beginning, but united in opposition to this 
tactic by the end in 1994.
This relates to the second and third general conclusions because the British 
elite division in 1988 and unity in 1994 was reflected by journalists relying on elite 
social actors as sources for newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban. 
Although there were exceptions where journalists called on non-elite social actors to 
speak, in general, elite social actors dominated the discursive composition of 
newspapers. Unsurprisingly, this resulted in alternative discourses being stifled 
whereas dominant discourses proliferated. This conclusion also relates to the support
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for the ban amongst most of the British newspapers when the British government 
introduced the censorship because those that did were politically aligned with that 
section of the British elite: the Conservative Party. As this section of the British elite 
was lifting its own censorship in 1994, it is no surprise that the newspapers aligned 
with it supported the British government lifting the broadcasting ban too.
Aside from these three general conclusions regarding British newspaper 
representations of the broadcasting ban, there are further conclusions that can be 
drawn from this research. These can assist in explaining such representations and the 
role of the mass media in society more generally. The ban itself is indicative of two 
ideological propositions about the mass media, which originated from the British elite 
and their defenders in academia and the mass media itself. Firstly, that ‘terrorists’ 
thrive on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and, secondly, that the broadcast media actually 
supply it. In the case of the Northern Ireland conflict, suggesting the ‘terrorists’ (the 
Republican Movement) thrived on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and the broadcast media 
supplied it, functioned to build support for the suffocation of censorship in Britain.
When considering the symbiotic relationship between the mass media and 
‘terrorism’, it is important to explain the significant omissions by orthodox writers 
such as the fact that all social actors require the mass media to further their political 
objectives. Indeed, recognising that representatives of states and non-state 
organisations both need the media to further their objectives in a military conflict 
should be as obvious as recognising that both sides use language and violence to 
achieve them. However, orthodox scholars focus on the mass media dependence, 
propaganda and terrorism of ‘them’ and never ‘us’ because orthodox writers 
reproduce the ideological position of the government and military to which they 
personally and subjectively identify with.
In this research, it has been argued that both sides (‘them’ and ‘us’) in the 
Northern Ireland conflict depended on the media (the ‘oxygen of publicity’) and used 
violence against civilians (‘terrorism’). For academics, politicians and journalists to 
claim otherwise merely illustrates their role in the propaganda war. Crucial to this 
discursive aspect of the Northern Ireland conflict was representing the Republican 
Movement as ‘terrorists’ who thrived on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and representing 
the British broadcast media as providing them with an ‘easy platform’. Such claims 
were used to justify introducing the suffocation of censorship in the form of the 
broadcasting ban, which in turn ensured an advantage for the British government in
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the propaganda war. The direct censorship of the broadcasting ban was an extension 
of indirect media control that had already been operating for many decades in Britain. 
Both forms of media control were designed to bring the British broadcast media in 
line with the British government’s perspective on the Northern Ireland conflict.
Clearly, the mass media is itself a battleground because there are conflicts 
between media workers, employers and politicians in the production of news as well 
as struggles over interpretation of news content by media consumers. Although 
workers in both the British broadcast media and the British newspaper industry did 
attempt to resist the broadcasting ban, they could not match the strength of unity 
between the British government and the majority of British newspaper owners. 
Indeed, the struggle for meaning in the broadcasting ban newspaper articles 
representing this censorship was itself a refraction of the struggle between media 
workers and media owners, between those willing to defend the principle of media 
freedom, the right of freedom of expression and the right of the public to be informed 
versus those willing to defend the British government ending them.
Another conclusion of this research then, is that whilst there was evidence of 
resistance by media workers within the newspaper articles representing the 
broadcasting ban, overall the power of the British elite to dominate the discourse was 
more apparent. Media workers do not have control over their own labour even though 
they are essential to the production of media commodities such as newspapers. 
Instead, it is their employers and managers that largely control the editorial position of 
newspapers. Therefore, it would be unfair to blame journalists for newspaper content 
which reinforces and perpetuates the dominance of the British elite.
Responsibility for the erosion of media freedom in Britain during the Northern 
Ireland conflict ultimately rests with the British government representatives who 
pressured the British broadcast media indirectly, and legislated directly, the practice 
of censorship. Relying on the British newspaper industry to defend the British 
broadcast media from British government censorship is perhaps both an unfair and 
rather optimistic expectation. This is because newspaper owners are themselves 
members of the British elite and, in several cases, are opposed to the very existence of 
public service broadcasting due to a combination of political and economic reasons. 
That said, it does raise questions as to how notions of the ‘Fourth Estate’ need to be 
reassessed, especially when some ‘watchdogs on the powerful’ actually called for the 
censorship of themselves, not only their commercial rivals.
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Indeed, as the Leveson Inquiry investigates phone-hacking and other criminal 
activities at the now defunct News o f the World, some journalists, editors and others 
have warned against state regulation of the press as it could lead to an erosion of free 
speech and a free press. However, considering the record of the British newspaper 
industry during British government direct censorship of the broadcast media in the 
Northern Ireland conflict, the hypocrisy is evident. The broadcasting ban (1988-1994) 
eroded the free speech of democratically elected Sinn Fein representatives and 
prevented the British broadcast media from informing the public about the conflict. 
Yet, the majority of newspapers sampled in this research supported the British 
government introducing this direct censorship over the broadcast media.
They were not forced to support this censorship by the state, but the political 
and economic interests of the newspaper owners meant that they did. Some even 
supported direct censorship over the newspaper industry when it was believed the 
British government was going to introduce censorship across the entire British media. 
This reveals how opportunistic the British newspaper industry can be rather than 
illustrating its commitment to free speech and a free press. It also suggests the 
Leveson Inquiry may wish to ask how journalists can be committed to free speech, a 
free press and be watchdogs on the rich and powerful, when their employers are often 
more committed to their own private profit, which depends on the stability and 
dominance of the rich and powerful.
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Endnotes
1 An exception being Jempson (1993) who reviewed newspaper coverage o f the broadcasting ban the 
day after and the first Sunday after the British government introduced die ban.
2 Obviously it is not so clear cut and some within the artificially constructed ‘schools of thought’ will 
disagree on some aspects. Some writers may reject the labels o f ‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’ placed on 
them and their opinions here. However, this labelling is important for categorising and analysing 
opinions on the subject. The point is to recognise that political sympathies largely determine writers’ 
views on the subject o f ‘terrorism’ and its relationship with the mass media and that no position is 
‘objective’. Carruthers (2000) uses the phrase ‘orthodoxy’ to describe those expressing the 
conventional wisdom on the subject of the mass media and ‘terrorism’, but it has been taken further 
here in order to differentiate each writer between the orthodox and critical camps.
3 Burnett and Whyte (2005) discuss the ‘expert’ network that exists in ‘Western’ societies and pay 
particular attention to the Research And Develop ment (RAND) Corporation, which they note ‘is 
regarded as the single most important think tank for the US military’ (Burnett and Whyte, 2005: 8). It 
was also an employer for several in the Bush administration, including Condoleezza Rice and Donald 
Rumsfeld who were formerly administrators at RAND (Ibid.). Interestingly, it was actually Bruce 
Hoffman (the editor o f the RAND Corporation journal Studies in Conflict and Terrorism) who founded 
the Centre for Studies in Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University o f St Andrews, 
Edinburgh. The CSTPV was home to both Paul Wilkinson (former co-editor of the journal Terrorism 
and Political Violence and Chairman of the Advisory Board for CSTPV) and Alex P. Schmid (former 
co-editor o f Terrorism and Political Violence and Director of CSTPV (Ibid.) and epitomises the 
orthodox position on ‘terrorism’.
4 Nacos (1995; 2002) has mostly written about non-state organisations such as the Irish Republican 
Army, the Red Army Faction, the Red Brigades, Black September and A1 Qaeda as well as non-state 
individuals such as Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber.
5 Chomsky (1991) acknowledges that in large parts of the world, the US is regarded as a leading 
terrorist state and recalls the condemnation of the US by the World Court in 1986 for carrying out 
prolonged acts o f international terrorism against civilians in Nicaragua. At least one million Iraqi 
civilians have been killed by the US and Britain through a combination of sanctions, bombings, 
shootings and torture. Dennis Halliday, former United Nations (UN) coordinator o f humanitarian aid 
for Iraq, maintains that the 13 years o f sanctions alone killed around one million Iraqi civilians, mostly 
children (Lando, 2007). During the ‘war on terror’ thousands more Iraqi and Afghan civilians have 
been killed by US and British combatants (Rogers, 2008).
6 As Chomsky (2002: vii) explains: ‘St. Augustine tells the story o f a pirate captured by Alexander the 
Great, who asked him “how he dares molest the sea”. “How dare you molest the whole world?” the 
pirate replied: “Because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief; you, doing it with a great 
navy, are called an Emperor”. The pirate’s answer was “elegant and excellent,” St. Augustine relates. 
[...] St. Augustine’s tale illuminates the meaning o f the concept o f international terrorism in 
contemporary Western usage, and reaches to the heart of the frenzy over selected incidents o f terrorism 
currently being orchestrated, with supreme cynicism, as a cover for Western violence’.
7 Chomsky (2002) recalls the double standards involved when the US carried out international 
terrorism against Nicaraguan civilians by arming and funding the Contras in the 1980s and compares 
the different ways in which the US and Iran were treated in ‘Western’ political and media discourse: 
‘There are many terrorist states in the world, but the United States is unusual in that it 
is officially committed to international terrorism, and on a scale that puts its rivals to shame. Thus Iran 
is surely a terrorist state, as Western governments and media rightly proclaim. Its major known 
contribution to international terrorism was revealed during the Iran-Contra inquiries: namely, Iran's 
perhaps inadvertent involvement in the US proxy war against Nicaragua. This fact is unacceptable, 
therefore unnoticed, though the Iranian connection in US-directed international terrorism was exposed 
at a time o f impassioned denunciation o f Iranian terrorism’ (Chomsky, 2002: 122). In other words, the 
propagandists approach to terrorism dictated that when Iran was a threat to US government interests 
and held US embassy staff hostage, it was a terrorist state, but when the US government sold weapons 
to Iran to fund the US government’s proxy war against the Nicaraguan government, the US was not a 
terrorist state even though it killed civilians for political purposes and broke its own arms embargo 
against Iran (a state sponsor o f international terrorism according to the US government itself).
* Klopfenstein (2006: 107-8) defines new media as ‘those mediated forms o f communication that have 
diffused throughout society more recently than die traditional media o f newspapers, magazines, radio, 
and television’. The examples o f new media that he provides are ‘any Internet-based communication
219
medium (e.g., websites, streaming media, email, Internet telephony, chat rooms, Usenet groups, etc.), 
satellite telephony, and any other form of computer-mediated communication’ (Ibid.: 108-9).
9 A1 Qaeda is a militant Islamist organisation that emerged from the Afghan Mujahedeen fighters who 
resisted the 1979-89 Soviet Union invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Armed, trained and 
financed by the CIA (Operation Cyclone), MI6, and Inter-Service Intelligence (Pakistan’s intelligence 
agency) a large case o f blowback occurred on 11* September 2001 when A1 Qaeda attacked civilian 
and military targets in the US (Pilger, 2003; Saighal, 2003).
10 Ken Bigley was a British contractor working in Iraq who was kidnapped, held hostage and later 
beheaded in 2004 (Nunn and Biressi, 2008).
11 According to Carruthers (2000) Margaret Thatcher actually took the phrase from Britain’s then Chief 
Rabbi, Lord Jakobovits.
12 For a more recent discussion on news values see Richardson (2007).
13 Writers are divided on the extent o f the discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland. Darby 
(1976), Whyte (1983), Purdie (1990), Melaugh (1995) andGudgin (1999) give differing accounts.
14 Rolston (2007: 346) notes that ‘two television organizations [still] dominate in Northern Ireland: the 
publicly-funded British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and the commercial Independent Television. 
Both are British-based organizations and both have local stations: BBC Northern Ireland (established in 
1924) and Ulster Television (UTV, established in 1959) respectively’.
15 Cathcart (1984) believes Beadle’s absence during the General Strike brought about this proposition. 
The lesson the British government leamt in 1926 was that the BBC would serve the ‘national interest’ 
far better if the public perceived the BBC to be independent Hence, the subsequent Charter converting 
the BBC into a public service institution and Reith rebuffing Beadle’s recommendations.
16 It is worth noting how in contrast to the BBC, the commercially orientated and Unionist owned UTV 
that arrived in 1959 was actually less prejudiced, partly because it had to cater to as many people as 
possible so as to make the maximum revenue from advertisers, and partly because it was legally 
committed to pursuing a balanced and impartial approach under the Television Act (1954, 1964). As a 
result it sometimes gave a platform to Republicans on its news programmes (Schlesinger, 1987).
17 Obviously, this was an accurate statement at the time Schlesinger (1987) was writing, but within a 
year it was not because the British government had introduced the broadcasting ban (1988-1994).
18 The INLA used a car bomb to assassinate Margaret Thatcher’s campaign chief and shadow Secretary 
for Northern Ireland, Airey Neave on 31st March, 1979. He was killed as he left the Commons 
underground car park. Several months later, on 7* July, 1979, the late-night BBC1 current affairs 
program Tonight featured a twelve and a half minute interview with an anonymous member o f the 
INLA (Edgerton, 1996). Although the Tonight editor, Roger Bolton, had ‘rigorously followed the 
standardized “reference upwards” system o f internal editorial control at the BBC’ (Edgerton, 1996: 
117), the BBC was attacked by ‘scores o f Conservative MPs and much of the print journalist 
establishment, accusing it o f  providing a forum for terrorists’ (Edgerton, 1996: 118).
19 The BBC1 current affairs programme, Panorama, had filmed an IRA road block at the small village 
of Carrickmore, South Tyrone, as part o f a proposed programme on the strength o f the IRA, which as 
Schlesinger (1987: xviii) notes was ‘a virtually taboo area’. He adds that although the programme had 
not been transmitted, the British parliament and press whipped up a frenzy and the police seized the 
film. Curtis (1984) argues the BBC tightened up its ‘reference upwards’ system even more afterwards.
20 Hizbollah is a Lebanese political and paramilitary organisation that was created to resist the 1982 
Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation o f Lebanon.
21 Altogether there were over 2,000 BBC journalists and technicians on strike, which stopped most 
television and radio newscasts in Britain (Viera, 1991). Members o f the National Union of Journalists 
(NtTJ) at the BBC were also supported by other unions as well as by journalists at Independent 
Television News and Channel 4 News (Leapman, 1986; Viera, 1991).
22 It is interesting to note, as Miller (1994) does, that just like with Real Lives, it was the Rupert 
Murdoch media (this time The Sun and The Sunday Times), which ‘were consistently to the fore in the 
attacks on ‘Death on the Rock’ and the attempt to shore up the official version of the Gibraltar 
shootings’ (Miller, 1994: 26). This included the character assassination o f Carmen Proetta who was 
one of the key eye-witnesses to the murders in Gibraltar. The Sun claimed that Proetta used to be a 
prostitute, with one o f its headlines referring to her as: ‘The Tart o f Gib’ (see Miller, 1994). This was a 
complete fabrication. Although it was the Murdoch newspapers that led the smear campaign, other 
conservative British newspapers participated also (see Miller, 1994).
23 The eleven organizations covered by the broadcasting ban were the Irish Republican Army; the Irish 
National Liberation Army; Cumann Na Mban (IRA’s women’s movement); Na Fianna Eireann (IRA’s 
youth wing); Saor Eire; Sinn F6in; Republican Sinn Fein; as well as the Loyalist organizations such as
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the Red Hand Commandos; Ulster Freedom Fighters; Ulster Volunteer Force, and the Ulster Defence 
Association (Edgerton, 1996).
24 Bobby Sands was an elected MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone. Those refusing to admit local 
support for the Republican Movement claimed people voted for him out o f an emotional blackmail. 
The suggestion was that people only voted an IRA member into Parliament to prevent a young man’s 
death, but this did not explain why 100,000 people attended his funeral (Coogan, 2002).
25 On Is* October 1971, using Section 31 of the Broadcasting Authority Act 1960, the Minister for 
Posts and Telegraphs, Gerry Collins, issued a directive to the Irish national broadcasting service,
Raidio Teilifis Eireann (RTE). RTE was directed ‘to refrain from broadcasting any matter that could 
be calculated to promote the aims and activities o f any organisation which engages in, encourages or 
advocates the attaining o f any particular objective by violent means’ (cited in Fisher, 1987: 33). The 
vagueness o f the directive led the RTE Authority to ask for clarification from the Irish government, but 
the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs refused. After several disputes regarding coverage of the 
Northern Ireland conflict in 1972, including an RTE interview with Se&n Mac Stioftin, then chief-of- 
staff o f the Provisional IRA (Maillot, 2005), Gerry Collins dismissed the entire RTE Authority and 
appointed another in its place (Fisher, 1987). Another directive was issued in October 1976, which 
banned broadcasts or reports of interviews with members of a number o f republican organisations and 
o f organisations proscribed in Northern Ireland by the British government (Arthur, 1987).
26 Miller (1990) explains that in the Irish Republic the broadcast of interviews and reports of interviews 
with listed organisations were banned. It also prohibited Party Political Broadcasts, election coverage 
and reporting debates in the Houses o f Parliament, which the British Ban did not, although it did 
prohibit reporting debates in the European Parliament. Miller (1990) also points out the one area where 
the British censorship was stricter than the Irish censorship: the ban on historical footage of listed 
organisations, which was prohibited under the former, but not the latter.
27 It is important to acknowledge that most of these Sinn Fein appearances were on news stories 
concerning violence and law enforcement rather than politics. The research conducted by Henderson et 
al. (1990) found that in the year before the broadcasting ban was introduced, 84 o f the 93 British TV 
news stories in which Sinn F6in appeared were about violence. The same was true in the year after the 
ban was introduced, with 20 o f the 34 Sinn F6in appearances being about violence.
28 Spencer (2004: 604) explains the significance and power o f television news in more detail: ‘First, 
television news performs an expansive role in peace politics by broadcasting to all audiences at once. 
This makes it a valuable mechanism in the communication o f change and highlights why, as a medium, 
it has useful implications for participants seeking to talk with opponents and their respective 
constituencies by indirect means. Second, television news has the potential to facilitate diplomacy and 
force movement in ways that are unattainable behind closed doors away from public scrutiny, and 
where intransigence might be less easily challenged. Third, the emotional and dramatic emphasis o f 
television has a tendency to simplify and exaggerate problems in ways that can both directly and 
indirectly affect the flow o f communications. And, fourth, the ability o f television reporting to function 
instantaneously creates expectations for action which can pressure politicians to react and respond 
quickly, therefore speeding up the process o f interaction and dialogue’.
A mention o f the Northern Ireland conflict or a Northern Ireland social actor in a story about 
something else was not collected.
30 Op-ed is an abbreviation for the pages opposite the editorial, not opinion editorial. For an interesting 
brief history o f this newspaper article genre see Wahl-Jorgensen (2008).
31 See Appendix for the final coding sheet used to analyse each newspaper article.
32 For example, the Daily Mail dedicated eleven full pages o f its newspaper coverage to Tim Parry a 
day"after the British government lifted the broadcasting ban, including many photos of him and 
excerpts from the diary in which his father documented the child’s life and death.
33 This became law with the Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act 1989, but it was first proposed 
by the British government in October 1988.
When Fairclough (2003: 3) introduces his key terminology, he explains ‘[wjritten and printed texts 
such as shopping lists and newspaper articles are ‘texts’, but so also are transcripts o f (spoken) 
conversations and interviews, as well as television programmes and web-pages’. Essentially ‘texts’ 
refer to anything that cany meaning and textual analysis simply means the analysis o f them.
33 VoloSinov and Bakhtin are often discussed together because, firstly, they were both intellectuals in 
what became known as the Bakhtin Circle (Brandist, 2002) and, secondly, there is disagreement as to 
whether or not some o f the publications attributed to VoloSinov are indeed Bakhtin’s work (Clark and 
Holquist, 1994). For the purpose o f clarity, such authors are cited here in the same way as they are 
attributed to particular publications.
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36 It has been pointed out (Meyer, 2002; Wetherell, 2004; Blommaert, 2005) that several debates took 
place between supporters and detractors o f CDA in the 1990s. The first exchange was between 
Widdowson (1995) and Fairclough (1996), the second was between Schegloff (1997) and Wetherell 
(1998) and the third was between Schegloff (1999a; 1999b) and Billig (1999a; 1999b), which began 
after Billig (1999a) reviewed Schegloff s (1997) criticisms.
37 This is predictable for two interconnected reasons. Firstly, the British elite were divided over whether 
the broadcasting ban was the best strategy for stopping the Republican Movement as a physical and 
political force when the British government introduced the ban, but were united in their opposition to it 
by the time the British government lifted it. Secondly, the British government’s introduction of the 
broadcasting ban was far more newsworthy because of the element o f surprise for opposition 
politicians and media workers alike. Both aspects created more controversy and therefore more 
newspaper articles reflecting this.
38 Although there were many more references to the broadcasting ban in ‘Peace Process’ articles, it is 
important to recognise that this category differs from the rest. As it alludes to, this category refers to a 
‘process’ and therefore has many more articles than any of the other coding categories, which refer to 
more specific aspects o f the Northern Ireland conflict. That said, the lifting o f the broadcasting ban 
was also a key part o f the Peace Process because doing so acknowledged Sinn Fein was a legitimate 
political party that should be a part o f the solution to the Northern Ireland conflict.
39 Most o f these ‘Other’ articles concerned the British government’s decision to end the right o f silence 
of suspects in Northern Ireland, introduced on 20 October, 1988 (the day after the ban was 
introduced). This change in the law was designed to persuade members of proscribed organisations in 
Northern Ireland to give information about the activities of fellow members and their organisation more 
generally. If they did not, their silence could now be taken into account at trial, resulting in 
assumptions o f guilt and therefore longer prison sentences. There is clearly a relation between 
introducing the broadcasting ban and ending the right to silence because the British government hoped 
such measures would give it an advantage in the Northern Ireland conflict, helping it to defeat the 
Republican Movement. As such, there is a clear explanation as to why the broadcasting ban was 
referred to in many newspaper articles covering the ending of suspects’ right to silence, which were 
coded as ‘Other’ because there were less than twenty articles with this subject being the main story.
40 There are several ways in which this data can be interpreted because o f the subjective clustering of 
page numbers, which have differing ranges. Most importantly, if the data for ‘front page lead’ and 
‘front page other’ where combined to simply ‘front page’ there would be 16 ban articles that appeared 
on the front page. This would mean there were more occurrences of broadcasting ban articles on the 
front page than there were on page 21+, which is very significant in terms o f prominence. Therefore, 
although there were not many newspaper articles that focused on the broadcasting ban and few had 
corresponding images, the prominence o f ban articles in terms o f page number was high. However, 
there is a big difference between newspaper articles that lead the front page and those that appear on 
the front page, but do not lead. Newspaper articles that lead the front page are always much bigger and 
therefore prominent because it is the lead front page that is supposed to sell the newspaper. The front 
page lead image and headline act as the entry point for the whole newspaper (Tattersall, 2008). Non­
leading front page articles are usually dwarfed by lead stories and are usually continued in the rest of 
the newspaper on less prominent pages.
41 This encompassed a referendum on any changes to Northern Ireland resulting from Peace Process 
talks, mainly to reassure Unionist politicians and voters as well as Loyalist combatants.
42 These pejorative labels appeared in the following newspaper articles: Daily Mail, DEPRIVE 
TERROR OF THIS MEGAPHONE, 17.10.88; Daily Mail, MAGGIE TO STARVE IRA OF 
PUBLICITY, 17.10.88; Daily Mail, HURD TO WIPE ADAMS OFF TV SCREEN, 19.10.88; Daily 
Express, KING SET TO CURB REPORTS ON IRA, 17.10.88; Daily Express, CLOSING DOWN 
THE ENEMY MOUTHPIECE, 20.10.88; Daily Express, A SILLY STRIKE, 28.10.88.
43 As Wilkinson (1977) pointed out over a decade before the British government introduced the 
broadcasting ban, the Irish government had used Section 31 o f the Broadcasting Authority Act (1960) 
since ‘1972 to ban the state radio and television service (RTE) from carrying interviews with 
Provisional or Official I.R.A. spokesmen and sympathisers’ (Wilkinson, 1977: 168). From October 
1976, the Irish broadcasting ban was ‘extended to cover interviews or reports o f interviews with 
member o f the political wing o f the Provisional I.R.A., the Provisional Sinn Fein, or members o f any 
organisation proscribed in Northern Ireland’ (Ibid.). This included Loyalist organisations such as the 
Red Hand Commandos; Ulster Freedom Fighters; Ulster Volunteer Force, and the Ulster Defence 
Association (Edgerton, 1996).
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44 In 1987, New Statesmen journalist, Duncan Campbell, exposed British government plans to launch a 
spy satellite into space -  the Zircon Project -  when working on a six-part documentary series for the 
BBC called Secret Societies (Eldridge, 1995; Franklin, 2004; Green and Karolides, 2005). In response, 
the British government ordered Special Branch to raid Campbell’s home as well as the New Statesmen 
offices in London and the BBC offices in Glasgow (Ibid.). The raid at BBC Scotland lasted for 28 
hours and resulted in the removal of private files and programme notes (Ibid.). The documentary was 
screened two months later on BBC, but another part in the series exposing the operation of secret 
cabinet committees was censored by the BBC but later re-made by Channel 4 (Eldridge, 1995).
45 In 1988, former British MI5 Agent, Peter Wright, revealed in his auto-biography -  Spycatcher -  that 
MI6 had tried to assassinate Egyptian Prime Minister Gamar Abdel Nasser and that MI5 had 
collaborated with the CIA in spreading disinformation about British Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
being a Soviet agent (Human Rights Watch, 1991). The British government banned the book and 
attempted to censor British newspapers from covering the story, which many journalists boldly refused 
to accept. In October 1990, die European Commission on Human Rights held that the gagging orders 
against seven British newspapers in the Spycatcher case violated the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Ibid.).
46 The Daily Mail, for example, recognised that both the BBC and ITN broadcast statements from 
Geny Adams (Daily Mail, TV AND RADIO IN ROW OVER GAG ON THE IRA, 20.10.88). The 
Daily Express, however, like The Sun, chose to exclude ITN’s broadcast and only focus on the BBC’s 
‘irresponsibility’ (Daily Express, ROW AS BBC FLOUT HURD TERROR BAN, 20.10.88).
47 As Negrine (1994: 106) observes: ‘the Conservative Party’s obsession with the alleged excesses of 
the BBC is legendary; abhorrence of the BBC appears to be a litmus test for the Conservativeness of 
MPs’. This is largely because the BBC is a successful state institution, which contradicts Conservative 
beliefs about the free market system being the best way of running all aspects o f society.
48 This discourse was categorised as ‘Other’ in Chapter 4 because it was expressed very rarely 
amounting to less than 1% of the total discourses during the period covering the British government 
introducing the broadcasting ban.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 The Troops Out Movement (TOM) was founded in London by Irish solidarity activists in 1973 with 
two demands: ‘British Troops Out o f Ireland’ and ‘Self Determination for the Irish People as a Whole’ 
(TOM, 2010).
52 McNair (2003: 160) acknowledges the origins o f the The Lobby System and explains why it is 
labelled as such: ‘The Lobby was established in 1884 as a means o f enabling parliamentary 
correspondents to gain access to authoritative information about political events and governmental 
business. [This system is called The Lobby] because journalists originally assembled in the lobby of the 
House o f Commons, the system was institutionalised in 1921 and persists to the present day’.
53 This is also true o f most British journalists being based in London rather than Belfast.
54 An opinion poll commissioned by the BBC found that in 2010, 65% of respondents thought the war 
in Afghanistan was unwinnable and 63% wanted all British forces to be withdrawn from Afghanistan 
as quickly as possible (BBC, 2010).
55 Speaking in 1973, four years after acquiring the Daily Herald, which he renamed as The Sun, Rupert 
Murdoch said ‘I am constantly amazed at the ease in which I entered British newspapers’ (cited in 
Chippindale and Horrie, 1999: 10).
56 Rupert Murdoch was rewarded for his service to the British government four years later. Following 
the 1990 Broadcasting Act, which was officially designed to stem the corporate concentration of the 
British media, Thatcher allowed Murdoch’s non-UK (as the Astra satellite was based in Luxembourg) 
Sky to take over the British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB), which became BSkyB (Tunstall, 2004). This 
resulted in Murdoch becoming ‘not only the biggest owner o f national newspapers, but the chief owner 
o f the sole direct satellite television platform and also the dominant supplier o f premium content to 
cable television across Britain’ (Tunstall, 2004: 264).
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Appendix -  Final coding sheet
1. Identifier Number: _____________ .
2. Newspaper: Sun Mirror Mail Express Guardian Telegraph
3. Image: Yes No
4. Date: / /______ .
5. Page: front page lead front page other pages 2-3 pages 4-10 pages 11-20 pages 21+
6. Size of text: < 1/8 of a page 1/8 to V* lA to Vi Vi to 1 page
7. Genre: news editorial op-ed
8. Mention of the broadcasting ban: Yes No
9. Subject:
1) IRA members killed by SAS in Gibraltar/inquiry
2) British soldier(s)/RUC/prison officer(s) attacked/killed by IRA members)
3) Civilian(s) attacked/killed by IRA member(s)/anniversary of
4) Civilian(s) attacked/killed by UDA/UFF/UVF members)
5) IRA suspect(s)/member(s) arrest, imprisonment, release, extradition, prisoner controversy
6) Tom King assassination plot/trial
7) Fourth anniversary of Brighton bombing/Conservative Party returns to Grand Hotel
8) Broadcasting Ban
9) Peace Process
10) Other
